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Dansk Resume 
 
Truslen om cyber-angreb fortsætter med at vokse og forstyrre 
globale forsyningskæder. Denne trussel kan potentielt skade eller 
fuldstændig standse den daglige operation og dermed påvirke 
forretningens resultater og omdømme negativt. Derudover kan 
cyber-angreb potentielt resultere i langsigtede juridiske 
konsekvenser. Som følge heraf er der udgivet påfaldende lidt 
materiale om konsekvenserne af cyber-angreb. Virksomheders 
forsyningskæder fortsætter med at forberede sig på cyber-angreb 
gennem en blanding af traditionelle risiko- og resilience-
frameworks for at beskytte deres netværk gennem patches, 
firewalls og antivirus eller gennem økonomiske forsikringer. 
Disse tilgange har dog ikke ført til de ønskede resultater, hvilket 
afspejles i den stadige stigning i forstyrrelser fra cyber-angreb. 
Denne afhandling undersøger og foreslår værktøjer til styring 
af cyber-risici i forsyningskæden gennem en analyse, der følger 
tre overordnede trin. I trin 1 udføres et systematisk litteraturstudie 
for at analysere eksisterende viden om forsyningskæders cyber-
resilience og identificere mangler i litteraturen. To væsentlige 
mangler i den eksisterende litteratur behandles i detaljer: 1) 
behovet for at forstå de særlige karakteristika for cyber-risici samt 
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hvordan disse karakteristika differentierer sig fra andre risici i 
forsyningskæden i forhold til effektiv risikostyring og 2) 
anvendelsen af systemtænkning til at behandle aspekter af 
silotænkning, statisk fokus og afhængigheden af historiske data til 
håndteringen af cyber-risici og cyber-resilience i 
forsyningskæden. I trin 2 undersøges førstnævnte mangel i 
litteraturen ved at identificere de særlige karakteristika ved cyber-
risici ud fra rapporter om cyber-angreb. Slutteligt anvendes i trin 
3 metoder fra systemtænkning i casestudier for at vurdere 
anvendeligheden af disse metoder i forhold til at adressere silo-
tænkning, dynamik og historisk afhængighed for bedre at kunne 
håndtere cyber-risici og cyber-resilience. 
Resultaterne af forskningen fordeler sig på tre hovedområder. 
For det første afslører undersøgelsen relevante mangler i de 
traditionelle metoder til styringen af cyber-risici, eksempelvis i 
forhold til at tage højde for dynamisk adfærd, utilstrækkelig eller 
vanskelig rapportering af hændelser, afhængigheden af historiske 
data til håndtering af ukendte eller nye angreb, samt en anvendt 
silo-tilgang til at håndtere et tværfagligt problem. For det andet 
identificeres relevante forskelle mellem cyber-risici og andre 
risici i forsyningskæden, som eksempelvis evnen til ikke at blive 
opdaget, den høje reproducerbarhed, evnen til at påvirke 
forskellige geografiske placeringer samtidig, og kompleksiteten af 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 8 of 620 
cyber-angreb. Endelig afslører undersøgelsen at anvendelsen af 
metoder baseret på systemtænkning til at styre cyber-risici 
samtidig adresserer mangler i traditionelle metoder og giver 
grundlag for at tænke på cyber-risici som resultatet af 
ufuldstændige krav til design af forsyningskæder frem for at 
tænke på cyber-risici som en ydre trussel. Denne ændring i fokus 
giver forsyningskæder muligheden for at minimere tab ved at 
forberede systemet til at reagere på hvilken som helst cyber-risiko, 
der måtte føre til driftsforstyrrelser. 
Resultaterne af denne forskning har både forskningsmæssige 
og praktiske implikationer. Ud fra et forretningsmæssigt 
perspektiv kan forsyningskæder drage fordel af at designe den 
adfærd, de har behov for gennem tværfaglige, 
simuleringsbaserede teknikker. Set fra et akademisk perspektiv vil 
forskere kunne drage fordel af 1) justering af rapporteringstider 
for at matche den hurtige udviklingscyklus for cyber-angreb, 2) 
konsolidering af et tværfagligt forskningsfællesskab inden for 
cyber-risiko og cyber-resilience, og 3) udvidelse af eksisterende 
forskningsmetoder ved at integrere dynamisk systemtænkning i 
dataindsamling og analyse.  
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Summary 
 
The threat of cyber-attacks continues to grow and disrupt 
global supply chains, exposing companies to disruptions that 
severely affect or completely halt normal operations. This impacts 
business performance negatively through the company’s bottom 
line and reputation, even resulting in long-term legal 
ramifications. As a result, little information about attacks and their 
consequences is published. Supply chains continue to prepare for 
cyber-attacks through a mix of traditional risk and resilience 
frameworks, protecting their networks through patches, firewalls 
and antiviruses, or financially through insurance. Yet these 
approaches are not giving the expected results, as reflected by the 
steady increase in disruptions from cyber-attacks. 
This thesis investigates and proposes tools for managing cyber-
risks in the supply chain, derived from an analysis that follows 
three main steps. In step one, existing knowledge about supply 
chain cyber-resilience is analysed through a systematic literature 
review, and gaps are identified. Two of the identified gaps are 
addressed in detail, 1) insufficient understanding of the particular 
characteristics cyber-risks and how these compare to other supply 
chain risks for effective risk management, and 2) insufficient 
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address by current methods to aspects of compartmentalization, 
static focus and history-dependence in the management of supply 
chain cyber-risk and cyber-resilience. Step two of this thesis 
explores the first gap by identifying the particular characteristics 
of cyber-risks from cyber-attack report data. Finally in step three 
methods based on systems thinking are applied to case studies to 
evaluate the degree to which these methods address 
compartmentalization, dynamics and history dependency in their 
application to the management of cyber-risk and cyber-resilience. 
The findings of the research are in three main domains. First, 
the research reveals relevant gaps in the traditional methods 
available for the management of cyber risks, in areas such as their 
consideration of dynamic behaviour, inadequate or difficult 
reporting of events, their dependence on historical data to manage 
unknown or new attacks, and a silo-approach for managing a 
problem that is cross-disciplinary. Second, relevant differences 
between cyber-risks and other supply chain risks are identified, in 
areas such as the capacity of disruptions from cyber risks to go 
undetected, the high reproduction fidelity of cyber-risks, the 
capacity of cyber risks to affect different geographical locations 
simultaneously, and the complexity of cyber-attacks. Finally, the 
research reveals that the novel use of methods based in systems 
thinking for managing cyber-risks at the same time address gaps 
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found in traditional methods, and provide a foundation for 
thinking about cyber-risks not as an outside threat, but rather as 
the result of incomplete requirements to the supply chain design. 
This change in focus could allow supply chains to minimize losses 
by preparing the system for reaction to whatever cyber-risk leads 
to an operational disruption. 
The findings of the research have both industrial implications. 
The industrial implications suggest supply chains can benefit from 
designing the behaviours they require through cross-disciplinary, 
simulation-based techniques. The academic implications suggest 
that researchers will benefit from 1) adjusting reporting times to 
match the quick development cycle of cyber-attacks, 2) 
consolidating a cross-disciplinary cyber-risk and resilience 
research community, and 3) expanding existing research methods 
by integrating dynamic systems thinking into data gathering and 
analysis 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter starts by outlining the industrial context 
surrounding this study and the factors that motivate this research. 
Thereafter the chapter derives the main research question from 
these motivating factors, and the initial research sub-questions 
that guide the literature review in the next chapter. This chapter 
then introduces some key terms that are used throughout this work 
and ends by presenting a brief outline of the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Research motivation 
There has been an undisputed increase in the use of Information 
Technology (IT) in supply chains, with several indications that 
this trend is likely to continue (Da et al., 2014; Stevens et al., 2016; 
Gunasekaran et al., 2017). An effective response to market 
expectations requires activities that would be difficult or 
unfeasible to perform without the integration of IT systems to 
supply chain operations, for example: 
• A detailed plan, control and record of company activities, 
whereby an ERP system (enterprise resource planning) is 
used to provide consistent access to real-time information 
throughout the organization. For example, a sports shoe 
manufacturer, upon receiving an order, uses an ERP system 
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to confirm product price, applicable customer discounts and 
credit history. At the same time, the order is filled from 
different locations simultaneously, the invoice is printed in 
any language the customer may require, the need for 
additional manufacturing workforce is identified, additional 
raw materials are scheduled, and successful product lines 
are identified for promotion (Edmondson et al., 1997), 
• Supply chain analytics systems, whereby massive amounts 
of ever-changing data is analysed and interpreted. For 
example, after the September 11 New York attacks, Dell 
used its analytics systems to determine where supplies 
might be disrupted, increasing overseas production to 
mitigate anticipated shortages. At the same time, more 
efficient product configurations were identified to influence 
customers accordingly (Rocks et al., 2001), 
• Real-time inventory position monitoring, whereby 
replenishment or real-time pricing can be controlled. For 
example, as Pepsi inventory in vending machines is 
depleted, the price per can is increased and the 
replenishment and procurement times are decreased 
(Webster, 2009), 
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The introduction of software into physical operations has 
allowed complex highly interactive and coupled processes to 
emerge, and it has been argued that “programmable electronic 
systems have not introduced new forms of error, but by increasing 
the complexity of the processes that can be controlled, have 
increased the scope of the introduction of conventional error” 
(Kletz, 1988). 
Yet, at the same time, there has been an increase in the number 
of breaches that exploit this IT infrastructure causing behaviours 
for which it was not designed. It appears that the technology that 
allows a digital connectivity essential for activities society did not 
think possible before, is also the same infrastructure that is giving 
way to disruptions in the physical world (Webster, 2009, p.18), a 
phenomenon that is increasingly being identified as the supply 
chain’s “cyber-risks” (Goldman, 2010). 
The prefix “cyber” is used to “describe a person, thing or idea 
as part of the computer and information age” (Boyson, 2014), so 
in the context of this thesis and consistent with extant published 
literature (Warren et al., 2000; Hult et al., 2014), this term 
indicates a person, thing or idea where digital transmission and/or 
storage of information is involved. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 34 of 620 
In recent years, disruptions in the form of cyber-attacks to 
industrial organizations have affected national financial systems 
(Richards, 2014), electric power grids (Poulsen, 2009), nuclear 
facilities (Kushner, 2013), the movie and entertainment industry 
(Allen, 2014), and the retail industry (Reuters, 2014a) to name a 
few, making cyber-attacks a threat for many areas of the economy. 
As an example, foreign agents, by making use of the existing IT 
infrastructure, have even been able, remotely and anonymously, 
to render inoperable and tilt a floating oil rig, and delete records 
of containers at destination ports for the purpose of smuggling 
drugs (Reuters, 2014b). 
The implications of a cyber-attack on the physical world 
reached an unprecedented level with the discovery of the Stuxnet 
attack on a nuclear enrichment facility located in Natanz, Iran. The 
foreign software that was found in the control systems of uranium 
enrichment plants was like nothing that had been seen before. It 
“tricked” the system into making its own equipment collapse. 
The type of software to which Stuxnet belong are known as 
“worms”, and have the ability to replicate without any external 
triggers. Stuxnet was highly specialized in as it used different 
stolen (and therefore fraudulent) identity certificates, and what 
was more striking, it used six “zero-day” exploits. A zero-day 
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exploit is a programming flaw that is first discovered by the user 
and the software manufacturer when it is exploited, i.e., used for 
the benefit of a foreign or unauthorized agent. As a reference, a 
computer virus would need just one “zero-day” exploit to be 
effective. Some computer viruses cause damage without the use 
of a “zero-day” exploit, as these are difficult to find, and as soon 
as they are detected, they are usually solved by through an update 
notification by the software manufacturer. 
Stuxnet affected the control of an important piece of equipment 
in the process of uranium enrichment, called a centrifuge. Without 
getting into details of the enrichment process itself, it suffices to 
clarify that the centrifuge is a central component in the enrichment 
of uranium, and is an equipment that is required to spin at 
extremely high speeds, in the range of 100.000 revolutions per 
minute, an equivalent of 1600 spins every second. Controlling this 
speed is crucial both for maintaining a correct enrichment process, 
as well as for prolonging the life of the centrifuge, and since an 
enrichment facilities have over 8.000 centrifuges functioning at 
the same time, this is achieved through an automated control 
system (known as SCADA or Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition system) that has pre-programmed actions in case the 
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speeds are below or above safe operating speeds, known as 
operating thresholds. 
Researchers found that Stuxnet obstructed the correct 
communication of the speed signal from the centrifuges to the 
SCADA: by passing an incorrect signal to the automatic controller 
of speeds below the required threshold, it caused the centrifuges 
to spin to speeds that eventually damaged them. 
This iconic case brought several points to the public agenda.  
• First, it became apparent that there are ways of severely 
affecting the physical world with software.  
• Second, there are concerted efforts being made by groups 
with high technical know-how to disrupt operations through 
malicious software: the level of sophistication discovered in 
Stuxnet, suggested that it was not the creation of a lone 
programmer in his basement, but it required rather the 
effort, according to experts, of a team of at least 20 
dedicated programmers over a period of at least six months.  
• Third, there are little, if any, incentives to disclose when an 
attack had happened. Up to date, the Stuxnet cyber-attack 
has not been recognized by the Natanz uranium enrichment 
centre. It was rather detected via indirect information, in 
this case, the unusual replacement rate of centrifuges which 
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was being experienced in Natanz, as the trading of 
centrifuges for nuclear enrichment is monitored by 
international organizations such as the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). Typically the replacement rate 
would be about 10% due to material damages or worker 
errors, yet during the time of the Stuxnet attacks, the 
replacement rose to as much as 25% (Zetter, 2014, p.3).  
• Fourth, attacks might have been started long before they are 
detected. It has been estimated that Stuxnet had been in 
circulation and testing for at least five years before it was 
discovered in 2010.  
• Fifth, there is an underground market of “zero-day” 
exploits, and in the black market, these can sell for as high 
as US$ 50.000 each. This has only been increased by the 
public disclosure of hacking tools through sites such as 
Wiki-Leaks.  
• Sixth, malware can be advanced and built upon to create 
different varieties, as different varieties of Stuxnet have 
been identified since 2010, and it is as yet unclear if these 
are intermediate steps towards the final version that was 
discovered at Natanz or just simplified versions for other 
purposes.  
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• Seventh, even after years of expert decoding and analysis of 
the software that was found, there are still several 
unknowns. For example, the Stuxnet virus had the “turn 
off” date of 24 June 2012, the choice of the date unclear. 
This was not the first case of digital sabotage, and there had 
been stories of the CIA implanting malicious software to sabotage 
the valves in a Russian pipeline as far back as 1982, presented at 
the time as a win-win situation, as even if it was discovered, the 
Russians would permanently be suspicious of digital technology 
from the west being described as “a mission that would be 
successful even if compromised” (Zetter, 2014, p.197). 
With widely available technology, and connectivity through 
the internet, cyber-crime has become a widespread phenomenon. 
Despite underreporting being likely (Herrington et al., 2013; 
Onyeji et al., 2014), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3) received 269.422 
complaints in 2014 with overall complaints reporting losses of 
over US$ 800 million, corresponding to 46% of the complaints 
(IC3, 2017). 
As a recent example, the “Wannacry” attack in May 2017 
targeted computers of over 74 countries all over the world (Wong 
et al., 2017), taking data hostage until US$ 300 was paid to the 
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attackers. A solution to the continued spread of the attack was 
found only by chance. As an example of the effects, this attack 
affected as many as 70.000 devices in the national health system 
in the UK including computers, MRI scanners, blood storage 
refrigerators and operating theatre-equipment, forcing the 
cancellation of non-critical procedures, the turning away of non-
critical emergencies, and the diverting of ambulances to other 
parts of the system (Foxx, 2017). This obtained substantive media 
coverage and has brought back the phenomenon of cyber-attacks 
to the forefront of public opinion.  
The later “Petya” cyber-attack in June 2017, barely a month 
later, used a similar attack technique as Wannacry, and apparently 
build on the effectiveness of the attack, as no solution to its spread 
between computers was found, and an analysis of the virus code 
showed that even if the ransom was paid, the data would not be 
recovered (BBC, 2017). The only short-term solution that was 
found to prevent the data from being encrypted, was by shutting 
down the affected device if an unexplained restart was being 
experienced. Additionally, the email to which the ransom 
payments had to be confirmed was closed down by the hosting 
server, and thus no payments to the attackers were possible. 
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An example of the consequences of the Petya attack is the 
effects it had on the operations of the Danish shipping company 
A.P. Moller-Maersk, indicated at the time as one of the biggest 
disruptions to ever hit global shipping (Reuters, 2017). Petya 
caused the interruption of Maersk-run port operations in places 
such as Spain, the Netherlands, India and the United States, 
costing the company as much as US$ 300 million in lost revenue 
(Maersk, 2017). The society’s infrastructure has never been as 
dependent as it is today on cyber activities working, yet, it has 
been argued that “it is no longer a question whether an 
organization will be successfully hacked, but how long it will take 
to detect” (Hult et al., 2014). 
Cyber-attacks can cause considerable economic costs to the 
target companies and, in many cases, these costs and 
consequences are not noticed until after the damage has been 
done. Over one-third of companies that were affected by a cyber-
attack in 2016, experienced a revenue loss of over 20% (Cisco 
2017) and informed estimates report a 27,4 % yearly increase in 
the number of breaches from cyber-risks in 2017, costing 
organizations, on average, US$ 11.7 million (Richards et al., 
2017). The likely annual costs from cyber-crimes anywhere from 
US$ 375 billion to US$ 575 billion in losses (Security & Mcafee, 
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2014). Furthermore, supply chain disruptions can, on average, 
reduce shareholder value by 7%, with effects even before formal 
announcements are made to the market by the affected company 
(WEF, 2013). 
This is compounded by the increasing complexity of global 
supply chains, the speed and connectivity of operations required 
by companies to stay competitive, the growing skill of cyber-
attackers to find novel ways of accessing crucial data (Reuters, 
2012), and the limited information and tools available to manage 
these threats. This requires organizations to respond to cyber-
attacks with increasing velocity and effectiveness, thus be more 
resilient, before their supply chains collapse during a cyber-attack. 
However, little is known about the methods for managing the 
resilience to cyber-attacks (i.e., cyber-resilience) in the supply 
chain. 
There has been a lack of managerial action to acknowledge the 
relevance of the problem and find solutions (Burnson, 2013; 
Deloitte, 2012, 2013). It has been stated that “only a few CEOs 
realize that the real cost of cybercrime stems from delayed or lost 
technological innovation” (Bailey et al., 2014) and “countries, 
like companies have likely underestimated the risk they face” 
(Security & Mcafee, 2014). As a result, either by delayed 
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decision-making or by lack of awareness, the resulting inaction is 
leading to higher organizational costs from cyber-crimes. 
The approach that is to be taken by supply chains to manage 
these disruptions is still a matter of debate. However, from 
companies that have taken steps to contain disruptions derived 
from cyber-risks, the evidence points to two main strategies: 
access control and financial hedging. 
Access control is a strategy that has been pursued to safeguard 
processes and data through an increased investment in computer 
science technology, such as antiviruses, firewalls and cryptology 
(Windelberg, 2016). If a supply chain information network is 
thought of as a self-contained system, then access control 
approach restricts what can access this system (firewalls) detects 
any activity by foreign agents (antivirus) and confirms that the 
information that is exchanged between agents in the supply chain 
is accurate (encryption). All these activities can be considered as 
mitigation measures, to prevent disruption taking place derived 
from the existing IT systems. 
Financial hedging, on the other hand, is used as a way of 
counteracting the effects of disruptions, by balancing these effects 
with some other equal but opposite transaction (Eggert et al., 
2016). An example of this is the case of insurance. By paying a 
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premium i.e., cost of service, and if certain conditions are met the 
insurance company pays a pre-specified amount of money in case 
of a disruption derived from a cyber-risk. This is a common 
practice despite the many problems it creates and sustains.  
Despite these approaches, companies continue to struggle in 
the solution to the problem of cyber-risks, as cyber-attacks 
continue to show that breaches circumvent existing measures, in 
industries that are “in massive need for help, as they have no idea 
what the risks [from cyber-attacks] are” (Wagstaff, 2014). 
Linkov et al. (2013a) has mentioned the ability of a system to 
plan and prepare, absorb, recover and adapt to a negative event 
can be understood as resilience. For the case of cyber-events that 
require a resilient response, this response is a reflection of the 
cyber-resilience of the system. However, Linkov also mentions 
aspects which have hindered the identification of generalizable 
resilience principles, particularly the success of quantitative risk 
management, as “pervasive concepts of risk have encroached the 
understanding of resilience”. Two issues stand out. First, 
resilience has a wider scope than risk, particularly when risk is 
incomputable, as in the case when the adverse conditions are 
unexpected or when the analytic paradigm has proven ineffective. 
This first issue is visible from the evidence gathered about cyber-
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attacks in industry. Second, resilience has been fragmented into 
disciplines supporting incremental changes to known risks. This 
is at odds with the requirement to obtain a “generalizable 
approach that is both applicable to a diverse array of systems and 
revealing of their interconnectivity” (Linkov et al., 2013a). 
Resilience is therefore the relevant framework on which this 
research is based. 
1.2 Thesis objective and research questions 
An apparent contradiction between the expected management 
results from having risk management processes available and the 
increasing incidence of cyber-attacks is the foundation and the 
main objective of this work: the development of a scientific 
contribution towards the effective management of cyber-
resilience through supply chain security and response. 
The main research question of this thesis reflects the aspects 
described in the research motivation. Supply chains have had risk 
management processes for decades. However, there are records of 
an increasing number of incidents of operational disruption in 
supply chains caused by cyber-attacks. This work develops 
recommendations on how to manage the planning and recovery 
from operational disruptions resulting from cyber-risks in the 
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supply chain. Following the main objective of this thesis, the main 
research question is defined as: 
 
Main Research Question (RQ): How 
can cybersecurity and cyber-resilience 
be managed in the global supply 
chain? 
 
In order to answer this complex question in a structured way, 
this work first lays out currently available knowledge on the topic 
of cyber-risk and resilience in the supply chain from the 
perspective of the intersection of three relevant knowledge 
domains:  
• Supply chain management (SCM),  
• Information technology management (ITM) and  
• Risk and resilience management (R&RM).  
The knowledge domain that concerns supply chain cyber-risk 
and resilience management can be understood as the intersection 
between these three knowledge domains as proposed by the 
following Venn diagram based on Khan et al., (2015). 
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Figure 1 Relevant knowledge domains (Khan et al., 2015) 
As shown in Figure 1, the base knowledge domains generate 
new knowledge domains that are even more relevant to the 
definition of the supply chain cyber-risk and resilience 
management knowledge domain. These are 1) supply chain IT 
management, 2) IT risk and resilience management and 3) supply 
chain risk and resilience management, and are the base of this 
work’s review of current knowledge about the topic. 
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The first set of research sub-questions have been identified 
aimed at understanding the current state of knowledge about 
cyber-resilience in supply chains: 
 
Research sub-question 1 (RSQ1): 
What are the supply chain cyber-
resilience frameworks published in 
literature? 
 
Research sub-question 2 (RSQ2): 
Which case studies have been 
published about supply chain cyber-
resilience with operational 
disruption? 
These two questions are directed at understanding both the 
available tools in literature for managing cyber-resilience, as well 
as the published cases of cyber-resilience with operational 
disruption. This information is obtained from existing published 
literature. The process for identifying relevant literature is 
described in chapter 0.  
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The literature review reveals gaps in existing literature. These 
gaps justify further research sub-questions necessary to answer the 
main research question. These derived research-sub-questions 
then guide the rest of this thesis research. Section 2.9 describes in 
detail the origin of these derived questions, research sub-question 
3 (RSQ3) and research sub-question 4 (RSQ4). Figure 2 shows the 
research question and sub-questions considered in this thesis. 
 
Figure 2 Main research question and research sub-questions 
According to the previous figure, the thesis objectives and their 
respective research questions are laid out in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Objectives and research questions of this thesis 
Objective Research Question 
Develop a scientific contribution 
towards the effective management 
of cyber-resilience through supply 
chain security and response 
How can cybersecurity and cyber-
resilience be managed in the 
global supply chain? 
Identify and catalogue current 
knowledge about cyber-resilience 
in supply chains 
What are the supply chain cyber 
resilience frameworks published 
in literature? 
Identify and catalogue current 
knowledge of cyber-attack effects 
on supply chains 
Which case studies have been 
published about supply chain 
cyber resilience with operational 
disruption? 
Identify and catalogue the 
particular characteristics of cyber-
risks in supply chains 
How do cyber risks cause 
operational disruption in supply 
chains, and how does this differ 
from other supply chain risks? 
Test and evaluate the use of 
systems thinking to address gaps in 
current cyber-risk and resilience 
methods for supply chains. 
How can a systems approach be 
used to mitigate 
compartmentalization, static 
frameworks and historical 
dependence for managing cyber 
risks in the supply chain? 
 
Before proceeding with the literature review, the next section 
first defines some terms that are used throughout this work, and 
the chapter ends by describing the structure of the thesis. 
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1.3 Definition of key terms 
Some key terms are defined from the outset of this work to give 
a foundation of how these terms are understood and used in the 
thesis. This section does not provide a discussion of alternative 
definitions for these terms, as this research does not seek to define 
these terms better. Rather, the definition presented here serves as 
a foundation for further discussions and the development of 
aggregate or derived concepts.  
Additionally, a glossary of terms is provided in the appendix of 
this thesis, with the definitions of several technical terms used in 
this thesis, mainly aimed at informing audiences from different 
backgrounds to whom this thesis is relevant, such as SCM, ITM 
and R&RM. 
 
Hazard is considered “a state or a set of conditions of a system 
that, together with other conditions in the environment of the 
system, will lead inevitably to an accident or loss event” (Leveson, 
1995). 
 
Information technology (IT) is understood as the capabilities, 
tools and techniques involving the “development, maintenance, 
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and use of computer systems, software, and networks for the 
processing and distribution of data” (Merriam-Webster, 2017). 
 
Risk is understood throughout this work as “the possibility of 
loss or injury, through something or someone that creates a 
hazard.” (Leveson, 1995). 
 
The supply chain is be understood as “the network of 
organizations that are involved, through upstream and 
downstream linkages, to the different activities that produce value 
in the form of products and services delivered to the ultimate 
consumer” (Christopher, 2011, p.13). 
 
Supply chain management (SCM) is understood as the 
“management of upstream and downstream relationships with 
suppliers and customers in order to deliver superior customer 
value at less cost to the supply chain as a whole” (Christopher, 
2011, p.3). 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters in addition to a 
reference and appendix. Through this structure, the sequence of 
enquiry for answering the research question and sub-questions is 
laid out sequentially, and the methods, results and supporting 
documentation are described, as explained next chapter by 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 1 outlines the industrial context for this study, 
describes the factors that motivate this research, by introduces the 
main objective and research question of the thesis, presents the 
initial research sub-questions that motivate the literature review, 
and introduces key terminology. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the method, process and results of a 
systematic literature review carried out to gather and analyse 
published literature about the topic of cyber-risk and resilience in 
the global supply chain. The analysis of the gathered data 
identifies gaps in the extant literature that prevent answering the 
research question. These gaps give rise to additional research sub-
questions which are mentioned at the end of the chapter. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 53 of 620 
 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology used in this thesis by 
defining the philosophical position of this research from the 
ontological, epistemological and axiological dimensions. The 
research design is then presented and descriptions are given for 
the chosen research approaches for answering the research 
questions, i.e., a documentary / archival research process, a 
systems approach to risk assessment, and a dynamic simulation. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the results of the research process to 
address the first research sub-questions derived from the identified 
literature review gaps, related to the “nature” i.e., the particular 
characteristics of cyber-risks, by analysing data about cyber-
attack reports. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the results of the research process to 
address part of the second research sub-question derived from the 
identified literature review gaps, related to the use of systems 
thinking to evaluate cyber-risks. The chapter presents the results 
of the systemic risk analysis approach as applied to in-depth cases 
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in the United States. The performance of this method is then 
compared to a traditional risk assessment method. 
 
Chapter 6 describes the results of the research process to 
address the remaining of the second research sub-question derived 
from the identified literature review gaps, related to the use of 
systems thinking to evaluate cyber-resilience. The chapter 
presents the results of a system dynamics model developed for a 
detailed case study.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses the results in chapters 4, 5 and 6 in a 
discussion towards answering the research sub-questions laid out 
after the systematic literature review in chapter 2. Finally, this 
chapter answers the main research question of this thesis, based 
on the research results. 
 
Chapter 8 describes and categorizes the contributions made 
throughout this thesis, both from the perspective of academia and 
industrial practitioners. 
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Chapter 9 presents the conclusions for this thesis, summarizes 
the process followed in this work, reviews the research question 
and sub-questions with their answers, and derives potential future 
areas of research. 
1.5 Summary of the chapter 
This introduction described of the industrial context for this 
study, and the factors that motivate a research about managing 
cyber-risk and resilience in the global supply chain. Furthermore, 
this chapter introduced the main research question as derived from 
these motivating factors and the initial research sub-questions that 
motivate the literature review in the next chapter. This chapter 
then gave a definition of some key terms used throughout this 
work and closed by presenting a brief outline of the structure of 
this thesis. 
The next step in this work, based on the initial research sub-
questions, describes the current state of knowledge about cyber-
risks, by reviewing extant literature on the topic. 
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2 Literature review 
This chapter first gives a background about the process of a 
literature review and describes the suitability of carrying out a 
systematic literature review in particular. The chapter then 
identifies the biases present in the review process and outlines the 
choice of systems thinking as the framework through which the 
literature review analysis is carried out. 
This chapter goes on to detail the systematic literature review 
method and presents the results of the application of this method, 
first in descriptive terms detailing aspects such as the number and 
sources of the selected documents, and then thematically. 
Finally, the initial research sub-question RSQ1 and RSQ2 are 
answered, relevant gaps found in the literature are outlined, and 
the remaining research questions and strategy of enquiry is 
completed, which the rest of this thesis proceeds to answer. 
2.1 Literature review background 
A literature review is an attempt to make inferences based on 
the consideration and analysis of studies by other researchers. It is 
considered as the “identification, synthesis and assessment of all 
available evidence, quantitative and/or qualitative in order to 
generate a robust, empirically derived answer to a focused 
research question” (Mallett et al., 2012).  
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A literature review is a first step towards understanding the 
state of the knowledge in a specific field, which for this thesis is 
the knowledge regarding cyber-risk and resilience for the case of 
supply chains. A literature review process avoids “reinventing the 
wheel” (Zorn et al., 2006), integrates existing knowledge through 
the accumulation of scattered and potentially unconnected 
research, and revitalizes the development of knowledge (Webster 
et al., 2002). 
Medical science was one of the earliest areas to systematize the 
concept of advancing scientific knowledge through the collection 
and synthesis of scientific work by others. Murlow (1987) 
introduced guidelines to make the process of gathering and 
evaluating literature more systematic, i.e., reproducible, and is one 
of the earliest suggestions of an approach that has come to be 
known as “Systematic Literature Review” (SLR). 
The SLR constituted an improvement from what was a classical 
literature review based on a more narrative approach, with no 
specific methodology or structure. SLR reflects an incremental 
development of the review process towards reproducibility, 
transparency and comparability, and thus a more positivist 
approach to literature reviews (Jesson, 2011). 
From medicine, SLR has been adopted by other fields of 
research and adapted to the more specific needs of these fields, 
including management (Tranfield et al., 2003), software 
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engineering (Brereton et al., 2007), supply chain sustainability 
(Teuteberg et al., 2010) international development (Mallett et al., 
2012), and more recently, SCM (Durach et al., 2017). 
Literature reviews have been acknowledged as playing a 
central role not only in the accumulation but also in the creation 
of knowledge (Webster et al., 2002; Boell et al., 2014; Jennex, 
2015). Ways in which a literature review creates new knowledge 
include: the synthesis or conversion of existing knowledge, theory 
building that would need to be validated in future research, 
adoption of new viewpoints or concepts at a different level of 
aggregation, theory testing in the case where a number of 
empirical studies have been accumulated, the identification of 
research gaps, and through the provision of research agendas 
(Schyren et al., 2015). 
The process of knowledge creation through SLRs is relevant in 
some areas. For example, in 2016, SLR constituted more than 
40% of the publications for the journal Nature Reviews 
Immunology, with 48 articles out of a total of 116 published 
during that period (Durach et al., 2017). 
2.2 Relevance of a systematic literature review 
A systematic literature review is a special type of literature 
review that uses an explicit method and comprehensive strategy 
that has been defined before the review takes place (Denyer et al., 
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2009). The relevance of a systematic approach to literature 
reviews is reflected in the structure and social significance of its 
final results, with implications for explicitness, transparency, 
comprehensiveness, trustworthiness, relevance, and synthesis of 
the results. 
First, a systematic approach makes an explicit description of 
the protocols used before the actual data collection starts. This 
helps to reflect and reduce hidden bias in the data collection 
process. The philosophical position of the research determines if 
and to what extent the researcher is a subjective or objective part 
throughout the research process. Greater bias is expected for a 
subjective researcher position, and less so if the researcher 
position is more objective. Yet, regardless of the level of accepted 
bias in the research process, an explicit description of the process 
creates greater transparency and improves reproducibility and 
comparability.  
Second, through the use of explicit protocols, a systematic 
approach creates transparency about how the analysis is carried 
out and how the conclusions are generated. This reduces the 
misrepresentation of the available knowledge collected for the 
review, promotes critique that is more focused, and results in more 
efficient improvement of any future SLR process. 
Third, a systematic approach attempts to gather as much of the 
available research as possible by reducing the excessive influence 
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of studies that are simply easier to find through the use of 
inclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria describe the way in which to 
assess how much each study addresses the research question. A 
systematic review does not need to be exhaustive as some reviews 
only attempt to gather representative examples of evidence to 
answer the research question. These types of reviews benefit 
nonetheless from being explicit in their criteria. 
Fourth, a systematic approach to a literature review indicates to 
the reader how much the conclusions reached by the review can 
be trusted, i.e., its validity. Science is not only the advancement of 
the contents of the available body of knowledge but also the 
process of its diffusion and acceptance by relevant communities 
(Resttvo, 1988). This makes trust on the results reached by 
systematic reviews a fundamental part of the research process 
objectives.  
Fifth, as a way of increasing the acceptance of the findings, a 
systematic approach should include information from relevant 
communities of interest to the research question.  
Finally, a systematic approach presents a synthesis of the 
results in the form of a structured narrative, summary tables and 
some type of meta-analysis such as statistical indicators. This 
analysis then drives recommendations intended to connect the 
findings from the information that was gathered and the 
conclusions derived by the researcher. 
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2.3 Bias in the structured literature review 
It is unlikely that an SLR is without error as, at the very least, 
the human nature of the scientists performing the research 
introduces biases into the SLR process. Biases in SLRs are 
reflected as discrimination or prejudices against some results in 
favour of other results and are thus considered systematic errors, 
i.e., errors which present themselves consistently in a similar way. 
This is in contrast with random errors, where the error source is 
unknown and can vary in any direction.  
Systematic literature reviews contain different biases that need 
to be identified and controlled to increase the objectivity, validity 
and transparency of the results. Biases present in SLR have been 
described in the literature as either related to the search space 
(sampling bias), the search tool and the tool user (selection bias), 
the objective processing of the gathered data (within-study bias), 
or the subjective processing of the gathered data (expectancy 
bias). 
The first main bias is sampling bias. Felson (1992) defined it 
as the possibility of being unable to retrieve all the relevant 
findings on the aspects that are required by the relevant research 
questions. This bias is connected with the search space where the 
information is located and is composed of two other biases that 
drive it.  
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The first constituent of the selection bias refers to the 
possibility that the relevant findings might not necessarily be 
available for retrieval (regardless of how thorough the retrieval 
process is) due to discrimination at the journal editing board, that 
might decide against the publication of results that challenge 
existing knowledge, results that are negative (i.e., results do not 
confirm a hypothesis), or results that confirm existing knowledge 
(reproducibility studies). This is known as “publication bias”. 
An example of publication bias is the existing discrimination 
towards publishing positive results only, having grown as much 
as 22% in areas of social science research in the last 20 years, with 
effects that are particularly burdensome to the scientific process 
(Fanelli, 2011; Granqvist, 2015). A positive result is when the 
expected or wanted effect of an experiment was indeed observed. 
Despite positive results being the most attractive of the possible 
outcomes, a negative result also holds important information, and 
not sharing this through publication leads to inefficient use of 
resources through the lack of shared insights. The scientific 
community could thus potentially be making the same mistake 
over and over again instead of trying new ways of conducting the 
experiment.  
The other subcomponent of the sampling bias relates the 
inability to access a representative sample of the available 
literature on the subject, i.e., “retrieval bias”. This is partly driven 
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by the publication bias (Daniels, 2002), and by an incomplete 
search protocol lacking a mix of search engines that cover the 
relevant area of study. 
The second main bias is the “selection bias”, defined by Felson 
(1992) as the possibility for the search resulting in an incomplete 
or wrong subset of relevant literature for analysis. This bias refers 
to the search process itself and the researchers performing the 
search and is also composed of two biases that drive it. The first 
pertains to the inclusion criteria that were chosen to identify 
relevant literature, as these criteria might be incomplete when 
based on defective theoretical boundaries, units of analysis or 
sources of data. This bias is known as “inclusion criteria bias”. 
The second constituent of the selection bias pertains to the 
subjective application of the inclusion and exclusion criteria by 
the researcher or researchers performing the search, known as 
“selector bias”. These biases are based on two complementary 
aspects: having the correct tool as represented by the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, and using the tool correctly. 
The third main bias is the “within-study bias”, defined as the 
potential variability in the coding of the documentation that has 
been retrieved (Durach et al., 2017). Coding is the process through 
which the gathered data is classified, grouped and/or ranked. The 
coding results in the identification of the relevant constituent parts 
for each of the pieces of data that were chosen during sampling, 
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and the subsequent integration and grouping of these constituent 
parts in a way that may answer the research questions that justified 
the SLR. Despite coding being necessary to facilitate the analysis 
towards answering the research questions, the approach through 
which these constituent parts are grouped highly depends on the 
experience of the research team and considers aspects such as the 
philosophical framework applied in the analysis.  
The fourth main bias is the “expectancy bias”, defined as the 
possibility that the research team discriminates against 
information that is perplexing, thus rather going for the 
information that conforms to their expectations (Durach at al., 
2017). This bias can be understood as the subjective processing of 
data. Different forces are at play when this bias is present such as 
the pressure to publish positive results (as was discussed in the 
sampling bias), which could lead to discarding outliers or data that 
leads to negative results, or the inexperience of the researchers, 
which could lead to prematurely considering unexpected data as 
errors from the sampling process. 
This thesis has taken three measures to mitigate the sampling 
bias through its two sub-components: first, by working with 
several search engines relevant to the topic; second, by seeking 
the advice of specialist librarians both at the Technical University 
of Denmark (DTU) and at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) to confirm the most reliable sources of 
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information for the search; and third, by considering a variety of 
source for published literature, i.e., peer-reviewed journals, book 
chapters and conference papers. 
Additionally, this thesis has taken three measures to mitigate 
selection bias, within study bias and expectancy bias. First, more 
than one researcher was involved in the generation of the search 
criteria, to ensure different opinions on search terms and 
combinations. Second, the search was done in 2015 and updated 
in 2017 to include more recent literature, updated results based on 
revisited and adjusted search criteria. Third, the literature review 
was subject to a peer-review process as part of a paper submission 
to a peer-reviewed journal, to obtain feedback regarding the 
suitability of the applied keywords and search strategy. 
Finally, this thesis has taken one additional measure to mitigate 
the within-study bias, by defining systems thinking as the 
underlying ontology and resulting framework through which the 
coding is carried out. The foundations of systems thinking are 
explained at length in the methodology chapter and the next 
section describes the principles of systems thinking, to understand 
the choice for its use during the SLR coding process. 
Table 2 shows a list of the different biases present during a 
literature review process, their definitions, the proposed 
mitigation strategies suggested in the literature, and the mitigation 
strategies included in the literature review of this thesis. 
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Table 2 Biases in the Systematic literature review process 
 
Bias type Definition Proposed mitigations
Mitigations used in 
this work
Sampling bias
Failure to retrieve all 
relevant study findingson 
the aspects of the 
developed theoretical 
Retrieval bias
It is the risk that the 
chosen sample is not 
representative of the 
available literature base 
Commisioning of 
expert searchers who 
understand 
databases and search 
Use of a variety of 
search engines. Use of 
advice from Librarians 
at DTU and MIT
Publication bias
Discrimination by journals 
to favor publishing results 
that challenge or change 
existing knowledge, while 
studies that confirm 
previous knowledge are 
Consider both 
published and 
unpublished sources 
(Tranfield et al., 
2003). Consider 
journals that 
Use of published 
sources from high 
quality journals. 
Inclusion of non 
published sources.
Selection bias
Risk of search resulting in 
the incomplete or wrong 
subset of relevant 
Inclusion criteria b
Inaccurate design of 
selection criteria: 
Theoretical boundaries, 
unit of analysis, sources of 
data, and study contexts.
Parallel and 
independent 
development of 
inclusion/exclusion 
criteria by two or 
more researchers 
Use of multiple 
researchers and 
review process
Selector bias
Subjective application of 
inclusion/exclusion criteria 
(Cohen, 1960)
Involvement of 
multiple researchers 
and use of blind 
processes, where 
researchers do not 
have access to 
journal or author 
names during 
selection process 
Use of multiple 
researchers and 
review process
Within-study bias
Risk of the variability in 
the coding of primary 
studies retrieved in the 
SLR (Durach et al., 2017)
Involvement of 
multiple independent 
coders (Felson, 1992), 
Involvement of an 
Use of multiple 
researchers and 
review process
Expectancy bias
Risk of researchers 
discriminating information 
that is perplexing and 
favoring information that 
conforms to their 
Involvment of 
multiple coders from 
different 
sociocultural and 
educational 
Use of multiple 
researchers and 
review process
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2.4 System thinking as coding framework  
A coding framework provides the criterion through which the 
descriptions, categorizations and discussion derived from the data 
obtained for an SLR, are presented. This framework makes the 
data comparable, and facilitates the identification of gaps in this 
data with respect to the research questions that the SLR answers. 
The choice and description of systems thinking as a coding 
framework is explained next. 
A system is a “regularly interacting or interdependent group 
of items forming a unified whole” (Merriam-Webster), where “the 
system is something more than the collection of its parts” 
(Meadows, 2008). Systems thinking is thus an approach to related 
concepts, methods and tools for understanding the world from the 
perspective of the systems from which it is built, and it is thus a 
“system for thinking about systems” (Arnold et al, 2015). 
From the description of the problem laid out in the introduction 
of this thesis, a visible characteristic a global supply chain is the 
multitude of systems interact due to the use of information 
technology (IT) within a competitive market. Such systems 
include  
• IT-hardware systems,  
• IT-software systems,  
• Organizational systems,  
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• Physical systems such as warehouses and transportation,  
• The interaction of these systems within each of the different 
agents in the supply chain, and  
• The interactions of the agents -systems in themselves- with 
each other. 
As interdependence increases and networks get larger, it is “not 
good enough to get smarter and smarter about our particular 
piece of the rock” (Richmond, 1994), and a common language 
becomes necessary for sharing knowledge between the different 
interacting parts. The systems thinking approach thus becomes an 
option for making sense of this complexity (Meadows, 2008; 
Plate, 2010; Sterman, 2003; Senge, 1990). 
Different definitions of systems thinking have been offered in 
the literature. Peter Senge defined systems thinking as “a 
discipline for seeing wholes and a framework for seeing 
interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of 
change rather than static snapshots” (Senge, 1990), while Barry 
Richmond defines systems thinking as “the art and science of 
making reliable inferences about behavior by developing an 
increasingly deep understanding of underlying structure” 
(Richmond, 1994). Sweeney and Sterman have defined systems 
thinking as “the ability to represent and assess dynamic 
complexity, e.g., the behaviour that arises from the interaction of 
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a system’s agent over time, both textually and graphically” 
(Sweeney et al., 2000). 
More recently, Arnold et al., (2015) developed a unified 
definition that considers aspects of systems thinking by different 
authors. 
“Systems thinking is a set of synergistic analytical skills used 
to improve the capability of identifying and understanding 
systems, predicting their behaviours, and devising modifications 
to them in order to produce desired effects. These skills work 
together as a system” (Arnold et al., 2015). 
Literature presents different applications for systems thinking 
in diverse fields concerning SCM with different levels of 
aggregation. A level of aggregation is understood as the grouping 
or collections according to which a phenomenon is described and 
studied. A higher level of aggregation takes a broader view and 
thus makes analyses that describe a phenomenon according to 
some larger grouping criteria. For example, an analysis of cyber-
risks at a country level is said to have a higher level of aggregation 
that an analysis of cyber-risks at a company level. 
Systems thinking has been used for understanding complex 
problems in areas such as production control (Forrester, 1960; 
Sterman, 2000, p.710), project management (Jalili et al., 2016), 
claims settlement in complex projects (Cooper, 1980), commodity 
market analysis (Glöser-Chahoud et al., 2016), healthcare (Vennix 
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et al., 1992; Homer et al., 2006; Peters, 2014), oil industry 
(Morecroft et al., 1992), worker burnout (Homer, 1985), 
maintenance (Sterman, 2000, p.66), antibiotic resistance (Homer 
et al., 2000), biomedicine (McCarthy et al., 2014), automobile 
leasing industry (Sterman, 2000, p.42), agriculture and natural 
resource management (Turner et al., 2016), and humanitarian 
logistics (Besiou et al., 2011). 
The use of systems thinking for analysis, sense-making and 
knowledge development in an SLR requires defining the 
epistemological framework, i.e., what is considered as knowledge 
at the time of the analysis. The systems thinking framework is 
derived from the definitions that are available in the extant 
literature, and conditions the way in which the information 
gathered in the SLR can be organized. Although the different 
aspects concerning systems thinking are explained in the 
methodology section, three aspects are considered for the SLR 
analysis 1) the “leverage level” of the framework, 2) the feedbacks 
present, and 3) the level of aggregation for each resilience 
framework. 
The first aspect of the analysis framework is understanding and 
identifying the “leverage level” for each of the cyber-resilience 
frameworks identified in the SLR. The leverage level is the degree 
of abstraction that is taken to understand a system. In the systems 
thinking perspective, the understanding of systems can take place 
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at different levels. A first level is through the behaviour of the 
system, i.e., what is apparent and can be observed or recorded. A 
second level would be through the patterns of behaviour present 
in the system, which results in the specific behaviours seen in level 
1. A third, deeper level is through the structures that cause the 
patterns which in turn cause the behaviours of the system. 
Changes in this third level are typically the most efficient, creating 
a bigger and more enduring change for the same unit of cost, than 
at any of the other two levels, and is thus said to be the level with 
the highest leverage. 
The analysis of the SLR with the use of a systems thinking 
framework consists of identifying the elements that compose each 
these frameworks and their connections, and to explain an 
observed behaviour such as a performance measure. The gathered 
data contains a number of resilience frameworks, with potential 
relationships between these (some might have been derived from 
others), and the performance measure is of how relevant these 
frameworks are for managing cyber-risks in global supply chains. 
In order to understand the system leverage, the systems 
thinking framework considers 1) an analysis for each of the 
resilience frameworks in the SLR data with respect to the 
components of the framework, and the proposed relationships 
between these components, 2) a categorization of the resilience 
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frameworks with respect to the aspect they address, a behaviour, 
a pattern or a structure in the system. 
The second aspect of the analysis framework is understanding 
and identifying the feedbacks present in the resilience frameworks 
that have been identified. A feedback structure is a chain of 
circular causality that results in changes over time of a variable of 
interest, i.e., the dynamic behaviour of the system performance. A 
relationship between elements in a system is considered causal if 
it is “sequential in time and incorporates some hypothesis about 
the mechanisms whereby one element directly influences another” 
(Meadows et al., 1985, p 11). 
Thus, for resilience frameworks the “feedback” analysis aspect 
considers 1) identifying feedback, i.e., circular causality, and 
structures, i.e., elements and connections, and 2) categorizing the 
different resilience frameworks as static or dynamic in terms of 
how the framework conceptualizes supply chain cyber-resilience. 
The third aspect of the analysis framework relates to 
understanding the level of aggregation for cyber-resilience in each 
of frameworks. Different levels of aggregation i.e., grouping of 
the elements and connections that make up the structure of a 
system, influence aspects of the analysis process such as the 
categorizations of the information that is necessary to implement 
the framework and the unit of analysis that would be involved.  
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For cyber-resilience frameworks, the “aggregation” analysis 
aspect considers identifying 1) the unit of analysis for each of the 
resilience frameworks, 2) level of aggregation for the information 
needed to implement the framework. 
Figure 3 summarizes the aspects of systems thinking included 
in the framework for analysing the literature review. 
 
Figure 3 Aspects in a systems thinking analysis framework 
 
This thesis has so far described the need and suitability of an 
SLR, it has described the potential biases in the SLR process, 
outlining mitigation measures included in the process to mitigate 
these biases, and it has described the systems thinking framework 
applied in the SLR analysis. The following sections describe the 
SLR process in detail. 
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2.5 Methodology for the systematic literature review 
The systematic literature reviews in this thesis were conducted 
based on documented guidelines for the management discipline as 
outlined by Durach et al., (2017). Durach builds on both the 
frameworks by Murlow (1987) for the medical field and its 
adaption to management by Tranfield et al., (2003). The paper 
outlines the idiosyncrasies present in SCM research, and the 
biases present in the systematic literature review process. 
Tranfield identified differences between of management and 
medical research according to twenty different dimensions. These 
differences range from the nature of the disciplines and the 
resulting data extraction and synthesis practices to the reporting 
and implementation of evidence. In particular, Tranfield argues 
that medical research has a great degree of convergence in regard 
the to what the field considers as important, and as a result 1) the 
research questions are clearly defined, 2) the scope of the research 
is geared towards interventions that deliver results, 3) the research 
is predominantly quantitative, 4) the research presents a tradition 
of meta-analysis and structured reviews, and 5) results are 
presented with a standardized report structure.  
On the other hand, management research has traditionally been 
characterized by divergence in terms of what the discipline finds 
important, as an increasing number of areas are being addressed 
through management research. This results in management 
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research 1) presenting a low consensus about what the research 
questions should be, 2) delivering both qualitative and 
quantitative results, 3) concerning itself with why something 
works and the contexts where these benefits happen, 4) presenting 
the results in the narrative, and 5) using non-standardized report 
structures. 
The systematic literature review chosen for this thesis is a 
comprehensive, explicit and reproducible six-step method for the 
identification and analysis of appropriate documents and 
publications, aimed at answering specific research questions 
(Durach al., 2017). The six steps of the SLR process are grouped 
into three phases, as shown in Figure 4, and are explained in detail 
next. 
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Figure 4 SLR process (based on Durach et al., 2017) 
 
2.5.1 Phase 1 – Planning the review 
The planning phase for an SLR is a process that results in a list 
of characteristics that justify the need and guide the application of 
such a review. The need for an SLR is justified through an 
argument about the relevance of the SLR as a way of answering a 
relevant research question. The guide to the application of the 
SLR is determined by a list of characteristics and requirements for 
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the SLR process, and which the gathering phase implements. 
Durach et al., (2017) proposes the planning can be structured in 
two sequential steps: first, define the research question and the 
suitability of SLR for answering this research question, and then 
create a protocol to explicitly define the process through which 
this SLR is carried out. 
Step 1: Define the research questions. In this step, the studied 
phenomenon is described to identify the scope of the literature 
review as resulting from research questions. Thereafter an 
argument is given as to why a literature review is an appropriate 
way of answering these research questions. 
 
The planning process is considered an iterative process of 
definition, clarification and refinement (Clarke et al., 2004). The 
result is a number of research questions that are considered 
valuable and which respond to the gap found in the current 
theoretical framework for a specific context, as illustrated in the 
following figure. 
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Figure 5 Review planning (based on Tranfield et al., 2003) 
 
The following research sub-questions (RSQ) were laid out in 
the introduction chapter: 
 
Research sub-question 1 (RSQ1): 
What are the supply chain cyber-
resilience frameworks published in 
literature? 
 
Research sub-question 2 (RSQ2): 
Which case studies have been 
published about supply chain cyber-
resilience with operational 
disruption? 
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As all these questions are concerned with the existing 
knowledge about cyber-resilience frameworks and the risks 
themselves, a review the extant literature is suitable for answering 
these questions. 
Step 2: Determine the required characteristics. This step 
consists in defining the criteria 1) for selecting the documents used 
for answering the research questions, and 2) for the search process 
for identifying those documents. The documents criteria define 
both what is to be included in the sample and what is to be 
excluded from the sample. The criteria for the search process 
define how the work is carried out, where the search is performed, 
and what form the search patterns take. These criteria are reflected 
in a document known as the “SLR protocol”. 
The SLR protocol is an action plan for identifying and selecting 
documents to answer particular research questions. The main 
purpose of the SLR protocol is to maintain the objectivity of the 
results by describing all the steps taken in the review process. The 
main components of the SLR protocol are the 1) context for the 
study, 2) the research question or questions, 3) an indication of the 
value of carrying out the SLR, 4) the sources for the data, 5) the 
search strategy and 6) the inclusion and exclusion criteria (Durach 
et al., 2017).  
The first three components of the SLR protocol, namely the 
context of the study, the research questions and the value of 
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performing an SLR have been argued during the first part of this 
chapter and during the introduction. The rest of the components 
are defined next. A summary of these components is shown in 
Table 3. 
The fourth component of an SLR protocol are the sources of 
the data. These have been defined as search engines for published 
scientific peer-reviewed literature. Four research databases are 
considered in this SLR. These databases were identified from 
meetings with reference librarians at DTU and MIT. The chosen 
databases are: 
• Web of Science (https://apps.webofknowledge.com) 
• EBSCOhost (https://search.ebscohost.com) 
• ProQuest (https://search.proquest.com) 
• Google Scholar (https://scholar.google.com)  
The fifth component of the SLR protocol, the search strategy, 
defines the parameters that will condition the search process a) the 
search keywords, b) the search patterns, c) the unit of analysis, d) 
the language of the publications, and 4) the years publication for 
the documents.  
The search keywords were determined from a knowledge 
domain analysis of the concept of supply chain cyber-risk and 
resilience, as represented in Figure 1. The three main knowledge 
domains to be considered were identified as “supply chain 
management”, “information technology management”, and “risk 
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and resilience management”. This analysis defines the main 
keywords that are used in the systematic literature search. Table 3 
lists the keyword used in the systematic review. 
Table 3 Keywords and search terms used in the systematic review 
 
• The search patterns are the different keyword combinations 
used for identifying documents in the search engines. These 
patterns are defined by three rules: 1) The concepts are 
combined through AND operators, 2) The keywords within 
each concept are combined with the OR operator, and 3) At 
least 2 concepts are included. Figure 6 illustrates the search 
pattern structures. 
Concept Keywords
Supply Chain
Supplier
Supply Network
Supply Chain Management
Cyber disruption
Cyber resilience
Cyber risk
Cyber attack
Information Technology
IT
Disruption
Disruption Management
Resilience
Resilient
Resiliency
Information 
Technology
Risk and 
Resilience
Supply chain
Cyber
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Figure 6 Search pattern structures 
• The units of analysis that is considered for this literature 
review are published, peer-reviewed articles and peer-
reviewed conference papers.  
• The language of the articles considered is either English, 
German or Spanish, as these are the languages spoken by 
the thesis author. 
• The years of publication for the literature research are 
papers between the years 1985-2017. 
The last component of the SLR protocol, i.e., the inclusion and 
criteria, is necessary to narrow the number of papers that result 
from the search engine to a baseline sample. Following an analysis 
of the title and abstract of the documents from the initial search 
results, the baseline sample will include documents that meet the 
following criteria: 
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• Document is about supply chains or relevant to supply 
chains 
• Document is about the recovery of operations from 
unforeseen disruptions 
• Documents presents a framework to structure decision-
making 
• Document considers the information exchange and storage 
in the analysis 
The research protocol gathers the information that has been 
described in this section and is shown next. 
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Table 4 Research protocol for literature review 
 
Relevant Theoretical frameworks 
SLR Systematic Literature Review (Durlach et al., 2017)
Context for research Cyber attacks continue to occur in suply chains. Yet, Supply chains alrady consider risk management in some ways. This apparent contradiciton is the source of a research gap.
Relevance of a Systemtic 
Literature Review
A review of the current published information about resilience frameworks and their 
applicability to cyber-risks, can highlight areas where there is an opportunity for 
research.
Unit of Analysis
1.- Published, peer-reviewed articles 
2.- Reports by International organizations, agencies and consultants
Research Question
RSQ1: What are the supply chain cyber resilience frameworks published in literature?
RSQ2: What cases have been published about supply chain cyber resilience with 
operational disruption?
RSQ3: How do cyber risks cause operational disruption in supply chains?
RSQ4: How do cyber- risks differ from other supply chain risks?
Sources of Data International search engines for acadmic articles and reports from the year 1985 to the present; articles in English.
Search Strategy
Peer reviewed articles - Triple filtering approach
A.- Use selected "Search Engines" with the "Keyword combinations" to obtain a first 
selection of documents.
B.- Review references in documents chosen in A.- to identify other relevant documents 
by using the "Topic Relevance Criteria".
C1.- Peer reviewed articles - Review abstracts of documents chosen in A.- and B.- to 
identify relevant documents for analysis by using the "Topic Relevance Criteria"
C2.- Other Documents - "Identify Trustworthiness Factors" and "Topic Relevance 
Criteria" to filter relevant documents
Inclusion Criteria
Search engines: 
Google Scholar, Web of Science, EBCOhost, ProQuest
Keyword Combinations:
(Supply chain OR Supplier OR Supply Network OR Supply Chain management) AND (IT OR 
Information Technology) AND (Resilience OR Resilient OR Resiliency OR Disruption  OR 
Disruption Management) AND (Cyber disruption OR Cyber resilience OR Cyber risk OR 
Cyber attack)
Topic Relevance Criteria:
*Document is about supply chains or relevant to supply chains,
*Document is about the recovery of operations from unforeseen disruptions, 
*Document presents a framework to structure decision-making
*Document considiers the information exchange and storage in the analysis 
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2.5.2 Phase 2 - Gathering the data 
The process of conducting the literature review is carried out 
according to the protocol defined in the first phase. The gathering 
phase according to Durach et al., (2017) is to be carried out in two 
steps of increasing scrutiny: first with the selection of a broad 
sample from a partial analysis of the documents, i.e., the “baseline 
sample”, and subsequently a refined smaller set of documents 
following a thorough review of the documents, i.e., the “synthesis 
sample”. 
Step 3: Retrieve a baseline sample. This step considers the 
identification of the sources according to the search strategy. This 
is done with the chosen search engines by applying keyword 
combinations defined in the protocol. The title and the abstract of 
the resulting papers are reviewed according to the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria to form the baseline sample. This step also 
considers the identification and elimination of duplicates, as the 
same article might be a result of searches using two different 
keyword combinations. 
Step 4: Select the synthesis sample. This step considers refining 
the documents found in the previous step through two main 
processes. First, the baseline sample is refined by testing of the 
relevance of the publication based on the content of the whole 
document beyond the title and abstract. Second, the references to 
the refined set of articles are reviewed to identify relevant 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 88 of 620 
documents that might not have been identified through the initial 
broad search. The set of documents that results from these two 
processes is called the “synthesis sample”. 
2.5.3 Phase 3 - Reporting the results.  
The reporting phase according to Durach et al., (2017) 
considers the synthesis of the sample according to a specific 
framework, in addition to the status reporting of the findings. 
Step 5: Synthesize literature. This step considers the extraction 
of data from the synthesis sample, according to both the 
characteristics of the publications themselves and the theoretical 
framework for the analysis. Furthermore, the step considers the 
integration of this data into proposals of how the initial theoretical 
framework can be refined, the identification of the mechanisms 
described in the sample data, the contexts and limitations of these 
mechanisms, and the outcomes that can be extracted from the 
sample data. 
Step 6: Report status. This step considers a description of how 
the framework refinement identified or proposed in step 5 
compares with the initial theoretical framework that was described 
in step 1. This is usually done through a two-step process. A 
descriptive analysis is presented first, followed by a thematic 
analysis. 
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• In the descriptive analysis the data is presented according to 
their numbers and characteristics such as volume, 
distribution, authorship or source.  
• In the thematic analysis the synthesis sample is discussed 
according to the chosen theoretical framework, and the 
findings are presented and narrated through descriptions, 
diagrams and categorizations.  
2.6 Descriptive analysis 
The descriptive analysis summarizes the documents considered 
for the synthesis sample according to characteristics regarding the 
year of publication, academic journal or conference of 
publication, industries, and applied method. The analysis ends by 
providing an assessment of the maturity of the field. 
Based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, the process of the 
literature review resulted in 323 documents. These documents 
were reviewed according to the exclusion/inclusion criteria and 
resulted in a final refined document list, i.e., the synthesis sample, 
based on which the analysis was performed. The overall process 
is shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Review process for the sample selection 
The synthesis sample consisted of 62 documents ranging from 
the year 2000 to 2017, with over 80% of the documents in the 
synthesis sample being peer-reviewed journal articles, as shown 
in Figure 8. A complete list of the papers considered in the 
synthesis sample ordered by year of publication can be found in 
the Appendix 11.7. 
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Figure 8 Distribution of documents in synthesis sample 
The publication of articles about supply chain cyber-resilience 
has increased through the years, as reflected in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Publications in synthesis sample per year of publication 
Table 5 shows the distribution of journals for publications 
about supply chain cyber-resilience. Four journals provide four or 
more articles about cyber-resilience with a relevance to supply 
chains. A deeper analysis shows that these have been special 
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issues about cyber-resilience or cyber-security, particularly the 
following journal publications: 
• Environment Systems and Decisions, volume 33, issue 4, 
December 2013, a special issue of cybersecurity, risk and 
decisions, edited by Zachary A. Collier, with 5 articles in 
the synthesis sample. 
• Journal of business continuity & emergency planning, 
volume 7, issue 2, fall 2013, special issue of cybersecurity, 
edited by Frederick Hult, with 5 articles in the synthesis 
sample,  
• Technovation, volume 34, issue 7, July 2014, special issue 
on security in the cyber supply chain, with 4 articles in the 
synthesis sample, 
• Technology Innovation Management Review, volume 5, 
issue 4, April 2015, special issue about cyber-resilience in 
supply chains, edited by Omera Khan and Chris McPhee, 
with 5 articles in the synthesis sample. 
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Table 5 Journal publications in synthesis sample 
Journal Name # of publications 
Environment Systems and Decisions 5 
Technology Innovation Management Review 5 
Journal of business continuity & emergency planning 5 
Technovation 4 
Proceedings of the IEEE 3 
Computers & Security 2 
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 2 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management 2 
Network Security 1 
Computer 1 
Politics 1 
International Journal of Interactive Multimedia & 
Artificial Intelligence 1 
International Journal of Computer Networks & 
Communications 1 
Quality of Protection 1 
Pervasive and Mobile Computing 1 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1 
International Journal of Computer, Electrical, 
Automation, Control and Information Engineering 1 
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 1 
Information & Security 1 
Risk analysis 1 
International Journal of Research in Engineering and 
Applied Sciences 1 
Computer Science Review 1 
Production Engineering 1 
The Electricity Journal 1 
Electronics 1 
MITRE Report 1 
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 1 
Journal of Cyber Policy 1 
Business Information Review 1 
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Journal Name # of publications 
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 1 
Grand Total 50 
 
The low number of publications over the years and the 
dispersion of the papers across different journals seem to point 
towards this being an immature research field. An analysis of the 
applied research method in the synthesis sample shows over 45% 
of the articles are descriptive without using specific case 
examples as shown in Figure 10. Furthermore, the articles do not 
address an industry or address the industry in a generic form, as 
shown in   
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Table 6. This general way of addressing case examples and the 
industries involved further indicate how supply chain cyber-
resilience is an immature field. 
 
Figure 10 Synthesis sample publications per method 
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Table 6 Publications in synthesis sample per industry 
Industry # of publications 
None 17 
Generic 9 
Critical infrastructures - electric 7 
Control systems 5 
Government 4 
Military 2 
Production 2 
Critical infrastructures - generic 2 
Critical infrastructure - water systems 2 
Standards 2 
Insurance 2 
Maritime 2 
Education/training 1 
Various (transport /pharma /maritime) 1 
Various (oil/production) 1 
Engineering development 1 
3D printing 1 
IT/software/hardware 1 
Grand Total 62 
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Table 7 provides an overview of the main conferences where 
the conference articles in the synthesis sample were published. 
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Table 7 Conference publications in synthesis sample 
Conference Name # of publications 
Technologies for Homeland Security (HST) 2 
Proceedings of the 2015 Workshop on Automated 
Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense 
2 
Resilient Control Systems (ISRCS) 1 
Dependable Systems and Networks Workshop 1 
Systems and Information Engineering Design Symposium 
(SIEDS) 1 
ICMLG2017 5th International Conference on 
Management Leadership and Governance 
1 
Internet of things (iThings/CPSCom) 1 
Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC) 1 
Decision and Control and European Control Conference 
(CDC-ECC) 
1 
Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems 1 
 
The dispersion of conference papers dispersion together with 
the low number of conferences papers included in the synthesis 
sample support the claim that the field of supply chain cyber-
resilience for the supply chain is an immature field of research. 
2.7 Thematic analysis 
This section describes, categorizes and discusses the articles in 
the synthesis sample according to the chosen framework of 
analysis or “themes”, looking to answer the research questions 
that motivated the SLR. As indicated in section 2.4, the chosen 
framework of analysis is systems thinking, along three main areas: 
leverage, feedback and aggregation level. The leverage considers 
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the identification of the constituent parts of each framework, their 
relationships, and categorizing according to behaviours, patterns 
or structures. The Feedback deals with the circular causality 
structures and thus the dynamics, i.e., variation over time, present 
in each of the frameworks. Finally, the Aggregation refers to the 
level at which the framework is grouped, e.g., at a company level, 
and industrial level or government level, as well as with the type 
of data that these frameworks require. 
The aim of this analysis is to provide a list of comparable 
descriptions of the literature in the synthesis sample research to 
answer the research questions that guide the SLR. These questions 
are: 
Research sub-question 1 (RSQ1): 
What are the supply chain cyber-
resilience frameworks published in 
literature? 
 
Research sub-question 2 (RSQ2): 
Which case studies have been 
published about supply chain cyber-
resilience with operational 
disruption? 
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Both of these questions are directed towards answering the 
main research question: 
Main Research Question (RQ): How 
can global supply chains manage 
cyber-risks and security? 
 
When comparing the answers that can be obtained from the 
synthesis sample analysis to the research sub-questions, these 
answers reveal gaps in the knowledge required to answer the main 
research question. The gap analysis is described in the last part of 
the Literature Review chapter, in section 2.9. 
The synthesis sample presented a distribution of papers from 
the three knowledge domains mentioned in section 1.2., namely 
SCM, R&RM, and ITM. The distribution of the articles is shown 
in Figure 11. The synthesis sample contained a similar number of 
papers from SCM and ITM. 
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Figure 11 Sample per knowledge domain 
The knowledge domain from which the papers originate 
conditions the approach through which cyber-resilience is 
presented. 
2.7.1 What is cyber-resilience 
The SLR revealed a number of definitions for cyber-resilience 
as shown in Table 8. The earliest definition of cyber-resilience 
found in the published literature is a definition by Hult et al., from 
2014. This is two years later than the earliest reference to cyber-
resilience found in other extended literature, in this case, a 
document by the World Economic Forum from 2012. 
The different definitions of cyber-resilience that were found 
consider cyber-resilience as either an ability (WEF, 2012; Ahmad 
et al., 2015; Björck et al., 2015; Davis, 2015; Khan et al., 2015b; 
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Arghandeh et al., 2016), a capability or capacity (Hult et al., 2014; 
Khan et al., 2015a). 
Table 8 Cyber-resilience definitions in the synthesis sample 
Cyber-resilience definition Reference 
Cyber-resilience is the ability of systems 
and organizations to withstand cyber events, 
measured by the combination of mean time 
to failure and mean time to recovery. 
WEF, 2012 
Cyber-resilience is the capacity of an 
organization to remain healthy in an 
environment of permanent conflict and 
constantly evolving cyber attacks 
Hult et al., 
2014 
Cyber-resilience refers to the ability to 
continuously deliver the intended outcome 
despite adverse cyber events by humans and 
nature. 
Björck et al., 
2015 
Cyber-resilience is the ability to 
anticipate, withstand, recover from, and 
evolve to better address cyber threats 
Ahmad et al., 
2015 
Cyber-resilience is the ability of a system 
that is dependent on cyberspace in some 
Davis, 2015 
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Cyber-resilience definition Reference 
manner, to return to its original or desired 
state after being disturbed. 
Cyber-resilience is the capability of a 
supply chain to maintain its operational 
performance when faced with a cyber-risk 
Khan et al., 
2015a 
Cyber-resilience is the ability of a system 
to resist against or minimize, the potential 
damage in order to maintain the system state 
within an accepted operational level in 
response to an external cyber threat or cyber-
attack. 
Khan et al., 
2015b 
Cyber-resilience is a system’s ability to 
reduce the magnitude and duration of a 
disruption when faced with an unexpected 
set of disturbances, by altering its structure 
in an agile way. 
Arghandeh et 
al., 2016 
 
Ability is defined as a natural aptitude towards doing 
something, and the capability as the potential of a system towards 
doing something (Merriam-Webster, 2017).  
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While ability points to what a system is currently in a position 
to do, capability points towards what a system could end up doing, 
or the extent to which its ability may reach. As an example, a 
person that has the ability to play the piano also has the capability 
of playing Rachmaninov’s 3rd piano concerto. This particular 
person’s ability to play the piano could thus extend to 
accomplishing a piano concerto. 
Given the unexpected (Arghandeh et al., 2016) or constantly 
evolving (Hult et al., 2014) characteristics of the cyber-risk-
derived disruptions that lead to the manifestation of cyber-
resilience, it would be better described as a capability. Therefore 
this thesis considers cyber-resilience as:  
 
“The capability of a system to minimize the effects on expected 
performance of a disruption caused by the manifestation of a 
cyber-risk” 
 
With this definition, cyber-resilience is considered a capability 
as it is the extent to which the current combination of abilities can 
help to obtain the desired outcome, i.e., maintaining the expected 
performance. Additionally, both external and internal sources of 
cyber-risk and both intentional and unintentional sources of 
disruption are also considered in the definition. 
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2.7.2 Level of aggregation for cyber-resilience 
The Aggregation level explores the way in which the 
information about cyber-resilience is grouped, and the type of 
information that would be required to apply the framework. 
The synthesis sample revealed papers with different levels of 
aggregation. Figure 12 shows the distribution of papers for three 
levels of aggregation, government level, industry level, and 
company level. 
 
Figure 12 Aggregation for papers in the synthesis sample. 
63% of the papers in the synthesis sample consider cyber-
resilience at the company level, while government level and 
industry level articles share similar proportions of the total, 16% 
and 21% respectively. However, only a few of the articles address 
the problem of the aggregation level for cyber-resilience analysis. 
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Björck et al., (2015) presented a number of levels of 
aggregation for understanding cyber-resilience, which have been 
grouped within the government, industry and company levels: 
• Government level: 
• Supranational level, i.e., an aggrupation of nations, e.g., 
the European Union, 
• National level, i.e., a particular country or society, e.g., 
Denmark, 
• Industry level 
• Regional level, i.e., a particular region or city, e.g., the 
great Copenhagen region, 
• Company level 
• Organizational level, i.e., a specific organization or 
company, e.g., the Technical University of Denmark, 
DTU, 
• Functional level, i.e., a specific business function, e.g., 
the supply function in an organization, 
• Technical level, i.e., a specific technical system, e.g., the 
control systems present in the purchasing function 
Björck also argues that “these levels have to be addressed in 
parallel for cyber-resilience to be effective” (Björck et al., 2015). 
An analysis of the knowledge domains of the articles in the 
synthesis sample shows a clear relationship: as can be seen in 
Figure 13, the articles from the SCM domain are chiefly 
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government or industry level analyses, while the IT domain papers 
chiefly correspond to company level analyses. 
 
Figure 13 Aggregation and knowledge domain in sample 
2.7.3 Cyber-resilience versus cybersecurity 
The SLR revealed different authors describing cyber-resilience 
as having evolved from cybersecurity. At the same time, there is 
mention of insufficient clarity on how these two concepts differ, 
and how this can lead to problems (Zhu et al., 2011; de Crespigny, 
2012; Fink et al., 2014; Hult et al., 2014; Ferdinand, 2015; 
Arghandeh et al., 2016; Conklin et al., 2017; Jin et al, 2017).  
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Cybersecurity has been described as being mostly concerned 
with attacks coming from outside the organization, of establishing 
perimeter defences in a castle mentality (Hult et al, 2014), with a 
focus towards maintaining IT infrastructure availability and of 
giving the right people access to resources. Additionally, both IT 
and cybersecurity have also been characterized as slow in 
adapting to malicious activity from insider sources (Hult et al., 
2014). 
As illustrated in Figure 14, to characterize the main objectives 
of IT and cybersecurity, a triad for IT-security has been proposed 
consisting of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and 
communications known as the “CIA triad” (Goldman, 2010; Zhu 
et al., 2011; Boyes, 2015; Li et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 14 CIA triad of IT Security (based on Zhu et al., 2011) 
It is important to note that despite similarities, IT security and 
cybersecurity are not strictly synonyms. IT security is a broader 
concept as it considers the protection of data in whichever format 
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this data is stored and communicated in the organization. 
Cybersecurity deals with the protection of data in electronic 
format, and it also deals with the protection required as a result of 
the network connectivity achieved by the Internet.  
Given that since cyber-risks focuses on data in electronic 
format, IT security and cybersecurity for the ends of this thesis, 
despite being terms not strictly synonymous, should be 
nevertheless considered as equivalent. A similar consideration 
should be had with the terms IT-Infrastructure and cyber-
infrastructure. 
The synthesis sample described cyber-resilience as 1) 
multidisciplinary and requiring integration across departments 
(Hult et al., 2014), 2) driven by organizational learning and 
capabilities, i.e., being able to change quickly defence and 
investment strategies as a reaction to cyber-attacks, thus requiring 
a dynamic capability process (Ferdinand et al., 2015), 3) being 
insightful towards the adversary and intelligence-driven, and 4) 
part of the values of the organization instead of merely a set of 
procedures (Hult et al., 2014).  
These differences can be summarized for each of the two 
concepts of cyber-security and cyber-resilience according to 1) 
aspects of behaviour, e.g., objective and aim, 2) aspects of pattern 
e.g., the approach considered for each of the two concepts, and 3) 
aspects of structure, e.g., the architecture and scope of each 
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concept. A comparison of these dimensions is described in Table 
9. 
Table 9 Cybersecurity versus cyber-resilience 
 Cybersecurity Cyber-resilience 
Objective Protect IT Systems 
(Björck et al., 2015, 
Zhu et al., 2011) 
Maintain business delivery 
performance (Björck et al., 2015) 
Aim Fail-Safe (Björck et 
al., 2015) 
Must identify and 
prepare for all cyber-
attack cases 
(Ferdinand, 2015) 
Safe-to-Fail (Björck et al., 2015) 
Defence against all possible cyber-
attacks is unrealistic (Goldman, 
2010; Ferdinand, 2015) 
Complete mission despite cyber-
attacks (Goldman, 2010) 
Approach Apply security from 
outside (Björck et al., 
2015) 
Building perimeter 
protection (Hult et al., 
2014) 
Top-down control 
mechanism in static 
environment 
(Boyson, 2014) 
Build security from within (Björck 
et al., 2015) 
Capability-built reaction (Hult et 
al., 2014) 
Address fundamental mechanisms 
and real-time world scale of 
adaptive IT Networks (Boyson, 
2014) 
Re-architecting of systems for 
resilience (Goldman, 2010) 
Architecture Single-layered 
protection (Björck et 
al., 2015) 
Multi-disciplinary and integrated 
across departments and disciplines 
(Hult et al., 2014) 
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 Cybersecurity Cyber-resilience 
Information and 
embedded 
automation systems 
are the key protected 
assets (Hult et al., 
2014) 
Purely technical 
means of control 
(Boyson, 2014) 
Multi-layered protection (Björck 
et al., 2015) 
Managerial and human factors 
engineering in preventing risks 
from disrupting IT system’s 
operations (Boyson, 2014) 
High level of collaboration, 
information sharing, cross-training 
and influencing  
Scope Atomistic, one 
organization (Björck 
et al., 2015) 
Holistic, network of organizations 
(Björck et al., 2015) 
Cybersecurity as part of the 
organization’s values (Hult et al., 
2014) 
Requires structural integration 
(Boyson, 2014) 
 
2.7.4 Cyber-resilience frameworks 
Very few of the resilience frameworks present in the synthesis 
sample are described as derived, i.e., are incremental 
contributions, from other previously proposed resilience works. 
As Figure 15 shows, more than 90% of the papers in the synthesis 
sample did not make reference to any other resilience framework. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 10, over half of the papers in the 
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sample, i.e., 33 papers or 53% of the total, made a descriptive 
analysis of the cyber-resilience problem and 26 out of the total 62 
articles (42% of the total) proposed a framework starting from an 
original analysis independent of any existing resilience 
framework, in what could be called a fundamental analysis. 
 
Figure 15 Sample publications per resilience framework 
The term “fundamental analysis” is used mainly in investment 
theory. It is, however, a term with a broader implication, and it 
means an analysis starting from the fundamental forces that create 
the phenomenon that is being described. In the sense of cyber-
resilience frameworks, a fundamental analysis starts from 
assumptions about the reality being described, towards the 
proposal of equations or models based on those assumptions. 
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Table 10 Papers in synthesis sample per resilience framework 
 
The earliest reference to cyber-resilience is the management of 
disruptions derived from cyber threats to the supply chain by 
Warren et al., (2000), where a general framework of managerial 
interventions to counteract cyber-risks was described. Three types 
of interventions were defined: 1) technical interventions to the 
supply system, 2) formal interventions to improve organizational 
and official hierarchical aspects of the supply system, and 3) 
informal interventions, which would be directed to improving the 
human aspects of the supply system. 
This general categorization of intervention types reflects one of 
the characteristics of supply systems, namely the co-existence of 
different dimensions of activity. The proposal by Warren et al. 
(2000) is general and does not specify what these “human” aspects 
consider or what form these “interventions” should take. Warren 
et al. (2000) do not consider any evolution over time hence it is a 
static analysis.  
Resilience Framework Yes No Total
Christopher et al., 2003 1 0 1
Linkov et al., 2013 2 0 2
None 26 30 56
Various 0 3 3
Grand Total 29 33 62
Presents Framework
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 114 of 620 
A static analysis does not consider time as a factor, and it is 
descriptive of a specific state of a system at some point in time. In 
contrast, a dynamic analysis considers time, and more specifically 
the change of the system state through time, as the relevant point 
of description and analysis. 
The proposal by Warren et al. (2000) does not venture into the 
organizational structures that are necessary, and focuses on the 
patterns to be avoided, i.e., risk types, and the patterns to be 
followed to minimize these risks, i.e., intervention types. The 
analysis is presented at a company level and with a strategic 
outlook, presenting overall aims of cyber-resilience. 
Williams et al. (2002) proposed the notion of “electronic supply 
chain” or “eSC” considering variation over time as a relevant 
aspect of analysis, identifying as an advantage that “eSC are 
dynamic and adaptable” (Williams et al., 2002).  
Thus, these authors described the use of electronic supply 
chains as suitable for vertical integration, allowing for 
relationships in the supply chain to move from being merely 
competitive to collaborative. This move changes the paradigm 
from a cost-based to a value-based relationship formation. 
The management of electronic supply chains is proposed by 
Williams et al. (2002) as a circular, nested process with the focal 
company at the centre, and the different stakeholders with whom 
a connection is made “as long as a need is met”, and thus changing 
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over time. Due to the dynamic character of the required 
stakeholder connections, Williams et al. (2002) highlight an 
important advantage of electronic supply chains as the ability to 
reconnect or disconnect as necessary, with high speed and lower 
transaction costs than what they call traditional “arms-length” 
stakeholder relationships. 
The description by Williams et al. (2002) is strategic and at the 
company level. They take a dynamic approach to understanding 
the management of electronic supply chains. This approach is 
presented as a circular, recurring process that adapts over time and 
is as such “extremely dynamic”. 
The description by Williams et al. (2002) proposed advantages 
of electronic supply chains that have not completely materialized. 
The connectivity architecture does not consider the practice to 
connect and disconnect from supply chain partners constantly, but 
rather have a constant connection that is used as necessary. 
Both Williams et al. (2002) and Warren et al. (2000) mention 
the electronic supply chain as a different challenge with respect to 
the existing traditional supply chains. However, despite outlining 
the types of advantages and risks that result from using an 
electronic supply chain, they do not provide an actionable 
framework through which to manage the reaction of the supply 
chain when the risks materialize. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 116 of 620 
Goldman (2010) explored the architecture of what is a resilient 
system. Architecture is “the way in which a system is purposefully 
built for a certain objective aesthetic and functional” (Merriam-
Webster, 2017), and it considers design, method and 
implementation. Therefore, Goldman looks at structures that are 
responsible for the cyber resilient behaviour that is required.  
Goldman proposes looking at the structure instead of only 
protection since “the notion that we can achieve 100% protection 
is not only unrealistic but also results in a false sense of security” 
(Goldman, 2010). Furthermore, “we must change our current 
philosophy that we can keep adversaries out or detect their 
breaches with our first-line defences”.  
Goldman, therefore, argues resilience and particularly cyber-
resilience should be built on the concept of survivability, 
combining the disciplines of performance, security, reliability, 
fault tolerance, and safety to “support a balanced combination of 
protections, detections and adaptive technical and operational 
responses that respond dynamically” (Goldman, 2010). For this 
end he proposes a cycle of objectives, 1) protect and deter, 2) 
detects and monitor, 3) constrain and isolate, 4) maintain and 
recover, and 5) adapt. 
Protect and deter is a result of the adaptive objectives, 
represented through the implementation of the best security 
practices, the assurance of hardware and software integrity and 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 117 of 620 
correctness, the protection of the data, the minimization of the 
essential functions of the system, the consideration of data 
replication, redundancy and diversity, the tolerance of some level 
of failure, and the development of offensive ability. 
Detect and monitor is a result of the protection and deterrence 
objectives, represented through the detection of anomalous 
symptoms both in own system and in the connected partners, the 
monitoring of operating conditions, and the collection of data for 
forensic analysis. 
Constrain and isolate is a result of the detection and monitoring 
objectives, represented through the capacity to configure 
continuity of operations and disaster recovery, and the integration 
of safeguards to contain spread and propagation of damage. 
Maintain and Recover is a result of the constraints and isolation 
objectives, represented through the capacity to degrade parts of 
the system when necessary, the capacity to “fail in a good way” 
(Goldman, 2010) when necessary, and the capacity to return to the 
required operating conditions. 
Adapt is a result of the maintenance and recovery objectives, 
represented through the capacity to operate adaptively, the 
capacity of use hardware, software, data, and processing diversity 
in random ways, the capacity to return quickly to acceptable levels 
of trust, and the ability to confuse the adversary by introducing 
unpredictability, deception and randomness. 
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This dynamic framework proposal is shown in Figure 16 
(Goldman, 2010). 
 
Figure 16 Resilient architecture cycle (Goldman, 2010) 
Goldman (2010), introduces several relevant aspects 1) a 
dynamic approach towards the resilient architecture, 2) the fault 
tolerance approach to consider recovery of operations as a central 
feature of resilience beyond prevention and 3) the indication of 
trust as a relevant feature for recovery as part of the adaptation 
process. Another relevant contribution is that his approach does 
not start with the analysis of the cyber-attacks themselves, i.e., the 
traditional ways of protection, but instead from the analysis of the 
architecture of the system that is vulnerable to these cyber-attacks. 
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Goldman does not propose any quantification to these 
mechanisms and the proposal at the company level of aggregation. 
A common theme among the papers in the synthesis sample is 
the “situational awareness” required to obtain information to 
make decisions. Four domains have been identified by Collier et 
al., (2013), namely the physical, information, cognitive and social 
domains. Initially identified for IT security, Linkov et al., (2013b) 
extended their use as part of his resilience framework for cyber-
systems, from an original application to a generic resilience 
framework (Linkov et al., 2013a).  
The framework as proposed by Linkov et al., (2013a), is the 
earliest evidence of an explicit, actionable framework to evaluate 
the resilience of cyber systems. In this framework Linkov et al 
(2013b) combine two independent dimensions for the assessment 
of a cyber-system: 1) the four domains as mentioned by Collier et 
al., (2013), and 2) the phases of an “event management cycle, 
namely plan/prepare, absorb, recover, and adapt, as proposed by 
the National Academy of Sciences (Cutter et al., 2013). This 
matrix is shown in Figure 17.  
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Figure 17 Resilience matrix (Linkov et al., 2013a) 
Right from the outset of his first proposal for this matrix 
resilience framework, Linkov et al. (2013a) have argued for two 
important obstacles for measuring and thus managing resilience. 
First, the relative success of quantitative risk assessment as a 
dominant paradigm for the design and management of systems 
means that “the pervasive concepts of risk have encroached upon 
the understanding of resilience” (Linkov et al., 2013a). This 
creates a difficulty in understanding the concept of resilience in 
general and cyber-resilience in particular, as these are concepts 
with a much broader scope than risk and cyber-risk respectively, 
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and are “essential when risk is incomputable” (Linkov et al., 
2013a). 
Second, Linkov et al., argue that the fragmentation of the 
knowledge about resilience allows only for incremental 
improvements towards known risks, while critical infrastructure 
cyber-resilience “requires a generalizable approach that is both 
applicable to a diverse array of systems and is revealing of their 
interconnectivity” (Linkov et al., 2013). 
According to Linkov, the areas where relevant resilience 
knowledge for cyber systems is fragmented include 
environmental management, engineering infrastructure, and 
cybersecurity.  
Overall, 44 of the 62 articles in the synthesis sample (71%) did 
not mention change over time in their description and have thus 
been considered as static assessments. Of the articles that actually 
proposed some sort of model for cyber-resilience (29 articles), 
52% of them (15 articles) did not mention change over time as a 
relevant factor. 
2.7.5 Cyber-risks in supply chains 
Warren et al., (2000) mention the risks that are associated with 
a supply network and which are derived from IT-dependent 
processes: 1) the theft of passwords, 2) fraudulent 
communications, 3) traffic overloading, and 4) direct attack. 
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Methods for password theft include systematically using 
possible password combinations until one works out, i.e., 
cracking, or remotely recording the password when entered by an 
approved user, i.e., sniffing. Successfully stolen passwords can 
then be used to access content restricted to the original password 
owner. 
Fraudulent communication is produced by transmitting 
messages that appear to be legitimate or by faking information 
about the origin of the message, allowing the acceptance of this 
message by the receiver. This is called message spoofing. A 
different type of spoofing was identified as the fraudulent creation 
of a website that appears to be legitimate, and as a result get 
unsuspecting users to share some confidential information. This is 
called web spoofing. 
The purposeful overloading of the digital traffic is created 
towards a specific digital destination, to disable its function 
temporarily. In this way, the availability of these systems is 
obstructed for legitimate use. An example of this is what Warren 
et al., (2000) calls the “ping of death”. “Ping” is a type of message 
sent from one computer to another to find out if the destination 
computer is active. The destination computer can be affected by 
sending repeated ping messages and thus disabling its use for 
other purposes, or a ping message can be sent that is too big 
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causing the destination machine to crash or reboot. These attacks 
are called Denial of Service Attacks (DDOS). 
Finally, the direct attacks identified by Warren et al., (2000) 
were broadly described as “hacking to destroy, modify or extract 
data”, without specifying the detail process to achieve these. 
Goldman (2010) explores the techniques and mechanisms for 
cyber-resilience from the point of view of the particular 
characteristics of cyber-threats.  
The following table shows this relationship between the 
techniques and their characteristics, with the specific cyber-threat 
characteristic that Goldman (2010) indicates the technique seeks 
to address. 
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Table 11 Cyber threat characteristics vs. cyber-defence techniques 
Resilience 
technique 
Technique 
characteristics Cyber-threat characteristic 
Diversity / 
Redundancy 
Designed into 
hardware, software 
and components. 
Single point  of contact can 
have multiple consequences in 
similar parts of the system, and 
cause systems to fail 
sequentially (cascade effects) 
Integrity 
Beyond integrity 
checks, e.g., MD5, 
SHA, validate 
different independent 
and random parts of 
the system 
Cyber threats that change 
existing information, code or 
function of a system, are often 
invisible, and render 
contingency plans such as 
replication or transfer of 
services, ineffective.  
Isolation / 
Segmentation / 
Containment 
/Least privilege 
Separate critical from 
non-critical data and 
connections. 
Cyber-threats take advantage 
of connectivity and 
interconnections 
Separate activities 
and data for different 
levels of privilege 
Cyber-attacks access through 
the untrustworthy parts of the 
system (e.g., end-user client 
systems)  
Cyber-threats outpace 
patching, which is reactive. 
Detection / 
Monitoring 
Correlation of 
meaningful threat 
indicators and trends, 
and detecting 
compromises to 
integrity 
Cyber-threats need not 
immediately have an effect, 
but merely gather data. 
Non-
persistence 
Image keeping of 
systems for 
restoration, Evaluate 
if continuous 
connectivity is 
essential. 
Cyber threats affect systems 
that can be restored to a 
previous state, and access can 
be eliminated when necessary 
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Resilience 
technique 
Technique 
characteristics Cyber-threat characteristic 
Distributed and 
moving target 
defence 
Decentralize 
processing, distribute 
data, and synchronize 
as necessary. 
Randomize this 
process. 
Single point  of contact can 
have multiple consequences in 
similar parts of the system, and 
cause systems to fail 
sequentially (cascade effects) 
Adaptive 
management 
and response 
Have damage 
assessment dynamic 
capability 
Cyber-threats create damage 
which can be unpredictable 
Randomness 
unpredictability 
and deception 
Techniques such as 
Misinformation, 
Entrapment 
techniques (e.g., 
Honeypots), 
customized protocols, 
code, solutions, self-
protecting data- self 
modifying code, code 
and data obfuscation. 
Cyber threats gather data and 
patterns to identify targets 
 
Other authors expand on the taxonomy of cyber-risks from the 
economic perspective (Min et al., 2005; Andrijcic et al., 2006) and 
from the human factors perspective (Brown, 2016; Wilding, 2016) 
2.7.6 SCADA as cyber-physical interfaces 
Several of the papers in the synthesis sample went beyond 
strategy to explore the way in which cyber-threats affect 
operations, particularly through SCADA. The Supervisory 
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are systems that 
use computers, networked data and graphical user interfaces to 
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manage processes from a high-level. SCADA systems are seen as 
crucial components of operational systems to gather data for 
decision making, and are a direct interphase between digital data 
and the physical consequences of a decision made with that data 
(McQueen et al., 2006; Zhu et al., 2011a; Onyeji et al., 2014; 
Barron et al., 2016; Taormina et al., 2017; Ashok et al., 2017; Li 
et al., 2017). 
Despite being used for decades in different forms, SCADA 
systems remained relatively obscure in the cyber-threat landscape 
until the news of the most significant cyber-attack against critical 
infrastructure up until then (Onyeji et al., 2014), the Stuxnet 
malware attack against the Natanz nuclear-enrichment facility in 
Iran starting in 2009. 
The relevance of SCADA systems can be described through a 
generalized process control diagram, illustrated in Figure 18.  
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 127 of 620 
 
Figure 18 Control process diagram 
The SCADA is a central part of the operation as it uses control 
algorithms defined by human controllers to influence a controlled 
process in the real world, in a decision loop that adjusts according 
to the information obtained from sensors about the world. 
“Control systems” are a ubiquitous concept used to experience and 
interact with the world. 
SCADA systems obtain information from the controlled 
process through sensors, process this information according to 
some type of algorithm and react by acting on the controlled 
process through some type of actuator. This is a continuous 
process of adjustment in a flow that makes the physical world 
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interact with information that is generated from it, i.e., a cyber-
physical system.  
Additionally, the decision algorithms are determined by an 
objective set by a human controller who does not necessarily take 
an active part in the process control. The human controller is 
informed by some interface in the SCADA system about the 
current and historical operating conditions. Furthermore, this 
human controller can override the SCADA system by directly 
activating the actuators or by directly obtaining information from 
the sensors. 
SCADA systems differ from other IT systems in their primary 
security goal: while IT security focuses on the protection of the 
server over the user, SCADA security focuses on protecting the 
performance of the process (Zhu et al., 2011), and is thus closer to 
what is understood as cyber-resilience. SCADA systems were 
originally intended as closed systems, yet they are being 
connected to the Internet to drive physical infrastructure, 
increasing the risk of security breaches (Onyeji et al., 2014). Thus, 
SCADA systems are increasingly the subject of case analyses to 
identify the taxonomy of the cyber-risks to which they are exposed 
(Zhu et al., 2011). Moreover, simulations have been recently used 
to understand SCADA systems reactions to prospective attack 
scenarios (Taormina et al., 2017). 
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2.8 Answering the initial research sub-questions 
This section details the answers to the research sub-questions 
that justified the SLR. It discusses 1) the extent of the answers that 
are possible with the evidence that was obtained from the 
synthesis sample and 2) the aspects which are not possible to 
answer with the data that that was obtained, i.e., gaps in the 
knowledge. These gaps result in further research questions 
pursued during the remaining thesis. 
2.8.1 Research sub-question 1 
The first research sub-question relates to the existence of 
frameworks for managing cyber-resilience in supply chains: 
Research sub-question 1 (RSQ1): 
What are the supply chain cyber-
resilience frameworks published in 
literature? 
According to the systems thinking framework level involved, 
the cyber-resilience frameworks found from the synthesis sample 
were catalogued either as descriptive, normative or quantitative. 
Descriptive frameworks concentrate on the events, normative 
frameworks focus on the patterns behind events, and the 
quantitative frameworks delve into the structures that generate 
those patterns. 
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The descriptive frameworks were the frameworks found in the 
older data, are mostly derived from the SCM knowledge domain, 
and are primarily strategic in nature. The identified descriptive 
frameworks that were found provided organizational, 
macroeconomic or systems descriptions of the cyber-resilience 
phenomenon.  
72% of the identified frameworks in the synthesis sample are 
normative frameworks that deal with the patterns underlying 
cyber-resilience. The sample presented an even distribution 
between frameworks from the SCM and the ITM knowledge 
domains. Moreover, there was an even distribution between 
strategic and operational approaches. 
The quantitative frameworks were found to be more recent and 
derive from the ITM knowledge domain. These frameworks are 
mostly operative in their approach. The frameworks and their 
descriptors - knowledge domain, and strategic versus operative - 
is laid out in Table 12. 
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Table 12 Cyber-resilience frameworks found in the literature 
Type Description Supporting Literature 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
Op
er
at
iv
e 
SC
M
 
IT
M
 
R&
RM
 
Descriptive 
(Event 
Related) 
Focal Company 
with concentric 
stakeholders 
Williams et al., 
2002 x   x     
Macroeconomic 
descriptive 
evaluation  
Andrijcic et al., 
2006;  
Kelic et al., 
2013;  
x       x 
Systems 
description 
DiMase et al., 
2015 x   x     
Normative 
(Pattern 
Related) 
Resilient 
Architecture 
Goldman, 2010;  
Goldman et al., 
2011;  
Lee et al., 2017;  
Conklin et al., 
2017 
x     x   
Robust and 
Resilient Control 
Zhu et al., 2011;  
Krotofil et al., 
2013;  
Arghandeh et 
al., 2016; 
Li et al., 2017 
  x   x   
Four Domains of 
Cyber resilience 
Collier et al., 
2013 x   x     
Plan/prepare - 
absorb - recover 
- adapt cycle  
Linkov e al., 
2013 x   x     
Autonomous 
reconstitution 
Ramuhalli et al., 
2013   x   x   
Attack graphs Abraham et al., 2015   x   x   
Multi-network 
Choudhury et 
al., 2015;  
Taormina et al., 
2017 
  x   x   
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Type Description Supporting Literature 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
Op
er
at
iv
e 
SC
M
 
IT
M
 
R&
RM
 
Information-
centric approach Davis, 2015 x   x     
Monitor - 
analyse - decide 
- change cycle 
Ferdinand et al., 
2015 x   x     
5-layer 
networked 
architecture  
Harrison et al., 
2016   x   x   
Wide area 
monitoring, 
protection and 
control 
(WAMPAC) 
Ashok et al., 
2017   x   x   
Quantitative 
(Structure 
Related 
Time to 
Compromise 
McQueen et al., 
2006 x     x   
Resource 
exhaustion cyber 
resilience 
Fink et al., 2014   x   x   
System 
Dynamics 
simulation of 
cyber resilience 
(Epidemiological) 
Tran et al., 2016 x       x 
 
2.8.2 Research sub-question 2 
The second sub-question refers to the experience gathered 
about the cyber-attacks on supply chains. 
Research sub-question 2 (RSQ2): 
Which case studies have been 
published about supply chain cyber-
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resilience with operational 
disruption? 
From the synthesis sample, only 6 of the papers (10%) 
presented case descriptions of cyber-attacks. Most of the papers 
(80%) that presented a case were from the SCM knowledge 
domain. 
Table 13 Cases presented in the synthesis sample papers 
Case industry Paper year 
Case 
year 
Supporting 
literature Anonymous? 
Education/Training 2012 
Future 
Project 
Rajamäki et al., 
2012 No 
Nuclear 2013 2010 
Herrington et al., 
2013 No 
Pharmaceutical 
Industry 2014 2010 Boyson, 2014 Yes 
Government 
Agency 2014 2011 Boyson, 2014 Yes 
Communication 
systems 2015 1998 
Ahmad et al., 
2015 No 
Maritime industry 2015 2011 Jansen, 2015 No 
Retail industry 2015 2012 
DiMase et al., 
2015 No 
Entertainment 
Industry 2015 2014 
DiMase et al., 
2015 No 
Communication 
Systems 2016 2001 Tran et al., 2016 No 
 
Beyond the presentation itself, the way in which the cases are 
presented is also relevant. Only the cases for the nuclear industry 
(Herrington et al., 2013), and the communication systems cases 
(Ahmad et al., 2015; Tran et al., 2016) contain some type of 
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structure of action through which a cyber-attack became an 
operational disruption. 
2.9 Expanding the research questions 
Having provided answers to the research sub-questions 1 and 
2, the next step consists of confirming if these answers are 
sufficient to answer the main research question, and if not, where 
the gaps lie. These gaps then structure the subsequent questions 
that are to be further answered by this thesis. 
Answering the main research question seeks to provide ways in 
which cyber-risks can be managed in the global supply chain: 
 
Main Research Question (RQ): How 
can global supply chains manage 
security from, and resilience to cyber-
risks? 
 
A definition of management is “the judicious use of means to 
accomplishing an end, through conducting or supervising 
something” (Merriam-Webster, 2017). From the answers that are 
provided to the research sub-questions, 1 and 2 different gaps can 
be identified. The gaps that have been classified as either referring 
to 1) the cyber-risks being managed, 2) the methods that have so 
far been proposed to manage the phenomenon of cyber-risk and 
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resilience in the supply chain, or 3) the people using the proposed 
methods to manage the phenomenon of cyber-risk and resilience 
in the global supply chain. Each gap type is discussed in detail. 
2.9.1 Gap type 1: the reporting of cyber-risks 
The synthesis sample shows that there is a clear lack of 
evidence in the published literature about the cyber-disruptions. 
This is reflected by the low number of cases that were described 
in the papers of the synthesis sample. Despite this SLR having 
been a comprehensive search of published literature, this lack of 
case evidence is not necessarily surprising due to factors such as 
the long reporting cycles, unreliable reporting and underreporting. 
Long reporting cycles. As indicated in Table 13, the average 
time from the point when the cases were experienced until when 
these were published is 6,2 years. This is an exceedingly long time 
for events of cyber-attacks that have been unfolding rapidly. For 
example, the Wannacry virus attack event that was mentioned 
during the introduction made use of an exploit1 which had been 
made public by the website Wikileaks only two months 
previously. With examples of two-month implementation cycles 
                                              
 
1 Exploit is understood in this context as a software tool designed to take advantage 
of a flaw in a computer system, typically for malicious purposes. 
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by hackers, reporting cycles of over 6 years severely question the 
suitability of the peer-reviewed process as it currently stands, for 
understanding and advancing the science around cyber-risks and 
security in supply chains. 
Unreliable reporting. Onyeji et al., (2014) indicate that “exact 
global figures on cybercrime are difficult to locate and prone to 
inflation”, and the phenomenon suffers a general lack of reliable 
data (McQueen et al., 2006). In a revealing article, Florencio and 
his team argue for the unreliability of the available information 
about cyber-crimes, as research shows that cyber-crime estimates 
“appear to be largely the answers of a handful of non-
representative people extrapolated to the whole population”, with 
“vagueness and lack of clarity about what is being measured” and 
that “75% of the cyber-crime estimates come from unverified self-
reported answers” (Florencio et al., 2013). Hyman (2013) argues 
that the reports about the effects of malware should not be created 
by companies that profit from the commercialization of anti-
malware software as this would lead to inflated statistics to scare 
consumers into purchasing their products. Similarly, Herrington 
et al., (2013) argue that “most cyber-crime statistics are 
contested”, by being perceived as “merely a sales promotion 
exercise for specialist security firms”. Moreover, official agencies 
have been severely criticized in the calculation of the cost of 
cyber-crime, for the lack of transparency in ascribing probabilities 
to the occurrence of cyber-attacks, based on “questionable 
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calculations that are impossible for outsiders to verify” (Moore, 
2011), revealing a problem of transparency in the process of 
cyber-risk calculation. Onyeji et al (2014) also mention that 
“determining the likelihood and severity of cyber-risks have 
proven to be very difficult”. These phenomena would add to the 
unreliability of the available information about cyber-crime. 
Underreporting of incidents. Different authors report the high 
likelihood of underreporting of cyber-crimes (Hyman, 2013; 
Herrington et al, 2013; Onyeji et al., 2014). Hyman (2013) 
indicates four hurdles that seem to be driving a generalized 
underreporting of cyber-events. 1) market incentives not to report 
due to effects on the business performance of the reporting 
companies, such as the reticence of many organizations about 
reporting of cyber-crimes to government agencies because they do 
not trust how the information is used 2) a self-selection bias 
derived from the losses, i.e., the higher the perceived loss from a 
cyber-crime, the more likely the company is to report it, and the 
likelihood of companies with small or no perceived losses to avoid 
reporting the cyber-crime, 3) the lack of a standard mechanism for 
reporting cyber-crimes, with no widespread method for including 
the costs of cyber-crime. For example, Hyman (2013) mentions 
downtime costs, cost of buying new equipment or the cost of 
upgrading the security as being included at times in the losses 
from cyber-crimes, 4) undetected losses, as many organizations 
are not aware of the losses they have had from an undetected 
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cyber-crime. Similarly, Herrington et al., (2013) mention that 
“victims are not ready to admit to cyber-breaches, and in some 
cases, they do not know that they have been attacked”. An 
example of this is a cyber-attack to the port of Antwerp in 2013; 
when it was discovered, it was at least 2 years old (Boyes, 2015). 
Of the cases that were reported, 60% of them made reference 
to the economic implications of the cyber-crimes, and only 30% 
of them made any reference to the way in which these cyber-
crimes actually created the disruption. Therefore, the data 
gathered through the SLR gives evidence of a lack of information 
about how the cyber-crimes actually result in operational 
disruptions affecting business, due to insufficient information on 
the mechanisms that result in the disruption. 
2.9.2 Gap type 2: the methods being used  
With respect to the methods that have so far been proposed to 
manage the phenomenon of cyber-risk and security in the global 
supply chain, two main gaps were found in the literature that was 
reviewed through the SLR, related to the compartmentalization of 
the knowledge about cyber-resilience, to the static nature of 
current frameworks, the historical-dependence of current 
methods, and the suitability of current methods for managing 
cyber-risks. 
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Compartmentalization is “the separation into isolated 
categories or compartments” (Merriam-Webster, 2017). 
Compartmentalization in the understanding and management of 
cyber-risks was mentioned by different authors as either a need 
for a more comprehensive method; (Khan et al., 2015b), or a 
calling for structural integration (Boyson, 2014), through 
approaches such as addressing jointly multiple levels of 
aggregation through which cyber-resilience can be understood 
(Björck et al., 2015), or addressing the different domains where 
cyber-resilience decision making takes place, namely the 
physical, information, cognitive, and social domains (Linkov et 
al., 2013b; Collier et al., 2014). The existing 
compartmentalization might be a result of using analytic reduction 
for managing organizations, methods inherited from an era with 
limited connectivity and complexity. As mentioned in the 
introduction, IT has dramatically changed both connectivity and 
complexity of supply chains. Cyber-resilience has been described 
to be “as much working with existing technology as it is about 
secure technology” as “cyber-resilience has less to do with 
information protection and more with operational control and 
trust in systems” (Hult et al., 2014) thus involving human and 
technological development. Compartmentalization has been 
described as penetrating even the strategic levels of the company, 
as can be evidenced by the few IT experts ending up on company 
boards outside the technology sector (Herrington et al., 2013). 
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Another important evidence of compartmentalization is the 
different disciplines where the knowledge about cyber-resilience 
is being advanced, which includes environmental management, 
engineering infrastructure, and cybersecurity (Linkov et al., 
2013). As a result, there is a perceived lack of integration for 
effective management of cyber-risks across disciplines and across 
departments, and as a result across decision domains, allowing for 
only incremental improvements in the management of these risks. 
A static approach is one that does not consider time, 
particularly variation over time, as its main focus. The static 
characteristic of cyber-resilience frameworks is highlighted by 
authors through the problems this approach generates, resulting in 
that “most companies do not know how to respond to cyber-risks 
in real time” (Boyson, 2014), indicating that “traditional static 
risk assessments are expected to become obsolete as new 
technology and methods become available”, (Collier et al., 2014). 
More than 50% of the models found in the SLR did not make a 
reference to change in time as a relevant factor and thus are not 
able to consider real-time reaction. Other authors mention the 
need for situational awareness which is the “perception of the 
elements in the environment in time and space, the comprehension 
of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future” (Abraham et al., 2015). This is required to counteract the 
“velocity in cyber-attack spread” (Tran et al., 2016). Velocity is a 
concept that is invisible to traditional static methods. 
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The historical-dependence of traditional cyber-risk assessment 
methods incorporate history in aspects such as probability 
calculations, and this was present in 66% of the quantitative 
methods for cyber-resilience proposed in literature as found 
through the SLR (McQueen et al., 2006; Fink et al., 2014) The 
problem with history-based methods is that “cyber domain 
changes are so quick that there is no historical data for potential 
threats” (Collier et al., 2014), as “cyber threats cannot be clearly 
identified and quantified through historical measures due to the 
rapidly changing threat environment” (DiMase et al., 2015). It is, 
therefore, is likely that “companies will have to face unexpected 
risks for which no mitigation strategies had been planned in 
advance” (Urcioli, 2015). 
The suitability of methods refers to how these methods address 
the characteristics of cyber-risks to manage the response to 
disruptions from cyber-attacks. No discussion was found in the 
data in the synthesis sample about the suitability of the proposed 
methods because 1) no literature review was found that discussed 
cyber-resilience frameworks: Only Khan et al., (2015a) made 
reference to existing resilience frameworks in supply chains with 
limited references to their suitability for managing cyber-risk and 
resilience, 2) only 10% of the articles in the synthesis sample 
made a reference to resilience frameworks in other disciplines, 
and 3) no discussion was found to the particular characteristics of 
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cyber-risks, if any, to determine the suitability of the suggested 
methods. 
2.9.3 Gap type 3: the people using the methods 
With respect to the people using the methods for managing 
cyber-risk and resilience in supply chains, some authors mention 
the failure to develop IT security education at a sufficient scale, 
which now is affecting how cyber-resilience is understood among 
users, highlighting as an example the low level of literacy among 
UK civil servants about internet or cybersecurity (Herrington et 
al., 2013). This gap in the needs for cyber-literacy in an 
organization can render other cyber-resilience measures useless or 
inadvertently help propagate the effects of a cyber-attack (Chaves 
et al., 2017). 
2.9.4 Further research questions 
The gaps found in the SLR for answering the main research 
question give rise to new research sub-questions to guide the 
development of this thesis research. The questions derived from 
the gaps found in the analysis are shown in Table 14. 
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Table 14 Potential research questions from gaps in SLR 
Concept Gaps from SLR Research sub-question 
The cyber-
risks being 
managed 
Long reporting cycle 
of incidents 
How can the available 
knowledge about cyber risks be 
quickly shared for better 
management? 
Unreliable reporting 
of incidents 
How can the reporting reliability 
of cyber risks be improved? 
Underreporting of 
incidents 
What incentives can be 
implemented for companies to 
report cyber-incidents? 
Mechanisms of action 
from cyber-attack to 
operational disruption 
How do cyber risks cause 
operational disruption in supply 
chains? 
The methods 
being used to 
manage 
cyber risks 
Compartmentalization 
What comprehensive methods 
can be used in supply chains for 
cyber risk and resilience 
assessment? 
Static frameworks 
What dynamic methods can be 
used in supply chains for cyber 
risk and resilience assessment? 
Historical frameworks 
What non-history dependent 
methods can be used in supply 
chains for cyber risk and 
resilience assessment? 
Suitability of methods 
How suitable are cyber-
resilience management methods 
to the characteristics of cyber 
risks 
The people 
using the 
methods 
Knowledge Gap How can the cyber-literacy in supply chains be improved? 
 
The main research question of this thesis points to the methods 
that can be used by organizations to manage security from and 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 144 of 620 
response to cyber-risks, by deriving tools and techniques through 
which supply chains can prepare for, and react to disruptions to 
their physical operations from cyber-risks.  
From the gaps that have been outlined in Table 14, the main 
research with respect to methodology corresponds to the 
suitability of the methods, compartmentalization of methods, 
static nature of methods and history-based characteristics of 
methods used for managing cyber-resilience. 
The structuring of the research question(s) and sub-question(s) 
is essential for helping the stakeholders understand their problem 
better, and for keeping them interested and focused on a problem 
they care about (Booth et al., 1995), and, as in other business 
disciplines, scientific success in the research of SCM is to a great 
extent determined by the practical relevance of the results 
(Freimann, 1994). 
Therefore, the answer to close the research sub-questions must 
be relevant to companies that are struggling to make sense of the 
apparent contradiction found in being exposed to an increasing 
cyber-threat landscape despite existing R&RM processes.  
As a result, the research sub-questions that are pursued further 
in this research are broken down into two objectives. First, 
understanding the nature of cyber-risks and how these differ from 
other supply chain risks. To understand the particular 
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characteristics of cyber-risks to supply chains, a first research sub-
question is proposed: 
Research sub-question 3 (RSQ3): How 
do cyber-risks cause operational 
disruption in supply chains, and how 
does this differ from other supply chain 
risks?  
This composite question RSQ3 addresses the partly the SLR 
gap regarding the thing being managed, with respect to 
mechanisms of action, and the SLR gap regarding the methods 
being used, in respect to the suitability of methods (see Table 14). 
Second, proposing tools from the systems thinking point of 
view, appropriate to the nature of cyber-risks that address some of 
the gaps found in current response management methods available 
to supply chains. The use of systems thinking as a framework for 
proposing the tools is explained in depth in the Methodology 
chapter of this work. Therefore the following research sub-
question is proposed: 
Research sub-question 4 (RSQ4): How 
can a systems approach be used to 
mitigate compartmentalization, static 
frameworks and historical-
dependence for managing cyber-risks 
in the supply chain?  
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As a result, the overall structure of enquiry for this thesis 
becomes the one represented in Figure 2, as shown in the 
Introduction of this thesis. 
2.10 Thesis structure to answer the research questions 
The chapters in this thesis cover the research questions as 
indicated in Figure 19. This figure also shows the relationship of 
each chapter to answering the research questions. 
 
Figure 19 Structure of this thesis 
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2.11 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter provided a background for the literature review 
process, described the suitability of carrying out an SLR, 
identified the biases present in the review process and outlined the 
choice of systems thinking as the framework through which the 
literature review is analysed thematically. 
Furthermore, this chapter described in detail the systematic 
literature review method used, and presented the results, first in 
descriptive terms and then thematically. 
Finally, the initial research sub-question are answered, relevant 
gaps found in the literature are outlined, and the remaining 
research questions and strategy of enquiry was completed which 
the rest of this thesis proceeds to answer. 
The process of answering these research questions follows a 
process derived from a specific worldview or philosophical 
position. This position and the subsequent derivation of chosen 
processes for answering the research questions are described and 
explained next in the methodology chapter. 
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3 Methodology 
This chapter describes the need for a clear methodology as an 
essential part of sound scientific contributions, and gives a 
detailed account of the methodologies followed in this thesis 
work. 
The chapter starts by discussing the strategic aspects: the 
philosophical position taken throughout this study followed by the 
explanation of the approach to theory development chosen for this 
work, also known as the “logic” of the research. Thereafter the 
design aspects are discussed: the methods used for the research 
are explained and arguments for their choice are given. The 
chapter continues with an explanation of the strategies considered 
in the research, to then finalize by explaining the tactic aspects of 
this research, namely the data collection and data analysis 
methods for each of the research questions, and the considerations 
for the quality of the research are laid out. 
3.1 Relevance of the methodology 
In order to answer the research questions, specific processes are 
followed, based on assumptions concerning the nature of the 
problem and the proposed ways/methods in which these gaps can 
be closed and how a theoretical contribution is made from this 
process. This chapter deals with the methods used in this thesis, 
the philosophical foundation upon which these methods were 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 150 of 620 
chosen, as well as a critical analysis of their advantages and 
limitations. 
Having a clear, explicit and consistent framework for analysing 
the methodology followed in this work, is a fundamental starting 
point from where knowledge can be built in a coherent way. Boer 
has proposed that, due to the need of embracing the 
epistemological diversity present in the operations management 
research community, a meaningful contribution proposal does not 
necessarily rely on following a strict set of criteria, but rather 
through consistency (Boer et al., 2015). As Jonathan Grix put it, 
“research should be judged on how its constituent parts logically 
link together, and not by which methods are used” (Grix, 2002). 
The framework used in this thesis for structuring the 
methodology proposal and thus ensuring consistency is based on 
the “research onion” as proposed by Saunders et al., (2016). This 
approach for framing the research project framework is based on 
a layered understanding of the conditions and assumptions that 
lead to the specific chosen research configuration. The choice in 
each layer serves both as input and border conditions of the 
available choices for the subsequent layers in the configuration. 
The layers considered through this research structuring approach 
are 1) the research philosophy, 2) the approach to theory 
development, 3) the methodological choice, 4) the strategies and 
the time horizon and finally, 5) the techniques and procedures that 
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are followed. A graphical representation of the onion can be seen 
in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20 The research “onion” (Saunders et al., 2016) 
Therefore, in following the “research onion” approach to 
understanding research, the methodology chapter starts with a 
detailed overview for each of these methodological “layers. 
Based on the description of the complexity that characterizes 
the topic of cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain, the 
approach followed in this thesis work is that of systems thinking. 
It was already introduced briefly in the literature review chapter 
when detailing the analysis framework, but its choice is justified 
in detail in this chapter. Furthermore, the methodological 
implications of choosing systems thinking for this work are 
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described, from the philosophical position down to the data 
gathering procedures. 
3.2 Systems thinking theory 
This section explains in a concise manner the foundations and 
philosophical implications of systems thinking and of the 
methodology of System Dynamics (SD). Considering that SD has 
been explored by an active community for many decades having 
implementations in different areas of human activity and 
influence, only the essential aspects of the systems thinking and 
SD are reviewed in this section of the thesis, as these are needed 
to understand the assessment tools being used to advance theory 
and answer the research questions later in this work. Therefore 
this exposition represents a limited view of what SD has to offer.  
Readers interested in deepening their knowledge beyond what 
is presented in this thesis are encouraged to refer to the works by 
Forrester (1961), Randers (1981), Richardson (1991), Bossel 
(1994), Sterman (2000) and Meadows (2008), and to reach out to 
the System Dynamics Society2 and the Creative Learning 
Exchange3. 
                                              
 
2 http://www.systemdynamics.org 
3 http://www.clexchange.org 
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3.2.1 Background 
Systems theory is an approach that started in the late 1930’s by 
the combination of emergent ideas from different fields into a 
general theory of systems, combination advanced by from Norbert 
Wiener (1948) from the control and communications engineering 
knowledge domain, and later by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968) 
from the biology knowledge domain, the latter being recognized 
as the founder of this movement (Leveson, 1995). Von 
Bertalanffy argued that the classical conceptualization of a closed 
system according to thermodynamics was not applicable to large 
classes of phenomena. Systems theory was born therefore as a 
response to certain limitations of traditional science at the time for 
coping with complexity. 
Traditional science is based on the precepts of repeatability and 
refutation, both of these based on the principle of analytic 
reduction, also called “reductionism”. Analytic reduction, 
credited to Rene Descartes (1596-1650), postulates that problems 
can be divided into identifiable parts, and then each part can be 
examined separately, making in the process three important 
assumptions (Checkland, 1981): 
• Dividing the problem into components does not distort the 
phenomenon being studied, 
• Every component is the same when examined on its own as 
when it is part of the whole, and 
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• The principles governing the interaction of the components 
is straightforward. 
These assumptions are reasonable for a big group of systems 
with physical regularities, and which has been described as having 
“organized simplicity” (Weinberg, 1975). For these systems, the 
interactions between components are known, and the interactions 
can be examined in pairs, limiting the number of possible 
interactions. This allows the system to be separated into 
subsystems without affecting the resulting behaviour of the 
system. Structural mechanics in physics has been highly 
successful in applying this model to systems in theory 
development. 
The second type of system is those said to have “unorganized 
complexity” (Weinberg, 1975), which do not have a clear 
underlying structure for the application of reductionism. These 
systems are then treated as aggregates, considering them complex 
but regular, and an understanding is gained by treating them as 
exchangeable units and calculating some mathematical moment, 
such as averages or standard deviations for some behaviour of 
interest. The basis for this approach is the “law of large numbers” 
whereby the larger population being studied, the more likely that 
the observed values are close to the predicted average values. For 
example, statistical mechanics is an example of the application of 
this approach. 
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However, there is a third type of system which exhibits what 
has been called “organized complexity” (Weinberg, 1975), which 
have been identified as those systems that are too complex for a 
complete analysis, but too organized for statistics. Systems 
exhibiting organized complexity describe many of the engineering 
systems that have been created post World War II, as well as 
biological systems and social system, and all these are the subject 
of systems thinking theory (Leveson, 1995). 
Moreover, the combinatorial complexity that has been 
described above, also known as detail complexity (Sterman, 2000, 
p.21), i.e., the complexity derived from the number of system 
components and relationships, is not the only complexity possible. 
Dynamic complexity arises from the interactions among the 
system components over time. Therefore dynamic complexity can 
arise even in systems with low combinatorial complexity. This 
dynamic complexity arises because (Sterman, 2000, p.22): 
• Systems are dynamic, i.e., their structure changes over time, 
• Systems are tightly coupled, i.e., the components of the 
system interact constantly 
• Systems are governed by feedback, as the actions of a 
system modify the state of the system and its environment, 
which in turn condition future decisions. Dynamics are the 
result of these feedbacks (Richardson, 1991), 
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• Systems are nonlinear, as the effect on the behaviour is 
rarely proportional to the cause, 
• Systems have delays, as the effects are not necessarily 
expressed right after the cause, 
• Systems are history-dependent, where future decision 
options are conditioned by the decisions taken before, and 
some of those decisions are irreversible, i.e., those decisions 
cannot be undone, 
• Systems are self-organizing, inasmuch as their dynamics 
are borne from its internal structure, 
• Systems are adaptive, as they react and change decision 
rules of the constituent agents over time. 
• Systems are counterintuitive, partly due to cause and effect 
being distant in space and/or time, partly because attention 
is drawn rather to symptoms than to underlying causes,  
• Systems are policy resistant, derived from the complexity 
of the systems in which human activity is embedded, 
overwhelming the intuitive ability to understand them; as a 
result, apparently obvious solutions result in a deteriorating 
situation, 
• Systems are characterized by trade-offs, as the delays 
present result in a behaviour in the long run that is different 
from the short-term results. Worse-before-better behaviour 
is a result of this when immediate yet transitory 
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performance deterioration gives way to performance 
improvements in the long run, or vice versa, known as 
“better-before-worse behaviour” (Sterman, 2000), when 
immediate yet transitory improvements are followed by 
long-run system performance deterioration. 
Systems thinking has a focus on understanding systems as a 
whole rather than about their parts separately, and it considers that 
there are system properties that can only be understood correctly 
taking into account social and technical aspects (Ramo, 1998; 
Sterman, 2000). These system properties are generated by the 
relationships of the parts that constitute the system, such as their 
fit and interaction. Therefore a systems approach focuses on the 
analysis and design of the whole instead of the components or the 
parts. 
Systems theory is based on two pairs of ideas: emergence and 
hierarchy, and communication and control (Checkland, 1981, 
Leveson, 1995). 
A system can be organized in increasing levels of complexity, 
where a higher level is said to have a higher level of complexity 
as well, and encompassing greater aggregation. This approach 
allows for the identification of levels of hierarchy, where each 
level is characterized by emergent properties, i.e., those properties 
that would be meaningless in a lower level, but which can be used 
to describe a higher level of the hierarchy. For example, the shape 
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of an apple is an emergent property which would not be 
understood when analysing the apple at a molecular level, as it is 
the result of a complex network of interactions at the molecular 
level, and which can only be observed when understanding the 
system from a higher level of the hierarchy. In the same way, 
supply chain cyber-resilience can be considered an emergent 
property that cannot be understood from the individual 
transactions between the components of the supply chain, but is 
the result of a complex network of interactions at the individual 
transaction level, and which can only be understood from the 
supply chain level of hierarchy. 
The constraints imposed on a specific hierarchical level from a 
hierarchical level above it, which define the ways in which that 
lower level can behave, are the “control actions” effected between 
hierarchical levels. As such, the application in man-made systems 
of the control mechanisms seen in natural systems has been 
studied by a branch of systems theory known as “cybernetics”. 
Therefore the description of control processes “necessarily 
required taking into account at least two levels of hierarchy”, and 
as such, “the upper level is a source of an alternative and simpler 
description of the lower level in terms of specific functions that 
are emergent as a result of the imposition of constraints” 
(Checkland, 1981).  
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The phenomenon of control in open systems (i.e., those that 
have inputs and outputs from the environment) introduces the 
need for communication of information for regulation and control: 
the information is obtained from the controlled process through 
some form of sensor, and the process is influenced by 
communicating information through some type of actuator, as it 
can be seen in Figure 18. In that figure, communication takes place 
in the cyber-physical as well as the socio-technical level, and the 
algorithms and set points provided by the human controller to the 
SCADA system (see section 2.7.6), correspond to the control 
actions effected by the socio-technical hierarchy on the cyber-
physical hierarchy. 
If this reasoning progresses from the system controlling some 
physical process to higher levels of hierarchy, these higher levels 
would sequentially consider operations management as a higher 
hierarchy to the process control, as it looks at different controlled 
processes; company management as a higher hierarchy than 
operations management as it considers different parts of the 
company; governmental regulatory authorities as a higher 
hierarchy than company management as they consider different 
companies in their geographical influence, and so on.  
Leveson (2011) developed a generalized representation of this 
generalized hierarchical control system, represented in Figure 21. 
Every hierarchy determines operational boundaries for the lower 
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levels and receives information from the lower levels as well. 
Therefore, the level of aggregation, i.e., the hierarchy level that is 
chosen to model a system is conditioned by the questions that are 
to be answered. 
 
Figure 21 Hierarchy of a sociotechnical system (Leveson, 2011) 
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3.2.2 Basic definitions 
In order to build the foundation of systems thinking as 
applicable to this thesis, some definitions are necessary (Forrester, 
1961; Bossel, 1994; Sterman, 2000). 
• The system has been defined as “a set of components that 
act together as a whole to achieve some common goal, 
objective or end” (Leveson, 1995). The assumptions 
required for this definition include that the goal of the 
system can actually be defined and that the structure of the 
system can be identified as a series of components with 
relationships between them (Mihramber, 1972). Moreover, 
Bossel (1994) argues the system’s purpose has to be 
recognizable by an observer, thus making the analyst also 
an explicit part of the systems thinking conceptualization. 
This can be said to be the basis of the idealist / 
presentationalist philosophy (Olaya, 2009) underlying 
systems thinking. 
• The state of a system is given by a set of relevant quantities 
that completely describe the system at that specific time. 
These states are independent of each other, and the number 
of state variables that are needed to make an essential 
description of the system at a specific point of time is said 
to be the dimension of the system. 
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• The environment for a system is the set of components that 
despite not being part of the system are able to affect its 
state. The system is separated from its environment by a 
boundary. 
• The structure of a system is the set of essential components 
and relationships that form the system. These relationships 
and components are said to be essential since any division 
of the system (i.e., loss of any of these essential components 
or relationships) would not allow the system to fulfil its 
goal. 
• Inputs and outputs from the system are anything that crosses 
the boundary between the system and its environment 
A system is “an abstraction conceived by an analyst” 
(Leveson, 1995), who defines the system boundary, the 
components of the system and their structure, and the inputs and 
outputs of the system, additional to the goals of the system as 
mentioned earlier. These concepts are represented in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22 System concepts (based on Bossel, 1994) 
Now, given the definition of a system to be observable to the 
analyst, a relevant question is “when is a system observable? 
Bossel (1994) argues that this only happens when a system acts 
on the surrounding environment by some behaviour or output 
variable, and that if this output variable does not correspond 
directly to changes in the environment, then these output variables 
must have been caused by something within the system itself, i.e., 
changes in the state of the system, described by the state variables.  
As a consequence, a system according to the systems thinking 
theory differs from a system in the thermodynamic sense as the 
latter considers a system materially closed and causally open, the 
systems thinking approach seeks to understand systems as 
materially open and causally closed (Sterman, 2000). 
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As a way of understanding the world through systems, it is not 
only relevant to understand how these are built, but also how they 
react over time, i.e., their dynamics. The next section presents how 
this variation over time can be represented and analysed, by using 
a method known as system dynamics. 
3.2.3 System Dynamics basics 
All systems upon closer inspection, are dynamic, i.e., their 
states experience change over time, albeit some of them slowly. 
The change in the state of a system over time is known as its 
behaviour. However, “frequently, knowledge about past system 
behaviour is not sufficient for obtaining reliable statements about 
future system behaviour” (Bossel, 1994), a particularly relevant 
insight for cyber-risks in the global supply chain. 
Forrester (1961) started what can be called the “MIT School” 
of thought in SD modelling. He brought together three fields 
which at that time were relatively new: Control Engineering 
through concepts such as feedback and self-regulating systems, 
Cybernetics through concepts such as the nature of information 
and the role it has in controlled systems, and Organizational 
Theory by considering the structures present in human work 
groups and the nature of decision-making. 
SD is a framework and methodology for the representation of 
systems that change over time by using networks of variables in 
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relationships of circular causality. These networks are composed 
of fundamentally two types of variables: stocks (accumulations) 
and flows either flowing into or out of these accumulations. By 
virtue of different timescales or the specific problem under 
question, it is sometimes convenient to represent some of these 
stocks or flows either as constants, i.e., not changing within the 
constraints and timeframe of the problem being analysed, or as 
auxiliary variables, i.e., changing instantaneously. 
The visible “state” for such a system is therefore completely 
represented by the values of the stocks in the system and all 
changes in these stocks are what can be understood as the system’s 
“behaviour”. These conditions have two consequences: 1) by 
virtue of this networked representation, all the behaviours of the 
system are the direct result of its own structure, in what is termed 
the “endogenous” view of behaviour in SD, and 2) any system that 
changes over time in an interesting way, has at least one feedback 
loop, i.e., the basic circular causality unit, in its structure 
(Forrester, 1961). SD is thus said to represent systems that are 
“materially open” and “causally closed” (Sterman, 2000). 
The relationships between variables in a system dynamics 
model can have any functional form, and be linear or non-linear. 
In the case of supply chains, non-linearity arises from the 
interaction between the physical and the institutional structure of 
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that system with the decision making processes of the agents 
acting within it. 
As an example consider the process of keeping stock of 
“widgets” in a supply chain. The supply chain would have a 
certain amount of stock that increases with the production of this 
stock (manufacturing or purchase) and the amount of stock would 
decrease through the use or shipment of this stock. This would be 
represented as a stock and flow diagram composed of one stock 
or level, “Inventory”, one flow going into this stock, 
“Production”, and one flow going out of this stock “Shipment”, as 
shown in the next figure. 
 
Figure 23 Stock and flow diagram 
The “clouds” at the extreme of each of the flows represent the 
limits of the system as it is currently considered. These limits are 
determined by the group that is developing the model, and it is a 
representation of the mental model this team has on the boundaries 
of the problem, and are a representation of the “materially open” 
nature of system dynamics models. Given that a system dynamics 
model is causally closed, all relevant events in the system have to 
be explained with what has been considered within the clouds. 
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Otherwise, the limits of the system have to be revised and 
modified, in a process denominated in the SD community as 
“challenging the clouds” (Sterman, 2000), approach applicable to 
a broader spectrum of life, as the philosophical position of 
constantly challenging self-imposed limits. 
The Inventory stock is the result of the inflows through 
Production and the outflows through Shipment. This means that 
the mathematical representation of these elements and their 
relationship can be either through a differential or an integral 
equation. The integral equation accounts for the value of the stock 
“Inventory” as the accumulation over time of the inflows minus 
the outflows. 
Equation 1 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝐼𝐼0) +  ∫ (𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑠𝑠) −𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡0
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑠𝑠))𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠         [Widgets] 
 
On the other hand, the differential equation focuses on the rate 
of variation of the stock, as resulting from a net change of the 
inflow minus the outflow. 
Equation 2 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝐼𝐼) − 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝐼𝐼)       
[Widgets/week]  
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The use of stocks is extremely relevant as Nathan Mass (1980) 
through his study of the dynamics of stock and flow variables 
applied to the problem of supply and demand. He identified stocks 
are critical in creating changes over time (dynamics) in systems 
as: 
• Stocks provide a characterization of the state of the system 
that is modelled, thus providing a base for decision-making. 
The state of a supply chain may be reflected by the level of 
inventory held at each step of the chain. Changes in these 
levels, when compared with desired levels, lead to specific 
actions in the case of a low Inventory level, a possible 
decision is to increase production, thus increasing the 
inflow to this stock. 
• Stocks provide inertia to the system, and constitute the 
system “memory”. Since the stocks accumulate past events 
(as represented by the net flows) if the activity is suspended 
and later restarted, the stock continues to represent the latest 
condition that was reached by the system, and from which 
the activity can proceed. The quantity of defective 
inventory, for example, remains the same until the time 
when either this stock is decreased by the elimination of 
defective inventory through actions such as sales or rework, 
or this defective inventory stock is further increased by 
defective production processes. 
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• Stocks result in delays, understood as the process where an 
output has some lag to the corresponding input. For 
example, in the case of a supply chain with a stock of 
inventory, there is some average lag between the time when 
an item enters the stock (i.e., it is produced) and the time 
when this item is shipped from the inventory. This average 
time is zero only in the case where no stock is kept, being 
this the case of pipeline flow, just in time, or make-to-order 
manufacture. 
• Stocks decouple the inflow and outflow rates allowing 
dynamic disequilibrium to arise, this being the fundamental 
source of dynamics in a system. Stocks accumulate the 
difference between the inflows and outflows and thus a 
stock allows these two processes to differ. If the Inflow is 
greater than the outflow, the stock increases and if the 
outflow is greater than the inflow, the stock decreases. If the 
outflow and inflow are equal, then there is no change in the 
stock level (the same amount is entering the stock as it is 
leaving it). This unchanging stock level even though there 
are flows, is called a “dynamic equilibrium”. This differs 
from the “static equilibrium” which is the case when there 
is no flow, and thus no activity in the system. For example, 
take the case of the Department of Management 
Engineering at DTU. If there are the same number of 
students graduating from DTU Management Engineering as 
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there are entering a study line in the same department, then 
the number of students remains the same, and this system is 
said to be in dynamic equilibrium. Since these two activities 
are controlled by different decision-makers in the 
organization, a buffer such as a “stock” of available 
studying facilities, needs to exist to allow these two decision 
processes (admissions and graduation) to differ. 
Furthermore, in the case of this example, the production level 
is not independent of the level of inventory but rather seeks to 
comply with the desired inventory level. This is represented by the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 24 Feedback Loop example 
In this case, two additional variables are included in the model. 
The first one is the “Gap in Inventory” variable, which reflects the 
difference between the desired and the actual inventory levels. 
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The second is the Desired Inventory Level, which as a first 
approximation it can be considered as a constant. 
Equation 3 
𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼                  
[Widgets] 
 
Equation 4 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼                   
[Widgets] 
 
The following structural features of the representation in Figure 
24 have to be noted: 
• There are causal relationships that have been added, 
represented by arrows with either a positive or a negative 
sign. These are called the “polarities” for these causal 
relationships. A positive polarity indicates that the two 
variables behave in the same way, i.e., if one increases, the 
other one increases as well. In the same way, if one variable 
decreases, then the other variable also decreases. For 
example, if the Gap in Inventory increases, then the 
Production also increases, but additionally, if the Gap in 
Inventory decreases, Production would also decrease. A 
negative polarity reflects cases where two variables behave 
in opposite ways. For example, if the Inventory level 
increases, then the Gap in Inventory decreases, all else 
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equal. In the same way, if the Inventory level decreases, 
then the Gap in Inventory increases, all else equal. 
• There is a circular causality structure that was added to the 
model, namely the one considering the loop formed by 
Production – Inventory – Gap in Inventory. This is a 
Feedback loop which connects these three variables in a 
sequence of mutual influence. The nature of this Feedback 
loop is determined by the polarities between the variables 
that are part of this feedback loop. In this case, it is a 
Balancing feedback loop, also known as a negative 
feedback loop, as the net effect of the circular causality is 
to counteract variations in any of its constituent variables. 
For example a decrease in the inventory level would lead to 
an increase in the Gap in Inventory level (mediated by the 
negative polarity between these variables). Then an increase 
in the Gap in Inventory would lead to an increase in 
Production (mediated by the positive polarity between these 
two variables). Finally, an increase in Production would 
result in an increase in the Inventory (there would be greater 
inflow into the Inventory stock, all else equal). The 
resulting effect of this balancing loop when faced with a 
decrease in Inventory, is actually to increase Inventory 
levels. This increase continues until the gap is zero, i.e., 
until the Inventory level has reached the desired inventory 
level, which is the goal of this balancing feedback loop. The 
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other possible circular causality structure (not present in this 
simple model) is a reinforcing feedback loop, also known 
as a positive feedback loop, as the effect it has is to 
compound and amplify variations in its constituent 
variables. 
• The representation has an indication of the loop type as well 
as a distinctive name. This is not merely aesthetic, but 
relevant for at least two reasons. First, the labelling of the 
loops in the diagram can help locate the loops involved in 
the behaviour as extracted by the analyst. This can be 
advantageous when the models grow to have a greater 
number of loops. Additionally, the names that are assigned 
to the loops help greatly in communicating the storyline 
behind the behaviour as identified by the analyst. 
• Exogenous and endogenous variables can clearly be 
identified from the diagram. Those that have an arrow, be it 
a causal arrow or a flow, are said to be “endogenous” to the 
model, as their value is defined by some other variable in 
the model. On the other hand, those variables that have only 
an arrow going away from them, are “exogenous” to the 
model, as these have to be determined externally. These two 
categories are relevant at the time of experimenting with the 
model and defining intervention policies, as it is exogenous 
variables that can be changed to see different model 
behaviours. The only way of changing endogenous 
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variables would be through structural changes, i.e., by 
changing the causal relationships between existing 
variables or by introducing some new exogenous variable 
that would modify the endogenous variable. 
• The analysis that is carried out for this model as is the case 
of any other SD model, is only looking at one causal 
relationship at a time, holding all else constant, i.e.,  the 
ceteris paribus condition of analysis for SD models. 
The general representation of an SD model and summary of 
what was explained from a practical model is shown in Figure 25. 
The state of the model, as represented by the levels or stocks in 
the system, is the information that feeds into the flows, or decision 
points, and which are a result of the policies chosen by the 
organization. These policies are influenced by a goal (that need 
not be a constant, but in itself be influenced by other policies), and 
this decision making, in the form of an action, creates a change in 
the level, where this process is repeated continuously.  
Information in the system does not deplete its source, however, 
rates/flows do. Information flows are not conserved quantities. 
For example, the information about levels of inventory can be 
used to determine how much new inventory to buy and at the same 
time used to determine the required warehousing space. On the 
other hand, the network of connected States/Levels and 
Rates/Flows are conserved: an outgoing flow from a stock, 
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decreases this stock, and an incoming flow into a stock increases 
this stock. For example, the selling and shipment of existing 
inventory decrease the available inventory, and the purchasing of 
inventory increases the inventory stock. 
 
Figure 25 SD general model 
Forrester proposed outlined a modelling process in his seminal 
work “Industrial dynamics” (Forrester, 1961). Additional to this 
original modelling process, other generic SD model development 
processes have later been proposed by Randers (1980, p.119), 
Richardson and Pugh (1981, p.16), and Sterman (2000, p.86). 
These show differences in the emphasis assigned to specific 
stages, but all agree in describing the process as an iterative, 
constructivist approach. Martinez-Moyano (2013) explored these 
differences to subsequently propose an overarching development 
framework, which includes novel aspects, such as including both 
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the strategies and infrastructure required for learning, an aspect 
not previously considered as an explicit part of the methodology. 
Bossel (1994, p.12), from what can be called the “German 
school” of thought in system dynamics modelling, puts forward a 
process for model development, simulation and behavioural 
analysis during system design, directed towards systems in 
general, including social systems, where he included the 
mathematical analysis as an explicit step in the process. This is 
not explicit in the MIT School of thought, and connects Bossel’s 
approach much more to its engineering background, in contrast to 
the engineering management background that influenced the MIT 
Sloan School, where Forrester developed his industrial dynamics 
approach. Bossel’s approach lays a special emphasis on finding 
state equations, equilibrium points, attractors, stability and 
behaviour at equilibrium points, for example (Bossel, 1994, p.20). 
Bossel has worked extensively in the wider application of 
system dynamics beyond sociotechnical organizations to domains 
such as predator-prey interaction, classic control problems in 
mechanics and hydraulics, hydro-thermodynamic equations such 
as the Lorenz system, and mathematical applications such as 
chaotic attractors. 
The SD development strategy that is used in this work follows 
Sterman (2000) and is an iterative process according to the generic 
steps of problem articulation and boundary selection, dynamic 
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hypothesis formulation, model formulation, testing, and policy 
formulation and evaluation. 
During problem articulation, the main aspect to be resolved is 
determined, and an assessment is made about the real underlying 
problem, beyond merely its symptoms. A model purpose is 
identified and the system boundaries are chosen. Additionally, an 
initial characterization of the problem is made, through tools such 
as time horizon and reference mode identification. The reference 
modes represent the problem dynamically i.e., through patterns of 
change for relevant variables over time as represented by graphs 
and other descriptive data. The iterative model development 
process goes back to these reference modes to confirm an 
alignment between the model development and the model 
objective is maintained. On the other hand, the time horizon for 
the problem is constituted by all the time required to describe how 
the problem emerged and to describe its symptoms, extending 
sufficiently far into the future to include delayed effects, even if 
these are indirect. The choice of an adequate time horizon is not 
trivial, as one of the deficiencies in the mental models of the world 
is the tendency to consider cause and effect as local and 
immediate, while these may, in fact, be located far away from each 
other physically and happen with some delay from one another. 
Additionally, the choice of the time horizon for the problem can 
also have a relevant effect on the perception of the problem. 
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The dynamic hypothesis is developed after the problem has 
been defined over an appropriate time horizon, and it is a theory 
that explains the troublesome behaviour in the reference modes. 
The dynamic hypothesis accounts for changes over time in the 
system referring to its structure is provisional, this is subject to 
revision throughout the iterative modelling process, and it aids and 
concentrates modelling efforts on certain parts of the model 
structure. The remainder of the modelling process is aimed at 
testing this dynamic hypothesis through experiments with the 
model and real-world data collection.  
The dynamic hypothesis extracts the mental models existing in 
the organization related to the origins of the problem, and 
normally mediation and facilitation are crucial, as different 
members in the system have a different theory on how the problem 
came to be (Vennix, 1996; Andersen et al., 1997). A major 
characteristic of the dynamic hypothesis is that it needs to derive 
its explanation from the variables and interactions of variables 
present in the model, in what is known as the “endogenous” source 
of the behaviour, “endogenous” coming from the Greek that 
means “coming from within”. Through such an explanation, the 
system structure can be altered to reveal changes in the behaviour. 
The opposite of this would be an “exogenous” explanation of 
behaviour, by using external variables o explain behaviour. This 
is self-defeating as an explanation since the logical follow-up 
question would be then what made this exogenous variable 
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change. By seeking to explain this, the model is expanded and thus 
an originally exogenous variable would become endogenous. 
The model formulation process relies on tools such as boundary 
diagrams, subsystem diagrams, causal loop diagrams (influence 
diagrams), and stock-and-flow maps. These diagrams serve as “an 
intermediate transition between a verbal description and a set of 
equation” (Forrester, 1961), and to be a tool for conceptualization, 
these have to efficiently organize the descriptive data held in the 
mental models, portrayed as the real decision-making processes 
(Morecroft, 1982). Table 15 summarizes the different available 
tools and some of their advantages and disadvantages.  
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Table 15 Main conceptualization tools used in System Dynamics 
M
odel Boundary Chart
Subsystem
 Diagram
Causal loop diagram
Stock and flow m
aps
Policy structure diagram
s
Description
A sum
m
ary of the boundary of the 
m
odel by listing key variables, 
indicating those that are 
endogenous, those that are 
exogenous, and those that have 
not been considered in the m
odel 
A sum
m
ary of the overall 
architecture of the m
odel, 
representing subsystem
s and their 
connections. 
A m
ap describing the causal links 
between variables in the system
, 
trough the use of arrows from
 a 
cause to an effect, polarities and 
feeback loops.
A m
ap representing the physical 
flows of the system
 and the 
feedback structures present 
Representation of the internal 
structure of a subsystem
. 
Advantages
By stating what has been left out, 
the boundaries of the m
odel and 
its applicability are m
ade explicit. 
It is the im
m
ediate result from
 an 
initial team
 brainstorm
ing about 
the problem
, can serve as a 
consensus tool.
States explicitly the subsystem
s, 
defining the level of aggregation 
of the m
odel. It represents the 
coupling of the subsystem
s 
explicitly. Identifies exogenous 
from
 exogenous variables.
Useful in capturing hypothesis for 
the causes of dynam
ics, the m
ental 
m
odels in the organization, and 
representing feedbacks. 
Differentiates between 
endogenous and exogenous 
variables. Integrates delays 
qualitatively. W
idely used in 
scientific research.
Can be sim
ulated com
putationally. 
Can represent subsystem
s and the 
level of aggregation of the m
odel. 
Differentiates between exogenous 
and endogenous variables. 
Integrates aspects such as inertia 
and delays explicitely.
Represents explicitly stock, flow 
and inform
ation variables. 
Represents decisions explicitly.
Disadvantages
It shows no relationships between 
variables, does not identify stocks, 
flow and inform
ation variables or 
any feedback processes. Does not 
identify exogenous from
 
endogenous variables.
Does not differentiate between 
stocks, flows or inform
ation 
variables. Does not indicate 
polarities and it does not indicate 
any feedback process. No explicit 
representation of what has been 
left out of the m
odel.
These do not differentiate 
between stock, flow and 
inform
ation variables, and thus 
lead to polarity am
biguity. Little 
correspondence between m
ental 
m
odel and loop structure. Seem
s 
like a conceoptualization tool, but 
is better suited as a sum
m
ary tool 
of insights. No explicit 
representation of what has been 
left out of the m
odel.
Very difficult to achieve, even for 
system
s of m
edium
 com
plexity.
Has to be used in connection to 
Subsystem
 Diagram
.
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3.2.4 System Dynamics to Sociotechnical problems 
Forrester´s approach in 1958 to understanding socio-technical 
systems considered aspects of the operations which had not been 
part of the models until then, “the limited information flow across 
organizations and functions within organizations, delays in 
gathering information, making decisions as well as the 
implementation and impact of those decisions, and the 
behavioural, sometimes suboptimal decision rules managers used 
to make inventory and production decisions at each level of the 
supply chain” (Sterman et al, 2015). 
System Dynamics has been used to explore cyber-risks, though 
not with a focus on supply chains. 
Radianti et al., (2007) explored possible structures and 
incentives present in a black market for vulnerabilities in digital 
communication systems. Their approach was exploratory and 
modelled aspects such as information asymmetry, stakeholder 
interaction and reward structures in the market. A more recent 
approach has been proposed by researchers at Harvard and MIT, 
with respect to zero-day vulnerabilities4 (Siegel et al., 2015). 
Siegel does not explore the operations that lead to the availability 
                                              
 
4 See the glossary 
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of zero-day vulnerabilities and rather concentrates on the flow of 
decisions that lead to the accumulation and use of the available 
zero-day vulnerabilities. This is consistent with the most powerful 
focus of the SD methodology, which is “… not on individual 
decisions, but on the policy framework producing continuous 
flows of decisions…” (Richardson, 1991, p.158) 
Gonzalez et al., (2017) have proposed ways of using System 
Dynamics for understanding the incentives that are present in IT 
Security Management, and their effect on system performance. By 
using system archetypes (Wolstenholme, 2003) and concept 
simulation models, and for electronic systems in the banking 
industry, they compare the effects of system performance when 
the end user has the burden of proof for an alleged cyber-attack, 
such as European banks, with respect to the North American 
model, where burden of proof corresponds to the bank. Their 
model concludes that an improved learning process is achieved in 
the latter. 
3.2.5 Suitability of the System Dynamics method 
SD is a framework offers advantages to understanding 
problems like the cyber-risks as these are being experienced by 
supply chains. These advantages can be catalogued as coming 
mainly from epistemological, technical, and flexibility 
dimensions. 
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Epistemologically, system dynamics is a representation which 
can be applied at different levels of aggregation and/or 
abstraction, being particularly well suited to problems of policy 
analysis. A distinguishing feature of the system dynamics method 
is the endogenous explanation principle, where the behaviour of 
the systems is a result of its structure: 
“System Dynamics […] regards external forces as there, but 
beyond control and hence not worthy of primary attention […] 
Instead, the focus is upon examining the organization’s internal 
structure; the intent being to arrive at an understanding of how 
this structure […] can be made more resilient to environmental 
perturbation. In adopting this approach, system dynamics is 
embracing the wisdom of the human body. The body, rather than 
forecasting – and then marshalling its forces in anticipation of – 
the arrival of each kind of solid and liquid input, remains 
continually poised in a state of general readiness for whatever 
may befall it” (Richmond, 1967). 
Computer models are a powerful source of information if 
properly constructed, presenting several advantages with respect 
to mental models: 
• Computer models are explicit representations with 
documented assumptions 
• Computer models calculate the consequences of the 
assumptions without error or bias 
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• Computer models are more comprehensive than mental 
models, as these can interrelate many more factors than the 
human mind can 
Computer models have also several shortcomings, as they are 
unable to deal with relationships between factors that are difficult 
to quantify, or that are difficult to replicate due to a lack of 
historical experience. 
3.3 Research philosophy 
Research philosophy refers to the way in which the knowledge 
is developed (Saunders et al., 2016). It incorporates beliefs and 
assumptions into the ways this research development happens and 
constitutes the cornerstone for the definition of a research process 
Beliefs and assumptions are at the same time ontological, 
epistemological, as well as axiological, and each of these is 
explained and defined for this research in the next section. In this 
way, the philosophical position that is considered in the research 
are made explicit, and its coherence is explained in this chapter. 
The choice of a research philosophy is not trivial since as it was 
shown through the research onion strategy, the philosophy 
influences the subsequent choice of methodology, research 
strategy, data collection techniques, and analysis procedures. 
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3.3.1 Ontological assumptions 
The “ontological position” of a research is a concept that 
describes the assumptions present in the research about the nature 
of reality and its definition, by answering questions such as what 
this nature is, and what the world is like. An ontological position 
is defined in terms of how much of that nature is real and objective 
or nominal and decided by convention, how much of this reality 
is external to the researchers or socially constructed, how much of 
this reality is based on the existence of one true reality 
(universalism) or consists of multiple realities (relativism), how 
much of this reality is constituted by things (granular stocks or 
items) or by flows (processes), and how much of this reality is 
order or chaos, for example. 
This study considers an ontology which is essentially the world 
of socio-technical systems. These systems are complex and 
composed of interactions between humans and technology, as 
well as between humans. These interactions can be synchronous 
(happening at the same time) or asynchronous (happening at 
different times) and can be geographically dispersed. The result of 
these interactions conditions and modifies the system itself, but 
results in an organization that functions due to the shared 
meanings and realities of all its members. This paradigm can be 
said to represent a subjectivist ontology, and more precisely, a 
social constructionist approach to knowledge. This assumption 
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considers that social reality is made of the perceptions and 
resulting actions of people (i.e., social actors). In particular, 
social-constructionism proposes that reality is established from 
social interactions, where the social actors present in the system 
create shared meanings and realities through repeated interactions. 
These shared meanings are also not static but are modified and 
evolve, according to feedback from the results of the flow of 
processes and interactions of the agents in the system. This is in 
contrast to a purely objectivist point of view, where there is a 
“truth” out there for which the research is said to be searching. 
A subjectivist / social-constructionist research ontology 
reflects the role of the researcher as looking to describe the 
realities of the different members of an organization, looking to 
understand their incentives, actions and intentions. The 
representation of the different dimensions of organizational action 
is made explicitly through the use of System Dynamics, a 
methodology described in the next section. 
A subjectivist /social constructionist approach also considers 
that the researcher not as an external, objective witness of what is 
being researched, but actively influencing these results. As such, 
known biases and assumptions have to be made public and 
presented explicitly to the research community. 
The ontological approach adopted in this work assumes that 
events in the world are caused by behaviours or patterns, which in 
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turn are caused by the structures present in the system. However, 
these structures are too complex for understanding through 
intuition alone. Modelling thus becomes a way of representing 
these structures, reproducing the behaviours that are actually 
being seen, and simulate alternate behaviours by changing 
assumptions or structures. 
3.3.2 Epistemological assumptions 
Epistemology comes from the Latin “episteme” meaning 
“knowledge” and “logos” meaning “logical discourse”, and the 
“epistemological position” of a research is a concept that 
describes the assumptions about what is constitutes meaningful 
knowledge, and how this knowledge is communicated to others. 
It refers to aspects such as “how do we know what we know”, 
“what can be considered as knowledge”, “what constitutes good 
quality data”, and “what types of contributions can be made to 
this knowledge pool” (Sanders et al., 2016) 
An epistemological position is thus defined in terms such as 
how the assumptions are adopted either from the natural sciences 
or the arts and humanities, how much of the information is 
considered as numbers or as narratives, how much of the 
information are facts or opinions, how much of what is to be 
analysed constitutes observable phenomena or are constituted by 
attributed meaning, and how much of the research outcomes are 
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law-like generalizations or highly context-and-individual specific, 
for example. 
As an overarching review, and derived from the recognition 
that scientific knowledge is not absolute truth but a structured 
approximation to it, three main answers have been proposed to the 
question of “what is scientific knowledge”. A first approach, 
supported by philosophers such as August Comte, considers 
scientific knowledge to be a tool that correlates data, a view 
known as Instrumentalism. Its advancement thus consists in the 
gathering of more and more data and /or by finding statistical fits 
to this data. A second view, advanced greatly by the philosopher 
Thomas Kuhn (1962), considers scientific knowledge as groups 
of ideas -known as paradigms- that help explain the world. In this 
second case, its advancement consists in the use of these 
paradigms on the data until unexplainable differences between the 
current paradigm and the data that is seen in the world require this 
paradigm to change. The third approach, advanced by the 
philosopher Karl Popper (1972) considers scientific knowledge to 
be a set of conjectures (i.e., opinions and conclusions based on 
incomplete information) that are refutable. In this case, the main 
method for advancement is the change or adjustment of 
conjectures to overcome these refutations, process known as 
“refutationism”. 
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The epistemological approach that is taken in this work is the 
refutationist approach. Through this lens, no piece of knowledge 
is regarded as “valid”, but rather as not having been yet refuted. 
Given the nascent nature of cyber-resilience in supply chains, the 
refutationist approach is seen as the most appropriate to 
accommodate new methodologies that do not rely exclusively on 
data or rely on data that is not quantitative and partial. 
In order to define what is considered as knowledge within this 
research, it is important to also understand what is considered 
“scientific research” in the social sciences and particularly within 
this thesis. King et al. (1994) proposed a definition of scientific 
research that highlights four characteristics: 
• First, the goal of scientific research in the social sciences is 
an inference, i.e., the generation of conclusions based on 
evidence and reasoning. This is achieved either through 
description or explanation, based on empirical information 
about the world. This discards the mere accumulation of 
facts as science in the social science realm, being rather that 
which can infer beyond the available data into something of 
wider scope that cannot necessarily be observed directly. 
Such non-immediate inferences include descriptive 
inference, i.e., from world observations learn about other 
facts that are not observed, and causal inference, i.e., the 
identification of temporal relationships between 
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observations, learning how one comes to pass because of 
the other, 
• Second, scientific procedures are public, explicit and 
coded, providing a basis through which the data can be 
assessed, and its validity judged by the community to which 
the work is relevant. Establishing the procedures explicitly 
can help assess and address their limitations, and serve as a 
medium to teach and share these procedures, allowing for 
the replication and comparison of results across different 
disciplines and research projects, 
• Third, the conclusions of the scientific research are 
uncertain, derived from the assumption that the inference 
process is imperfect, and that it is improbable that 
conclusions that are certain can be reached from uncertain 
data. It is therefore relevant to consider the uncertainty 
directly to avoid otherwise asserting that the scientist knows 
everything perfectly or that the scientist does not know 
about the uncertainty of the results, and  
• Fourth, the content of the scientific research is the method 
itself, as it is the observance of these methods which help 
validate the results obtained in the research process. Since 
the subject matter that can be the subject of scientific 
research is so broad “the unity of science consists alone in 
its method, not its material” (Pearson, 1892, pp.15). 
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Therefore, scientific research does not need to be error free to 
be a contribution, as errors are unavoidable and when pointed out 
by others, highlight research as a social enterprise (King et al, 
1994). 
3.3.3 Axiological assumptions 
Axiology comes from the Latin “axia” meaning “value” or 
“worth” and “logos” meaning “logical discourse”. The 
axiological position of a research is the concept that represents the 
role of ethics and values in the research process. It deals with 
questions such as what is the role of values in research, how the 
researcher’s values should be treated when performing the 
research, and how the values of the research participants should 
be considered. 
An axiological position is thus a result of defining a stance in 
the trade-off between value-free and value-bound research, and 
between having a detached researcher and having a researcher that 
is an integral and reflexive part of the research. 
The process of self-reflection by the researcher to understand 
the existing axiological standpoints cannot be overstated. The 
researcher’s values are the basis upon which judgments are made 
during the research process, defines the way in which the research 
is originated, conditions how it subsequently evolves, (as the 
researcher normally includes his or her own positions into the 
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research project definition) and thus conditions the research action 
(King et al., 1994; Heron, 1996).  
These positions include aspects such as any pre-existing 
assumptions about the problem and its contexts, interests of the 
researcher, or emotions associated with the research project. For 
example, having chosen this research topic over another is a 
reflection of the axiological position of the researcher, as the 
chosen topic is considered more important than other potential 
research topics. Therefore, having this position explicitly stated 
can only add to the credibility of the results.  
3.3.3.1 Statement of personal values 
My statement of personal values with respect to a research in 
the cyber-risks within global supply chains is based on the premise 
that supply chains are complex networks of interactions between 
humans and hardware, interactions which are enabled by a 
communication infrastructure that results in the physical 
movement and accumulation of goods, and the delivery of 
services. I believe supply chains to be some of the most impressive 
and important social structures created by mankind. Thus, the way 
in which modern supply chains can be disrupted can have not only 
commercial but also social implications, making research into the 
avoidance of, and recovery from disruptions to supply chains, of 
a high social relevance.  
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I believe organizations are the result of decisions that are made 
in people’s heads, derived from the ideas they have about the 
systems and processes around them, in what can be termed as 
“mental models”. I believe mental models to be a constituent part 
of how humans perceive and make sense of the world around 
them. However, I am also convinced that these mental models do 
not necessarily align with the existing systems where decisions are 
taken as these models may contain errors, or be crude 
simplifications of the real systems these decisions are set to 
manage. I believe that aligning those mental models with the 
actual system is the way of obtaining the greatest leverage 
differential result per unit effort (leverage) when considering 
change, yet it is a dimension of considerably more access 
difficulty than the traditional analysis of processes and 
organizational performance. 
I believe that part of the “mental models” held by the decision 
makers are constituted by the incentives they see around them to 
the decisions they take. All sentient, biological creatures react to 
stimuli of which incentives are a particular kind. How much those 
actual incentives actually contribute to the ends sought by the 
company can be a source of misalignment between the goals of 
the company and decision-maker. This misalignment cannot be 
said to be the responsibility of the decision-maker, rather a 
problem in the design of the decision-making system within which 
the decision-maker is located. I, therefore, believe human error to 
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be an easy excuse for managers in what is really a design error of 
the system in which these humans work. 
I believe managers really try to improve the systems they 
operate but have a lot going against them. As long as they 
concentrate on patching the behaviours, or blaming unwanted 
events and performance deficit on operator error, they are not 
really solving the problem, only buying time until the next 
unwanted event occurs. I also believe managers do not have the 
tools to understand the ways in which the systems they are set to 
manage to operate over time. The tools they have are largely static 
(by representing the state in one moment in time) while the 
systems are changing constantly. The tools they have are 
simplifications which despite having been used for simple 
systems, are increasingly unfit as the system complexity increases. 
The corporate pressures decision-makers face drive them towards 
short-term performance, while complex systems when intervened 
structurally for long-term improvement, normally present short-
term decreased performance, which is difficult to justify without 
considering the long-term perspective. 
I believe that addressing the deep structure of supply chains in 
search of the required behaviour is one of the duties of scientific 
research and that it is a significant potential contribution from 
academia to the industrial world: the possibility of looking at 
processes without the bias of corporate pressures for performance, 
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or optimum use of resources for short-term gains, is a 
differentiating advantage that allows academia to explore and 
propose beyond traditional paradigms. 
3.3.4 Overall philosophy  
The ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions 
mentioned in the previous sections, can be summarized in a 
philosophical approach that can be better described as a mixture 
between critical realism and interpretivism, taking some aspects 
from each of these. The main aspects of each of these philosophies 
are explained next and contrasted with positivism, the 
philosophical approach most broadly found in scientific research. 
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Table 16 Research philosophies (Sanders et al., 2016) 
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3.3.5 Challenges with the systems approach 
The validation of models and the information that can be 
obtained from them has been subject of analysis and critique by 
philosophers of science. The challenges that have been identified 
can be classified as ontological, epistemological and 
methodological in nature. 
The ontological challenge of using SD models for scientific 
research is embodied in that, despite their instrumental value, a 
sense needs to be defined in which SD model structures exist 
objectively in reality. To address this challenge, SD model can be 
said to be of ontological value by assuming that the structures 
proposed in the models represent something objectively real, since 
these models make explicit something that exists in the social 
world. The social world is interpreted by us in specific ways 
through which we give structure to reality. Therefore these 
constructions as represented in the SD models, can be as real as 
any of our intentional constructions. As such this is rooted deep in 
the idealist/presentationalist philosophy. 
The epistemological challenge of using SD models for 
scientific research is embodied in that, despite the explicit 
structure of SD models, a definition is needed of how SD models 
can have any explanatory value. This is, even if the causal 
relationships between the components of the system do have 
explanatory value, a sense needs to be defined in which these 
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relationships deliver genuine causal explanations. To address this 
challenge, it can be understood that SD models represent in 
explicit terms the knowledge contained implicitly in the actions of 
the agents involved in the system that is being modeled. SD 
models then reflect the consequences of these structures. 
Explanations that come from these structures reveal therefore 
what is implicit in the actions of the agents involved in the 
modeled systems. 
The methodological challenge in using SD Models refers to 
how system dynamics models can help create well-founded 
theories about the phenomena that are modelled. To address this 
challenge, it can be understood that SD Models reflect 
relationships between constructs present in the system that is 
modelled. As such, these relationships also represent logical 
relationships that explicit the inferences that are implicit in our 
discursive practices. Logical relationships that present a constancy 
across system representations of different members and agent in 
the system can be understood as logical truths, which in turn help 
us identify inferential constants in our discursive practices. 
This is by no means a settled matter, as the philosophical 
implications to science of using System Dynamics Models for 
scientific advancement is being researched from the point of view 
of its philosophical background. Examples of this include Barlas, 
1996; Vasquez et al., 2007; and Olaya, 2009. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 199 of 620 
3.4 Research approach to theory development 
Once a philosophical position has been chosen for the research, 
it is necessary to identify and define the research approach to 
theory development, in what is also called the research “logic” 
(Saunders et al., 2016). The research approach represents the 
process through which theory is advanced, and thus the way in 
which knowledge is produced. 
The starting point of a research could be an existing theory and 
the research process, through data gathering arrives at logical 
conclusions about this theory, process defined as “deductive”. It 
may also be that observations from the world are surprising with 
respect to an existing theory and the research, through data 
gathering, helps in refining that theory, a process known as 
“abductive” or “retroductive”. Finally, there may be no specific 
pre-existing theoretical framework to start with, and the research 
process converts data from the world into a proposed theory, 
process known as inductive. Sanders (2016) presents a summary 
of these features as shown in Table 17. 
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Table 17 Inference strategy comparison (Sanders et al., 2016) 
 
Deduction 
(Deductive Inference)
Induction 
(Inductive Inference)
Abduction 
(Abductive Inference)
Logic (Relationship 
between Prem
ises 
and Conclusion
If the prem
ises are true then 
the conclusion m
ust also be 
true
Known prem
ises are used to 
construct untested 
conclusions
Known prem
ises are used to 
generate testeable 
conclusions
Generalisability 
(Relationship 
between the 
Specific and the 
general)
Generalises from
 the 
general to the specific
Generalises from
 the 
specific to the general
Generalises from
 
interactions between the 
specific and the general
Use of Data 
Collection
Data used to test (evaluate) 
hypothesis regarding an 
existing theory
Data used to explore a 
phenom
enon, indentify 
patterns and them
es, to 
create a conceptual 
fram
ework
Data used to explore a 
phenom
enon, patterns, and 
them
es within an existing 
conceptual fram
ework, and 
then test this
Theory (How 
theory is advanced)
Theory falsification or 
verification
Theory generation and 
buiilding
Theory generation or 
m
odification
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The process for each of these types of inference requires an 
interaction between the framework that is used to understand 
reality (theoretical position) and the information obtained from the 
world (empirical position), a process that has been explored by 
Chris Voss and his team at Warwick Business School. Voss 
(2015) summarizes it in flow diagrams shown in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26 Theory Development vs. Inference (Voss et al., 2015) 
Voss argues that the interaction between the theoretical and 
empirical dimensions happens in different moments of the 
process, according to the theory development approach that is 
chosen. For both the deductive and abductive approaches, there is 
a starting theoretical framework. Either hypotheses derived from 
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this framework are proven/disproven (deductive approach), or 
incongruences between the theoretical framework and 
observations in the real world lead to theory extensions (abductive 
approach). In contrast, the inductive approach does not start with 
an existing theoretical framework for a current observation from 
the world and therefore requires a protocol to gather information 
in a structured way for the identification of patterns and 
subsequent theory creation through the generalization of these 
patterns. 
These processes of inductive and abductive inference can also 
be understood from a systems perspective as attempting to 
converge the ideas currently accepted about the underlying system 
structure that leads to the system behaviour and then to the actual 
observed behaviour from that system. The “systems approach to 
inference” is a central part of the methods and tools proposed and 
used in this thesis. 
In the metaphor of the iceberg, if the system behaviour is what 
is observable (e.g., above the water) then the patterns that lead to 
that behaviour, the accepted ideas about system structure that 
leads to those patterns of behaviour, and the mental models that 
result in those ideas about the system structures, is what is hidden 
below the water, as can be seen in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27 Iceberg metaphor 
In this analogy, for the inductive method, the system structure 
is not known as it is hidden from view. For the abductive method, 
a structure can be extracted from the people in the system, so it is 
visible, but its validity is not clear. The research process seeks to 
increasingly understand this structure by continually improving it 
through subsequent approximations of ideas about that structure, 
ideas that become better with more data about the actual behaviour 
of the system, this is what can be observable, and through testing 
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the ideas that people with knowledge about the system have about 
its structure. 
This approach recalls the allegory of the cave by Plato as laid 
out in “the Republic” (Annas, 1981), which describes the dialogue 
between Socrates and Plato’s brother Glaucon, who was being 
mentored by Socrates. In this allegory, Socrates tells the story of 
a group of men that were prisoners in a cave unable to turn their 
heads. All they can see is the wall of the cave. To their back there 
burned a fire and in between the prisoners and the fire, there were 
puppeteers. Thus, the prisoners were only able to look at the 
shadow cast by these puppets, not the real objects.  
One first insight given by Socrates is that these prisoners may 
mistake appearance for reality, thinking that the shadow is the 
truth, although they would know nothing about the causes of the 
shadow. In the same logic, a researcher observing a system may 
think they understand the system by looking at its behaviour, 
although they know nothing about the system structures that lead 
to that behaviour. 
The second insight is that only when the prisoners turn their 
heads and see the source of the shadows, do they realize their 
mistake. In the same way, only by looking at the structure (i.e., 
the proverbial turning of the head) would a researcher realize the 
source of the behaviour.  
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A third insight is that the perceptual experience of the shadows 
only provides a one manifestation of potentially many about an 
underlying structure and in no way defines it: in the same way that 
the shadow does not define the fire-puppet arrangement but is 
instead caused by it, perception of system behaviour does not 
define the system causing the behaviour and is merely one of 
many possible manifestations given the system structure. This 
notion of causality is central to the choice of methodology and is 
discussed in the next section. 
Still connected to the iceberg model, an initial idea of the 
structure behind a behaviour of interest, derives into hypotheses 
about this or other interesting behaviours of the system, 
hypotheses that are proved or disproved through data. This would 
be the deductive case.  
Incoherence can emerge when a prior idea about the structure 
behind a behaviour of interest, contradicts the observation of a 
different behaviour than what was expected according to the 
original idea of the system structure. This incoherence motivates 
the gathering of data to adjust this perceived system structure so 
that it approximates better to the observed behaviour of interest. 
This would be the abductive case. If on the other hand, no specific 
underlying structure is considered as resulting in an observed 
behaviour of interest, the gathering of data is used to propose a 
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structure behind a this system behaviour. This is the inductive 
approach. 
A deductive approach uses the accepted idea about a system’s 
structure to prove and disprove hypotheses about the behaviour of 
that system. The iterative process is therefore at the level of the 
events and no update of the idea of the structure takes place. The 
abductive approach uses the accepted idea of a system’s structure 
and its incoherence with an observed behaviour, to update this 
held idea about the system’s structure. The inductive approach 
starts at the level of observed behaviours and attempts to propose 
an idea of a structure that would result in those observed 
behaviours. 
From this conceptualization of theory building, it is also 
possible to identify relationships between these inference 
strategies. For example, an abductive process is likely to happen 
after an inductive process, since only once observations about the 
real world have been translated into an idea of a structure that 
causes these observations, can incoherent observations be used for 
theory development. Also, abductive processes do not seem to 
derive from deductive processes, as these do not question the 
underlying structure: process would rather declare a hypothesis as 
false rather than question if the hypothesis was sensible 
(justifiable due to the underlying structure) in the first place. This 
is one of the main critiques put forward to positivist approaches to 
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research, as these tend to encase research within an artificially 
tight theoretical framework, discarding dissonant observations as 
extremes or anomalies (Boer et al, 2016, Sanders et al., 2016). 
Time availability is an aspect to consider with regard to the 
inference approach that is to be followed. Deductive inference is 
typically quicker to complete than inductive or abductive 
approaches. Deductive research is based on a one-time data 
gathering and a predetermined framework through which this data 
is to be analysed and the hypotheses tested, while the inductive 
and abductive approaches require an iterative data gathering 
process, and the gradual identification of frameworks. 
Risk aversion is also important at the time of deciding the 
strategy to follow, as the inductive and abductive research types 
are normally riskier as it is always possible in these that no useful 
patterns or theory emerges. 
The topic of cyber-risk and resilience in the global supply chain 
does not have a formal existing framework that explains the nature 
of cyber-risks, the structure that leads to effective cyber-risk 
management or the structure that leads to resilient behaviour. 
Therefore it would not be credible to use either the deductive 
approach for any of those case. 
According to the results from the SLR, for understanding the 
nature of cyber-risks, data has to be gathered from alternate data 
sources. Without a pre-defined framework to understand this 
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nature of cyber-risks, this process is considered as an inductive 
approach. 
Yet, since “we all create and update cognitive maps of causal 
connections” (Sterman, 2000, p.28) people that are 
knowledgeable about the system have an idea of the structure 
behind the behaviour that is observed. When the structure that 
different people have about the same system is compared and 
agreed upon, a resulting model can be tested against actual 
behavioural data.  
As the structures that are revealed from the interviews reflect a 
structure that understands the world, both the risk analysis and the 
dynamic analysis for the research in this thesis follows an 
inductive approach. 
This is consistent with the approach that has been followed in 
the social sciences and contrasts with a deductive approach which 
has been mainly used in the natural sciences.  
Despite the increased risk profile of the inductive research 
approach, this was chosen to understand the nature of cyber-risks, 
as few relevant frameworks for this end were found through the 
literature review. 
3.5 Research strategy/design background 
Once the strategic aspects underlying the research process have 
been defined, the research strategy, also known as the research 
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design, has to be determined. The design corresponds to how the 
specific research is to be carried out and is concerned with 
techniques and procedures that researchers use to gather and 
analyse data (Grix, 2002). Once the epistemological position of 
the research defines what is considered knowledge for the 
research process, the method chosen determines how this 
knowledge can be acquired, without yet identifying the precise 
procedures. The method that is chosen is independent of, and 
unconstrained from the epistemological choice (i.e., what the 
researcher thinks can be researched) and is rather influenced by 
the research questions. 
This research design is determined by the research method, the 
research purpose and the methodological choice. 
3.5.1 Research method 
Method is derived from the Greek μέθοδος [methodos], 
meaning “pursuit of knowledge” and is distinct from the 
methodology: while the latter deals with the system that is 
considered for the research, including philosophical position, 
logic, strategy and design, the former is concerned with the 
procedures and techniques used in the research to gather and 
analyse data (Grix, 2002). To avoid this misunderstanding, 
Sanders et al. (2016) rather use the term research strategy when 
referring to the method that is used, as it can be seen from the 
research onion in Figure 20. 
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The methods available range from mainly qualitative to mainly 
quantitative, and can be classified as allowing research that is 
descriptive, explanatory, and evaluative or a combination of these. 
The experiment as a research strategy has its foundation in the 
natural sciences, and it has been widely used in psychological and 
social science research. The purpose of an experiment is to 
deliberately manipulate a variable, called “independent variable”, 
to study what the outcome is in another variable, called the 
“dependent variable”. By using a set of predictions of this 
outcome, known as “hypotheses” (equivalent to a pre-existing 
framework to be tested, and is thus a deductive inference 
approach) the result of the experiment being either that there is no 
significant relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variable, prediction known as “null hypothesis”, or 
there is a significant relationship between the independent and the 
dependent variable, prediction known as “alternative hypothesis”. 
This can be tested statistically and although the basic experiment 
tests the relationship between two variables, it can be 
complemented by the use of other variables concerning the 
problem, such as moderator variables which affect the nature of 
the relationship between the dependent and the independent 
variable, or control variables, i.e., those observable and 
measurable variables that need to be kept constant throughout the 
experiment, to limit the influence of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable. 
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The survey as a research strategy is normally associated with 
the deductive inference approach is used for descriptive or 
exploratory research. A survey using questionnaires allows for the 
collection of data that can be analysed quantitatively through 
descriptive and inferential statistics. Additional to a questionnaire, 
other methods of gathering data include structured observation 
and structured interviews. 
An archival and documentary research is the collection of data 
through historical data. Despite it being difficult to completely 
define all the potential sources of historical data, it has been 
suggested that a document is “a durable repository for textual, 
visual and audio representations” (Sanders et al., 2016). Some of 
the documents categories are used include: 
• Communication records such as emails, letters, social 
media or blog postings;  
• Individual records such as diaries or electronic calendars;  
• Organizational records, such as agendas, meeting minutes, 
agreements, contracts, reports or strategy documents;  
• Governmental records, such as national statistics or reports; 
• Media sources, such as printed and online articles. 
Since the records being used for this method were not originally 
created for the research, but rather gathered through it, is that they 
are considered as secondary data. 
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A case study research seeks to make an “in-depth inquiry into 
a topic or a phenomenon within its real-life setting” (Yin, 1994). 
The unit of analysis is identified, as it might be a person, an 
organization or an event, for example. Then the relationships 
between the case subject and its context are described and 
analysed. The case study is useful in instances when the 
boundaries between the subject and the context are not clear, and 
it can lead to rich empirical descriptions, and to the development 
of theory. There is no precise way to carry out a case study as it 
has been used both by positivist as well as interpretivist 
researchers, and case study has been used for exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory research. Yin (1994) has 
distinguished two dimensions along which a case study can be 
defined: single versus multiple cases, and holistic versus 
embedded cases, the latter of the dimensions relating to the unit of 
analysis, i.e., a whole organization (holistic) or specific 
departments (embedded). 
An ethnographic research is used to gather data about 
behavioural patterns between members of a particular group, thus 
having particular use in studies about culture and society. It is a 
strategy that has its origins in colonial anthropology (Sanders et 
al., 2016) and is normally done over extended periods of time,i.e., 
“longitudinal research”. This is in contrast to “transversal 
research” which is normally shorter as evolution over time is not 
a factor.  
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Action research is a process followed iteratively to develop 
solutions in organizations through collaboration and participation 
of the organization itself. Its strategy is to “promote 
organizational learning to produce practical outcomes through 
identifying issues, planning action, taking action and evaluating 
action” (Sanders et al., 2016) having been described as “research 
in action rather than research about action” (Coghlan et al., 
2014). 
Grounded theory research is an approach to theory building by 
using inductive and deductive approaches, and is a process to 
analyse, interpret and explain the meanings that the members of 
an organization build to make sense of their collective experience, 
through the building of theoretical explanations of social 
interactions. By providing a systematic approach to data 
collection and analysis, the grounded theory provides a 
framework to undertake qualitative research (Sanders et al., 
2016). Despite being catalogued as a mixture of inductive and 
deductive approaches, it has been argued that it might be more 
appropriate to think of it as abductive (Suddaby, 2006). The data 
that is collected through this research strategy is not indicated by 
the method, and therefore, the grounded theory can be based on 
different forms of data collection approaches. Grounded theory 
research is generally considered to be time consuming, and 
longitudinal in its approach, i.e., it extends the research and data 
gathering collection over periods of time, despite the time factor 
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not necessarily being part of the final theoretical framework that 
is achieved. 
A narrative enquiry research is a strategy that uses a story, 
(personal account) to interpret an event or a sequence of events, 
particularly seeking to record the chronological connections and 
the sequence of events as told by the participant (narrator), their 
interpretation of events, and the potential triangulation of 
narratives between different participants and their narratives about 
a common event or sequence of events (Chase, 2011). This 
strategy has been associated with small samples with specific 
purpose and objectives, as it is a time-consuming approach, 
normally generating large quantities of qualitative data that 
require special coding approaches such as structural narrative 
analysis (Sanders et al., 2016). 
Simulation-based research is an approach beyond the 
traditional research strategies mentioned so far, and despite being 
a method that has been advanced in engineering, it has so far had 
limited penetration in the social sciences. It is a method through 
which a researcher develops a representation of a phenomenon 
under investigation, i.e., the model, and chooses a simulation 
method that is coded into computer software. This model is then 
“run” many times under different conditions as necessary, to 
observe and analyse the outcomes from where to advance theory. 
It is reported that an average of 8% of the published articles over 
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the period 1994-2003 in social science journals used simulation as 
a tool for theory development, with numbers for operations 
management as low as 0.3% for the Academy of Management 
Journal, and as high as high as 24% for Management Science 
Journal (Harrison et al., 2007). Simulation has several advantages 
with respect to other research strategies, as it allows for the 
exploration of the interdependent behaviour of phenomena that 
individually may be well understood, but which might have 
complicated and unforeseen interactions. Meadows and her team 
mentioned some of the advantages related to the simulation of 
models as: their rigorousness through explicit specification, their 
comprehensiveness through their ability to process great amounts 
of information, their logic through a visible outcome from a set of 
assumptions, their accessibility through explicit, precise and 
unambiguous assumptions, and their flexibility through the 
possibility of repeated testing under a wide range of conditions 
(Meadows et al., 1985). Simulation is strongest for understanding 
a phenomenon for the purposes of behaviour prediction, as “proof 
of behavior” to test if a certain behaviour is even possible, for 
discovery of unexpected consequences, for explaining underlying 
processes behind observed behaviours, as a tool to criticize pre-
existing explanations of phenomena to find simpler explanations, 
for prescribing better ways of performing a process, as a tool for 
formalizing theory, and is particularly well suited for dealing with 
non-linear phenomena (Axelrod, 1997; Gilbert, 2005; Harrison et 
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al., 2007). Some of the risks and disadvantages of simulation is 
model misspecification, the technical difficulties of model 
development, problem of generalization beyond the specific 
parameters of the model, and particularly an insufficient 
understanding of the methods by the business and social science 
research community for them to be considered as a plausible 
research strategy (Harrison et al., 2007). For example, Sanders et 
al. (2016) in the latest edition of the book “Research methods for 
business students” does not once mention simulation as an 
available tool for social science research in business, despite this 
method being around for over 50 years (Forrester, 1961; Cohen et 
al., 1965). Some types of possible simulation methods are agent-
based modelling, system dynamics modelling, econometric 
modelling, and discrete event simulation, for example. 
3.5.2 Research purpose 
In order to identify the suitable research design, it is important 
to identify the purpose that this research design is pursuing. 
Sanders et al., (2016) propose a number of research purposes, 
namely exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, evaluative or any 
combination of these.  
• An exploratory research is directed towards the opening 
and gaining insights about an area of interest. The 
associated research questions are likely to start with “what” 
and “how”, and it is a research purpose that might throw 
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light on the feasibility of continuing to research some 
particular subject area. For this reason, it is a flexible 
research purpose that by its nature, adapts to the data that is 
being gathered. 
• A descriptive research wants to result in an accurate 
representation of a phenomenon, and are likely to have 
research questions that start with words such as “who”, 
“what”, “where”, “when” or “how”. It is not normally used 
as an end, but a way towards explaining the phenomenon 
beyond its mere description, and is thus considered a 
precursor to an explanatory study. 
• An explanatory research is looking to identify causal 
relationships between variables to answer questions 
intended to explain a phenomenon. Associated research 
questions are likely to start with or include “why” and 
“how” in their formulation. 
• An evaluative research is intended to identify how well 
something works, and thus its results evaluate research 
questions that are likely to start or include “how”, “what” 
and “to what extent”. This purpose is directed towards 
assessing effectiveness, making comparisons, and thus its 
theoretical contribution is not only understanding how the 
effectiveness is reached but why, to then compare this 
explanation to existing theory. 
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3.5.3 Methodological choice 
With the consideration of possible exploratory, descriptive, 
explanatory and evaluative research purposes for this research, it 
is also important to identify and define the methodological choices 
available for a research, in terms of three dimensions: quantitative 
versus qualitative, multi versus mono-method, and simple versus 
complex/mixed methods. 
A quantitative research is generally associated with positivism, 
and thus it is associated with the deductive approach to theory 
development, where the focus is to use data to test the theory. A 
quantitative approach has also been used to use data to develop 
theory. As such, a quantitative approach seeks to identify and 
analyse relationships between variables by different numerical 
and graphical methods. It can thus be used either from data 
coming from a single or multiple data collection techniques.  
On the other hand, qualitative research is rather associated with 
some philosophy that requires the interpretation of the data that is 
gathered, and where the focus is to build theory or to develop a 
modified theoretical framework than the one currently being used. 
Yin (1994) suggested, however, the use of qualitative research for 
a deductive approach to test certain theory through qualitative 
means. In practice, however, quantitative approaches are used 
more widely in processes of inductive or abductive inference. The 
data that is collected is not standardized, and some methods may 
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even consider information that emerges from the data gathering 
process (e.g., conversations leading to new questions not 
considered originally). Qualitative studies can also consider one 
or multiple methods for the data collection and analysis.  
In contrast with the mono- versus multi-method which is the 
determination of the number of data collection techniques that are 
going to be used in the research for either the quantitative or the 
qualitative research designs. 
The use of one or both qualitative and quantitative methods is 
the research design position that is known as simple versus mixed 
methods respectively. 
3.6 Research design overview 
In order to identify the appropriate research design, the research 
sub-questions that were identified after the systematic literature 
review were evaluated from the point of view of the purpose of 
the research. After careful evaluation, and as it is explained in this 
section, this research is a combination of the exploratory, 
descriptive, explanatory and evaluative purposes. 
For the case of RSQ3, as the problem of cyber-attacks and their 
effects in supply chains is still poorly understood, the first 
research question is related to identifying the particular 
characteristics of these risks and of how these differ from other 
supply chain risks. This research question has been divided into 
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three sub-questions. First, this thesis undertakes an exploratory 
approach for identifying what events of operational disruption 
caused by cyber-risks have been recorded, the topic of RSQ3.1. 
This differs from the RSQ2, as that question only took into 
consideration those events that had been published. The difference 
is not trivial, as the results of RSQ2 revealed only a few published 
cases. Answering RSQ3.1, therefore, requires looking an 
exploration into other sources of information about cyber-attacks 
beyond published literature. 
With the information retrieved from RSQ3.1, the next two sub-
questions are answered: first by using this information to describe 
the mechanisms through which a disruption is caused (descriptive 
purpose) originating RSQ3.2, and then by comparing these 
mechanisms with those caused by other supply chain risks 
(evaluative purpose), covered by RSQ3.3. 
In the case of RSQ4, the management of cyber-risk and 
resilience is separated into two parts, 1) the management of cyber-
risk and 2) the management of cyber-resilience, considering 
methods based on systems thinking for application to each part. 
As a result, two approaches rooted in systems thinking and 
successfully used in other knowledge domains, are identified, 
implemented and tested for the case of cyber-risks: first a method 
of systemic risk analysis and second a method of dynamic 
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simulation, both methods applied to cases of cyber-attacks 
focused on the operational disruption these attacks cause. 
Additionally, the research sub-question 4.1 related to the 
application of a systemic risk analysis, this is separated in two 
parts to  
• First address how a systemic risk analysis method addresses 
the method-related gaps identified in the SLR, i.e., 
compartmentalization, static vs. dynamic, and history-
dependency, and 
• Second, address the suitability of such a method by 
comparing it to some other established risk analysis method 
applied to the analysis of cyber risks. The purpose of each 
research sub-question is detailed in Table 18. 
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Table 18 Purpose of research for each research sub-question  
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The data types that are needed for researching each of these 
questions is 
3.7 Research design - The nature of cyber-risks 
Answering RSQ3 requires information from other data sources 
beyond published literature to obtain information. Therefore 
answering RSQ3 requires finding out which other information 
sources are available for data about cyber-attacks with operational 
disruption. Moreover, as these sources consider literature beyond 
published, peer-reviewed articles (as these were already addressed 
during the literature review), there is the matter of the validity of 
these new sources, in a trade-off between the need for updated 
information versus the validity of the information that is used to 
derive scientific insights. 
Not being the only possible approach, the strategy undertaken 
for this part of the research is one of archival and documentary 
research, with a focus on the review of news articles and reports. 
The research is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, a 
revelatory search is sufficient to uncover the characteristics and 
attack mechanics required to answer research questions 3.1 to 3.3.  
3.7.1 Data sources 
This part of the research uses secondary data. The data sources 
are obtained through an archival and documentary research 
strategy, to review documentary accounts of cyber-attacks 
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publicly available. For this search was carried out through internet 
search engines to establish where these accounts of cyber-attacks 
were being published online. Through this method, a raw database 
is extracted for analysis. The research protocol is: 
• The online databases used are: 
• Newspaperarchieve.com, a subscription database 
with search engine accessed through MIT Library 
(http://libraries.mit.edu/) during the period 
November 2016 to May 2017. 
• Googles news, an open-access database, 
http://news.google.com 
• ProQuest news and newspapers, an online 
subscription database located at 
http://www.proquest.com/libraries/academic/news-
newspapers/, accessed through the MIT Library 
(http://libraries.mit.edu/) during the period 
November 2016 to May 2017. 
• The data is obtained through the use of keywords “cyber-
attack”, “cyber-risk”, “hacker” and “Information 
disruption”, and the search timeframe considered current 
news to this PhD project timeframe from November 2014 
to May 2017. 
• The filter for the validity of sources is: documents are 
included when these have an origin in an established 
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newspaper with regional or national circulation, cyber-
attack research institutes, hardware or software 
manufacturers, cyber-attack specialists that have been 
referenced in established newspapers, government 
agencies, and universities. 
• The filter for the validity of content is: documents are 
included when these describe a cyber-attack that resulted in 
operational disruption.  
The protocol is laid out in Table 19. 
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Table 19 Research protocol for the nature of cyber-risks 
Relevant Theoretical 
frameworks SLR Archival and Documentary research 
Context for research 
Cyber attacks continue to occur in suply chains. Yet, 
it is not clear how these risks occur or how they 
differ from other risks in the supply chain. If these 
differ, then new options of management might be 
necessary. 
Unit of Analysis 
1.- News articles 
 
2.- Reports by International organizations, agencies 
and consultants 
 
3.- Newsletters dealing with cyber attacks 
Research Question 
RSQ3: how do cyber risks cause operational 
disruption in supply chains and how does this differ 
from other supply chain risks? 
Sources of Data 
• Newspaperarchieve.com, a subscription database 
with search engine accessed through MIT Library 
(http://libraries.mit.edu/) during the period 
November 2016 to May 2017. 
• Google.com, an open-access database 
• Proquest news and newspapers, an online 
subscription database located at 
http://www.proquest.com/libraries/academic/news-
newspapers/, accessed through the MIT Library 
(http://libraries.mit.edu/) during the period 
November 2016 to May 2017. 
Keyword 
combinations 
(“cyber-attack” OR “cyber-risk” OR “hacker”) AND 
(“Information disruption” OR "disruption") 
Search Strategy 
1.- Use selected "Search Engines" with the "Keyword 
combinations" to obtain a first selection of 
documents. 
 
2.- Review and filter documents according to the 
validity of sources criteria. 
 
3.- Revire and filter documents according to the 
validity of content criteria. 
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Validity of sources 
*Established Newspaper of regional or national 
circulation, cyber-attack research institutes, 
hardware and software manufacturers, cyber-attack 
specialists that have been referenced in established 
newspapers, government agencies, and universities  
(Technical Competence of author) 
Validity of content *documents describe a cyber-attack that resulted in operational disruption 
 
3.7.2 Data analysis 
The gathered information is analysed sequentially according to 
1) a general description of the event 2) the structure of the case 
also called the “physics” of the case, 3) the patterns that result 
from the case structures described in each report, and 4) the 
differences these patterns present to other supply chain risks. 
The physics of the case refers to the series of events and agents 
involved in a particular event (Sterman, 2000). In this case, the 
event is operational disruption resulting from a cyber-attack. From 
the systems thinking position, this analysis identifies the 
structures involved in the cyber-attack becoming the unwanted 
event. The result of this part of the analysis is 1) descriptions of 
cyber-attacks with operational disruptions, and 2) indication of the 
attack structure, i.e., agents involved including the external hacker 
and communications between the agents and with the 
environment. 
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During the analysis of the case structures, patterns for the 
disruptions are identified and categorized. According to the 
systems thinking position, the categories are identified as relating 
to some aspect of a common structure such as agents or 
communication patterns involved. 
Finally, the patterns and categories identified from the cases are 
compared to other supply chain risks to identify defining 
characteristics, i.e., the “nature”, of supply chain cyber risks. The 
next section will describe a small discussion about the supply 
chain risk categories to identify those with which cyber-risks are 
compared. 
3.7.3 Supply chain risk source categories 
Multiple categorization frameworks for risk sources have been 
proposed in the literature and by industry. Christopher identifies 
supply chain risks as originating in one of five possible “sources”: 
1) supply risks, 2) process risks, 3) demand risks, 4) control risks, 
and 5) environmental risks (Christopher, 2011, p.195).  
Despite being exhaustive, these categories for sources of risk 
are not exclusive, leading to problems in their application. For 
example, the case of a flood can at the simultaneously originate 
demand, supply, process, and control risks. The “sources” as per 
Christopher are thus more accurately “areas” of risk which might 
have a source in the area itself or elsewhere. Christopher makes 
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no mention of cyber risks within any of the categories. Being 
embedded in different categories in the framework, it is therefore 
unclear how cyber-risks can be compared to any of these 
categories. 
Sheffi proposes a “dichotomy” (Sheffi, 2015) of risks to supply 
chains as originating from one of nine sources: 1) competition 
risks, 2) economy risks, 3) accidents, 4) government and politics, 
5) social discontent, 6) non-compliance, 7) intentional 
disruptions, 8) supplier failure, and 9) random phenomena. Sheffi 
derives these sources from cases of supply chain disruptions. 
However, these categories mix a series of concepts such as 1) 
motives, e.g., “social discontent”, 2) normal market operating 
conditions, e.g., “competition risks” or “non-compliance”, and 3) 
environmental conditions out of control, e.g., “economy risks” or 
“government and politics”, “random phenomena”.  
Moreover, the category of “intentional risks” is misleading, 
since if it is assumed that the categories are exclusive, the 
“intentional risk” category would imply that all other categories 
are unintentional, which is not the case. For example, competition 
risk in the form of artificially low market prices can be generated 
as a way of purposefully affecting other companies in the market, 
making it an intentional source, which manifests through 
competition risk. 
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Sheffi’s approach to supply chain risk categorization considers 
cyber-risks as part of the “intentional risk” category. In the same 
way as the example of the purposeful competition risk example 
above, this categorization is misleading. For example, cyber-risks 
can generate supplier failure risks, lead to non-compliance or be 
accidental instead of intentional. As a result, cyber-risks can be 
compared only to some of the risk categories in the framework 
proposed by Sheffi. 
DHL proposes a categorization of supply chain risks according 
to four main sources (DHL, 2015), 1) operational risks, composed 
of IT failure, supplier failure, cargo problems and infrastructure 
problems, 2) natural disaster risk, composed of earth, wind, fire, 
and water origins, 3) transportation risks, composed of ground, 
marine and aviation sources, and 4) socio-political risks, 
composed of security, political violence or strikes. This 
categorization is illustrated in Figure 28, which shows examples 
of triggers that create a disruption through these risks. 
Within each of the four categories the sources can be multiple, 
e.g., security and political violence can occur simultaneously, or 
IT failure and cargo problems can occur at the same time, and 
there is a distinction between categories which is useful for a 
comparison with cyber risks as a source of disruption, considered 
in the DHL framework (DHL, 2015) as all risks except IT Failure. 
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Figure 28 DHL Resilience360 risk categories (DHL, 2015) 
The general model of disruption that is followed, according to 
the systems thinking framework, is a sequence of 1) a risk source 
leading to 2) the exploitation of a supply chain vulnerability that 
leads to 3) the manifestation of a disruption. This equivalent to 1) 
a structure, i.e., a risk source activating a vulnerability, that leads 
to 2) a pattern, i.e., the exploitation of a vulnerability, which 
results in 3) a behaviour, i.e., the manifestation of a vulnerability. 
This sequence is the basis of systems thinking as is represented in 
Figure 27. 
Once the vulnerability is exploited the effects depend on the 
vulnerability itself, irrespective of the source that caused the 
exploitation. As a result, the comparison between cyber-risks and 
other supply chain risks is bounded to how the risk source exploits 
a vulnerability. 
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Consider the following example. An earthquake might result in 
a road being unavailable for delivery routing due to some physical 
obstruction or its destruction. In the same way, a cyber-risk might 
lead to a cyber-attack that deletes paths on the GPS system making 
these paths unavailable for delivery routing. A vulnerability of a 
supply chain might be the lack of adaptive routing for dealing with 
cases of path unavailability. The effect is a delayed delivery to 
customers or no delivery at all. 
The comparison in this research is related to how the sources, 
i.e., an earthquake versus a cyber-attack, exploit the existing 
vulnerability, i.e., the lack of an adaptive routing system, rather 
than how this lack of adaptive routing affects delivery 
performance. 
Cyber-risks are compared to 1) other operational risks, 2) 
natural disasters, 3) transportation risks, and 4) socio-political 
risks to identify unique cyber-risk characteristics. 
Furthermore, cyber-risks are compared to the natural disaster 
risk in terms of how the source exploits the vulnerability. 
Examples of this comparison are a proposal from this thesis and 
run along dimensions such as: 
• Latency: refers to the period between occurrence and 
discovery of a disruption from the risk. High latency means 
a long time between occurrence and discovery. 
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• Physical location: refers to the geography where the 
disruption from the risk is manifested, ranging from 
localized to un-localized. 
• Complexity: refers to the number of agents in the supply 
chain affected by a disruption from the risk.  
• Replication: refers to the way in which the disruption can 
continue occurring in other parts of the supply network. 
• Perpetuity: refers to the effect over time of the disruption 
from the risk.  
• Component versus interaction risk: refers to the type of 
failure causing the disruption from the risk.  
• Anonymity: refers to the information about the controller, if 
any, originating the disruption from the risk.  
3.8 Research design – Systemic risk analysis 
This section presents a justification for the choice of a systemic 
risk analysis to answer the research sub-question 4.1, and it 
describes the data gathering process, and the case selection, to end 
with a mention of the software that was used. 
3.8.1 Why a systemic risk analysis 
All risk analysis methods to some extent relate to a more 
generic process of identifying, quantifying and reducing risk 
(Frosdick, 1997; Khan et al., 2007), and traditional approaches 
have followed the “analytical reduction” method of separating a 
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problem into smaller subunits, understanding the behaviour of 
each unit separately and then integrating this understanding into 
an understanding of the whole.  
Traditional notions of risk consider it to be the probability of 
failure of a system, as derived from two characteristics of the 
system, the probability of occurrence of a specific mode of failure 
that leads to an unwanted event, and the consequence or severity 
of the failure mode materializing. These ways in which the mode 
of failure can materialize have been identified normally through 
methods such as fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, the 
HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP), and the Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). These methods link a cause 
with an undesirable effect, but “are unable to include aspects such 
as design errors, such as software flaws, component interaction 
accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, 
and social, organizational and management factors contributing 
to an unwanted event” (Leveson, 2011, p.211). 
In contrast, a systemic approach is based on two different set of 
ideas which characterize systems: emergence and hierarchy, and 
communication and control (see section 3.2.1). These concepts 
introduce ideas that would be invisible through analytic reduction 
approaches, such as coordination failure through system flaws, 
that is, undesirable results because of how the system was 
designed, not because of defective operation of any specific part 
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of the system. This coordination flaws are particularly evident 
when looking at information flows and the operational disruption 
that could happen due to cyber-attacks to these information flows. 
The underlying basic assumption for any systemic approach to 
risk management is that the optimization of individual 
components or subsystems in a system does not in general lead to 
the optimum of the system. Rather, the optimization of one part of 
the system may actually worsen the overall system performance 
(Leveson, 2005, p.141). 
A systemic approach to risk management is not something new. 
Jay Forrester, starting from the application of control theory to 
organizations, proposed an approach for understanding the 
structures that make systems behave the way they do. In the 
seminal work “Industrial Dynamics” Forrester analysed in detail 
the influence of structure on the performance of supply chains, 
and developed both a graphical and a mathematical language 
through which to represent these structures and to derive 
management implications (Forrester, 1961). Figure 29 shows a 
representation by Forrester (1961) of what he called a 
“production-distribution system”  
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Figure 29 Production-distribution system (Forrester, 1961) 
Special attention was given to the value of information, 
particularly concerning that “information sources, like other flows 
in the industrial system, are subject to being distorted” (Forrester, 
1961, p.427). The implications and advantages of using a dynamic 
analysis to understand information resilience cannot be 
overstated. As an example of the power of this approach, 
Forrester’s application of a time-dependent, i.e., dynamic, 
analysis resulted in relevant insights: 
•  The bullwhip effect was uncovered. Also known as the 
Forrester effect, it is “the progression toward the factory of 
the disturbance that is created by the change in retail sales” 
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experienced as a “progressive increase in the peak ordering 
rate as the disturbance moves upward in the system” 
(Forrester, 1961, p.173). Based on the system shown in 
Figure 29, Forrester goes on to show how a step increase in 
retail orders results in behaviours to the distributor, 
wholesaler and factory of increasing distortion, as can be 
seen in Figure 30, where the manufacturing orders to 
factory have much larger swings (bigger amplitude) than 
the orders to distributors from retailers for example. This 
insight is not merely theoretical but has been experienced 
by anyone who has had the change of playing the 
“distribution game” (Sterman, 1989). This management 
game was derived from Forrester’s work and consists of a 
simplified version of a supply chain that has to be managed 
to cope with variations in demand. Despite the apparent 
simplicity of the game setting, participants routinely 
experience uncontrolled variations in inventory throughout 
the game, without any external influence, just due to the 
structure of the supply chain before them and their 
decisions. 
• Availability of information can be harmful. From 
Forrester’s analysis in the “Industrial Dynamics” book, and 
while arguing for the real value of information, proposing 
that “the result of more timely information can be harmful. 
The effect can be to cause the manager to put more and 
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more stress on short-range decisions” (Forrester, 1961, 
p.427). 
 
Figure 30 System response (Forrester, 1961) 
• More recently, Sterman et al., (2015) have further extended 
the unexpected consequences of a dynamic supply chain 
creating unwanted behaviours despite all components 
working as expected, through what they have called 
“phantom ordering” or the effect through which the orders 
in the supply chain are inflated as a result of bounded 
rationality and emotional reactions to a perceived future 
scarcity, introducing the human factor as a central aspect in 
modelling risk for supply chains. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 240 of 620 
Forrester did not mention risk in his work (Forrester, 1961), but 
considered system disruption by using exogenous variables 
(p.112) through which external shocks to the model were 
introduced to test its reaction. More recently, the use of switches 
to explore different internal information flow disruptions has also 
been proposed (Rahmandad et al., 2015). As such, despite risks 
not directly being addressed, their effects are nevertheless 
simulated and analysed. 
The existence of risk beyond component failure was identified 
by Charles Perrow (1984). These risks were denominated “system 
accidents” and are caused by the complexity of interactions and 
the presence of tight coupling, i.e., a system where software and 
hardware are not only linked but also dependent on each other. 
Perrow does not mention circular causality directly, but the 
definition of system accident requires mutual interaction. 
Others have addressed specifically the analysis of risk through 
systems thinking approach. White (1995) suggested the use of a 
systemic approach to understanding and managing risk as a result 
of studying existing risk assessment methods, suggestion driven 
by both the increasing number of hazards and failures that 
accompany the adoption of new technologies, and the different 
shortcomings in existing methods to manage this complexity. 
Carroll (1998), for the case of industries with high levels of 
hazard, highlighted that “a high level of complexity and the tight 
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coupling among problems seems to require a more comprehensive 
[approach] than those typically employed” suggesting that 
traditional solutions, although well-intentioned, fail to help 
through their unintended side-effects. Carroll goes on to indicate 
that well-intentioned commonplace solutions can actually hinder 
improvement, and even exacerbate the problem these intended to 
mitigate. He, therefore, proposes a problem-solving dynamic that 
would include both problem fixing and goal learning, as well as 
“modelling tools to organize dynamic interdependencies, and 
feedback about effectiveness” (Carroll, 1998). Figure 31 is a 
representation by Carroll that illustrates how two possible fixes, 
in this case writing detailed procedures and disciplining workers, 
can have unforeseen side-effects that make the original problem 
worse, in two vicious circles, known in the system dynamics 
community as reinforcing feedback loops (for more information 
about feedback loops, see the System Dynamics section of this 
thesis). 
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Figure 31 Representation of fixes that fail (Carroll, 1998) 
What is characteristic in Carroll’s approach, is the proposal of 
risk as generated internally by the organization, as in the case 
shown in Figure 31, there is no outside intervention in the loops 
that maintain the problem going, but rather it is created by the 
organization’s own structure. 
Kang and his team have used a systems approach to identify 
what they called Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), a 
concept that is extensible to supply chains (Kang et al., 2005). 
Their paper mentions three important aspects: 1) a systemic 
approach ensures a causal relationship in the establishment of the 
feedback loop structure, 2) the approach is useful for 
understanding the behaviour of a complex system over time, and 
3) a systemic approach is useful in conceptualizing a thorough 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 243 of 620 
understanding of human interactions within complex systems. 
Although Kang uses a systems approach for modelling, the 
feedback loops structures are not mentioned, and several of the 
relationships are expressed in probabilistic terms. It does however 
maintain the focus towards structures in the system that generate 
and maintain the behaviour that is seen. 
A method for analysing risk based on systems theory was 
proposed by Nancy Leveson and her team in 2011, based on 
several shortcomings seen for existing risk analysis methods to 
respond to the requirements of the market, such as the exponential 
creation of new paths to systems failing due to technological 
innovation, a reduced ability to learn from experience due to the 
fast pace of technological change, the changing nature of the ways 
in which the systems can fail due to the technological innovation, 
new types of hazards, an increasing complexity and coupling of 
systems, a decreasing tolerance for single accidents, a difficulty in 
selecting priorities and making trade-offs, an increasingly 
complex interaction between humans and technology, and 
changing regulatory views about safety, for example (Leveson, 
2011). The proposed method is named STPA (Systems Theoretic 
Process Analysis) and belongs to the family of failure tree 
analyses, yet differs from them by adopting a meta-causal 
approach. Instead of looking at the individual actions that lead to 
the operational disruption, STPA considers the systemic situations 
(called hazards) that lead to these disruptions, to then identify the 
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conditions in which actions already designed into the system 
(called control actions) can lead to these hazards and thus to the 
situations that want to be avoided (called losses). 
More recently, Ghadge et al. (2013) proposed a systemic 
approach based on three pillars of risk analysis: risk identification, 
risk assessment and risk mitigation. Their proposal considers the 
generation of a system dynamics model containing different 
attributes and parameters, where risks can be simulated over time 
(dynamically) and sensitivity analyses can be obtained about the 
relevance of each parameter. Despite the results and simulation 
clearly pointing out to a system dynamics model, it is unclear what 
feedback loops, delays and sources of inertia, i.e., stocks 
(Sterman, 2000) were considered. Ghadge et al. (2013) 
concentrate on the identification of impacts and the occurrence of 
other impacts within the organization as a result, this causality 
being represented by probabilities. Two shortcomings can be 
mentioned for this approach. First, the identification of impacts 
and their probabilistic relationship to other impacts requires 
historical information that, for events that are uncommon or that 
have not been experience before, is not available. Second, even if 
the probabilistic relationships between impacts is known, this sole 
relationship is not actionable in any way, as this relationship does 
not deliver any information on the mechanisms that originate this 
causality, and therefore neither result in recommendations for 
prevention nor mitigation. As a result, despite being focused 
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towards the risk that is created by the organization’s own impact-
contagion or transference, the approach by Ghadge et al. (2013) 
does not lead to practical implications for companies. 
Garbolino et al. (2016) and his team have used system 
dynamics modelling and risk analysis to propose a dynamic risk 
analysis method that includes both constraints and behaviour over 
time (dynamics). Their modelling approach focuses on the 
strengthening of constraints, and models organizations as 
managing a dynamic process where industrial systems continually 
adapt to external and internal changes to achieve their goals. The 
model proposes a ten-step approach that culminates in structured 
scenario analysis, where the system is tested against different 
boundary conditions of interest. It is however restricted to a single 
plant and its internal process, thereby lacking the integration with 
other supply chain partners.  
The comparison of the methods just mentioned is shown in the 
next table, where these are compared with the criteria that need to 
be considered for answering the research question. 
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Table 20 Comparison of systemic risk analysis method 
 
From this table it can be seen that Leveson (2011) fulfils the 
most of the criteria associated with research sub-question 4.1, 
addressing all five of the points associated with the question. It 
addresses integration, it is a dynamic approach, does not rely on 
historical information, is focused on analysing risk, and considers 
a systems thinking approach. The next section describes the 
process, and the data gathering and analysis it involves. 
3.8.2 Systemic risk analysis through STPA 
The Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) method is 
based on the fault tree analysis family of methodologies. The 
fault-tree family is all those methods that start from an unwanted 
result and seek back for the causality that originated this result. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) was developed in 1961 by H.A. 
Watson at Bell telephone laboratories and is a method mainly used 
for the identifying what causes a hazard, not for identifying the 
hazards themselves. FTA uses Boolean logic to identify and 
Framework Risk Analysis
Systems 
thinking Integrated Dynamic
Non-
historic Yes/Total
Forrester, 1961 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4/5
Carroll, 1998 Yes Yes Yes No No 3/5
Kang et al., 2005 Yes Yes No Yes No 3/5
Leveson, 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5/5
Ghadge et al., 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 4/5
Garbolino et al., 2016 Yes Yes No Yes No 3/5
RSQ4.1.- How can a systmic risk analysis apporach mitigate 
compartmentalization, static framework and historical dependence 
for managing cyber risks in the supply chain?
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describe the combination of faults that lead to an unwanted 
hazard, and is thus a top down method, starting from the hazard 
and drilling down through causes for that unwanted condition up 
to the basic or primary events, as can be seen in Figure 32. The 
FTA process has four basic steps: 1) system definition, 2) fault 
tree construction, 3) qualitative analysis, and 4) quantitative 
analysis. The FTA process provides no indication on how to 
define the system or the top events, and the basic or primary events 
could either require probabilistic information or are related to 
structural properties of the system. 
 
Figure 32 Fault tree representation 
STPA, starting from the general principles of FTA, goes on to 
adopt a meta-causal approach: instead of looking at individual 
actions that lead to undesirable outcomes, STPA considers the 
systemic situations that lead to these losses- called hazards- to 
then identify the conditions in which the actions already designed 
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into the system - known as control actions - can lead to these 
hazards and thus to the losses that want to be avoided. 
STPA assumes an internal source of risks - endogenous view 
of causality - by understanding failure as a result of the structure 
of the system, and not due to external factors of the disruption, 
being thus a method based on systems theory rather than 
traditional analytic reduction and reliability theory. According to 
the systemic view, design constraints for the system (or the lack 
of these) are the causes of an undesired outcome. It is thus a 
complementary approach to protection from external threats, by 
focusing on protecting the system “from its own design”. A safe 
operation (free of unwanted events) is seen as an emergent 
property resulting from the interactions between the system 
components and with the environment. The problem of avoiding 
“accidents” (i.e., unplanned loss events) thus becomes a dynamic 
control problem of limiting the ways in which the system can 
behave by designing the structure underlying this behaviour. 
From this perspective, cyber-attacks are not merely events that 
happen to supply chains, but rather events which supply chains are 
“misdesigned” to experience. Cyber-attacks are thus unintended 
consequences (Sterman, 2001) that result from incomplete 
requirements (Leveson, 2011) at the time of supply chain design, 
and that are originated in a structure that allows these attacks to 
occur. A systemic analysis seeks to identify this “unrequested” 
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design that results in cyber-vulnerability, and determine structural 
changes through which a cyber-vulnerable behaviour is less likely 
to occur or no longer possible. 
The use of systems thinking for the understanding the 
requirements for a safe system operation is based on some general 
principles for systems safety (Leveson, 2005): 
• Emphasis on safety during system design and construction, 
not in adding to a finalized design. In this case it joins the 
traditions followed by disciplines such as maintainability 
(Smith, 2017) and constructability (Tatum, 1987) that 
require aspects for effective maintenance and construction 
to be added at the system design stage, respectively, 
• Consideration of the whole system rather than components 
or subsystems, 
• View of hazards beyond only component failures, aspect 
which differs from the computer safety approach, 
• Emphasis of analysis rather than standards or past 
experience, aspect which requires understanding the 
structures that cause an accidents before these occur, 
• Emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative 
approaches, as the quantitative data at the time of design is 
limited on inexistent, 
• Recognition of the existence of system trade-offs and 
conflicts in systems design, since “no system is absolutely 
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safe, and safety is not the only and rarely the primary goal 
for building systems” (Leveson, 2011). 
Literature has been published about the STPA methodology 
framework (Estefan, 2007; Leveson, 2011; Salmon et al., 2012; 
Altabbakh et al., 2013), with examples of its application in several 
domains, such as medical industry (Antoine,2013), environmental 
studies (Hardy et al., 2011), robotics (Mitka et al., 2015), power 
production (Karami et al., 2015), software development (Wang et 
al., 2016), aerospace ( Ishimatsu et al., 2014) and defence (Chiesi, 
2016), to name a few. No application has been documented 
however for supply chains or cyber-risks in supply chains. The 
research process did not find documented literature on the 
application of systemic risk analysis methods such as STPA in 
supply chains or to cyber-risks. 
Additionally, the STPA methodology is advanced through an 
annual spring workshop (March-April) held at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in Cambridge, MA, USA. Under the 
leadership of professor Nancy Leveson PhD., and John Thomas, 
PhD., where the application of STPA and other derived methods 
are shared5. 
                                              
 
5 The latest workshop was held in 2017. For more information : 
https://psas.scripts.mit.edu/home/2017-stamp-workshop-registration/ 
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The process of STPA is based on the STAMP principles, the 
Systems Theoretic Accidents Model and Processes, a conceptual 
framework based itself on systems thinking, and which 
understands causality of unwanted events or “accidents” as 
derived from the disrupted system itself rather than externally. As 
such, STAMP it is the theoretical foundation for different tools for 
more specific applications (Leveson, 2011), as shown in Figure 
33. STPA deals with an analysis before an accident has 
materialized, and is therefore an ex-ante analysis, based on the 
STAMP framework. Another technique that is available derived 
from the STAMP framework but which is not used in this thesis, 
is CAST, or the Casual Analysis based on STAMP, for the 
analysis of scenarios where an accident has already occurred, 
being therefore an ex-post analysis. 
 
Figure 33 STAMP framework and derived techniques 
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In systems theory, and thus in the STAMP framework, 
emergent properties such as safety or resilience originate from the 
interactions between the components of the system, and are 
controlled by imposing restrictions on that level from a higher 
level of hierarchy. Emergent property behaviours therefore 
becomes a control problem, where the goal of the control is 
enforcing these required constraints during design and operation 
of the system. According to STAMP, preventing unwanted events 
from occurring requires a paradigm shift from avoiding failures 
from a process, to a broader goal of “designing and implementing 
controls that will enforce the necessary constraints on the 
process” (Leveson, 2011). 
STAMP is thus based on three overarching concepts: 
• Safety Constraints, a basic element in STAMP as accidents 
occur when the required constraints have either not been 
designed into the system, or, have not been enforced. 
• Hierarchical Control Structure (HCS), levels of 
aggregation where emergent properties of interest manifest 
and can be managed. Hierarchy is used to describe accidents 
in terms of adaptive feedback mechanisms (see Figure 34) 
through control actions on a controlled process that respond 
to feedback signals from that controlled process. The 
controller is in a different level of hierarchy and the control 
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actions are conditioning the ways in which the controlled 
process can behave. 
• Process Models, which are the abstraction about the 
controlled process and about the controller actions that the 
controller has available, and based on which the decisions 
are taken. As seen in Figure 34, the process model is distinct 
from the controller, but a crucial part of it, as it is through 
the process model at the controller that the control action 
decisions are taken during adaptive feedback. 
 
Figure 34 Adaptive feedback mechanism (Leveson, 2011) 
The process model contained in an organization includes all 
algorithms that are used by automated systems, as well as the 
mental models that agents in the organization have about how the 
organization works, or those ideas members of the organization 
have to explain how business and the outside world operate 
(Morecroft, 1992). For example “if you understand inflation, a 
mathematical proof, the way a computer works, DNA, or a 
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divorce, then you have a mental representation that serves as a 
model of an entity in much the same way as , say, a clock functions 
as a model of the earth’s rotation” (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
3.8.3 Data gathering process and data analysis 
The data for this research was primary data collected from 
interviews. A total of 18 interviews were carried out to workers in 
3 plants of the company. These workers were members of the 
Supply Chain Management, Finance, warehousing Production, 
Quality, and from a main supplier. A research protocol was 
created and followed in all interviews, and it has been included in 
section 11.10 of the Appendix. 
The process of systemic risk analysis based on STPA considers 
the following steps (Leveson 2011): 
• Identify the system that is considered for analysis. 
Consistent with the systems thinking framework, this 
system is defined by the system goal, the controllers that are 
part of the system, the information flows present in the 
system, any storage of information present in the system 
and the control loops that are present in the system. The 
Controllers are any agents in the system that have the ability 
of sending or receiving information, such as an operator, or 
an automated system for decision making. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 255 of 620 
• Identify the control actions that can be effected by the 
controllers identified for the system. These control actions 
are any processes carried out by the controllers to influence 
the system. 
• Identify the unacceptable losses in the system. Considering 
the goal of the system defined earlier, the unacceptable 
losses are those events that jeopardize the goal, including 
the loss of human life or human injury, property damage or 
environmental pollution. 
• Identify the hazards present in the system, i.e., the system 
states or a set of conditions that together with a worst case 
of environmental conditions lead to an unacceptable 
accident. 
• Identify the unacceptable control actions. Considering the 
unacceptable losses, hazards and control actions of the 
system, determine when a control action leads to a hazard. 
For the case of cyber-risk context, the environmental 
conditions are those derived from a cyber-attack.  
• Identify those unsafe control actions that are enabled by 
cyber attacks 
• Identify security requirements or system design 
requirements to avoid the unsafe control action. These 
requirements and design considerations allow for 
modifications to the existing system.  
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This whole process can thus be considered as a balancing loop 
aimed at minimizing the number of unsafe control actions in each 
iteration. This process is shown in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35 STPA process applied to cyber-risks 
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The process as laid out conditions both the type of data that is 
gathered and the way in which this data is gathered, since 
information has to be collected from the case company and 
organized according to the requirements and structure of the 
method. The method that is used is a case study method with a 
directed analysis. 
Case study research is especially well suited and is “the 
preferred strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and 
when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real-life context” (Yin, 1994). This constitutes a fit with the 
characteristics of the problem this research project is trying to 
model: cyber-risks to the supply chains is a phenomenon that is 
currently evolving (contemporary) and the effects are not under 
the control of the investigator. 
As shown by Ellram (1996), a case study strategy is the chosen 
type for empirical data that is mostly qualitative, as seen in Figure 
36. 
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Figure 36 Research design (Ellram, 1996) 
It has been argued that despite being intellectually demanding, 
the use of systems thinking for analysis of failures “offers the best 
chance of identifying contributory factors” (Bennet, 2016). 
3.8.4 Software used 
The process of defining the system, unacceptable accidents, 
hazards, controllers, control actions unsafe control actions and 
derived requirements is a process that results in a complex 
network of relationships. These relationships can and have been 
managed through either relational databases or related 
spreadsheets. However, software has been developed that makes 
this process not only manageable, but allows for a structured 
approach.  
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This thesis is using a mixture of spreadsheets and specialized 
software to manage and analyse the information that is obtained 
through the STPA modelling process. 
The Software that is used is called XSTAMPP6, a platform 
developed at the University of Stuttgart in Germany, to serve as a 
support tool for the STPA hazard analysis process (Abdulkhaleq 
et al., 2015). The information that was gathered in the XSTAMPP 
tool is stored in XML format. After having gathered the 
information in XSTAMPP (See Figure 37), this is then 
“translated” into Microsoft Excel sheets through a small python 
routine (See Appendix 0) to transform the XML data into text 
data. Excel is then used to derive the frequencies and probabilities. 
                                              
 
6 http://www.xstampp.de/ 
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Figure 37 XSTAMPP analysis tool for STPA process 
3.8.5 Case selection 
The STPA analysis requires information about organizations 
that are exposed to cyber-risks and, more importantly, that 
perceive the need to prepare for these risks. Yin (1994) indicates 
that in contrast to strategies such as surveys which rely on 
sampling of a representative population, the number of cases to be 
used in a case study is determined by “saturation” i.e., the number 
of cases required when no new findings are revealed through the 
data from additional cases. The saturation is therefore reached 
through a sequential discovery, as it is not possible to know the 
number of cases required if these cases are developed in parallel 
by a group of researchers until these are compared. In the case that 
the process in being executed by a single researcher, the only way 
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to find saturation is when the last case that was obtained did not, 
in fact, add new information from the one that was already 
obtained from previous cases. 
Additionally, due to time constraints, the number of cases can 
also impact the depth to which each individual case is researched 
(Sanders et al., 2016). The larger the number of cases, the less 
individual information that can be obtained. 
It is finally Yin (1994) that provides the strongest argument 
toward the number of cases required. The research question RSQ 
4.1 wants to explain the way in which a method already 
successfully applied to other domains, can be useful for the case 
of cyber-risks in supply chains. This context is indicated by Yin 
as the rationale for selecting a single case for representing the 
critical test of a significant theory. Additionally since STPA has 
not been used for the analysis of cyber-risks in a supply chain 
before, thus corresponding to a revelatory case, where the 
information and its analysis uncover new information. 
3.9 Research design – Dynamic modelling 
This section presents a justification for the choice of a dynamic 
simulation through system dynamics for understanding cyber-
resilience in supply chains, the data gathering process is laid out, 
and the case selection is described. 
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3.9.1 Why modelling  
Complex systems defy intuitive understanding, as is revealed 
in the statements that justify this thesis research: despite existing 
risk management processes, and the great investments that are 
carried out to advance cyber-security, cyber-attacks continue to 
occur with disruptive consequences for supply chains. From a 
systems thinking perspective, this “counterintuitive behavior” has 
many potential origins of which Sterman (2000) highlights: 
limited information, confounding variables, ambiguity, bounded 
rationality, misperceptions of feedback, and flawed cognitive 
maps, all of which lead to erroneous inferences about the 
management of the dynamics of the systems. This error is 
compounded by human biases of which many are invisible in daily 
decision making, defensive routines to justify flawed mental maps 
and biased decision-making, and the imperfect implementation of 
those decisions.  
In order to manage this troubled access to reality, “virtual 
worlds” (Schon et al., 1986) have been proposed, through formal 
models that create virtual simplified versions of reality, or “micro 
worlds” (Papert, 1980), that are simulated as “reliable substitute 
descriptions that can help one understand a real system and its 
expected behavior” (Bossel, 1994, p.4). These virtual worlds are 
sometimes the only way of analysing situations such as 
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emergencies in advance of them actually happening, potentially 
providing high quality outcome feedback. 
The use of models to understand socio-technical systems comes 
from a western tradition where “whatever happens is not believed 
to be random; it is assumed to have a cause that can be understood 
and probably altered”. Additionally “modelers have a managerial 
world view [according to which] problems should be actively 
solved, not passively endured” (Meadows, 1980).  
The importance of the modelling of organizations was well 
described by Jay Forrester in the 1960’s already. He indicated that 
when people were asked “who is the most important people in the 
safe operation of an aircraft?” most would answer that those were 
the pilots. However, despite the extreme relevance of skilled and 
well trained pilots in the operation of an aircraft, what is rather 
more important is the design of an aircraft that can have a stable 
and robust operation in extreme conditions, and which ordinary 
pilots can fly even if they are tired, stressed of flying in 
unexpected conditions (Sterman, 2000). Forrester indicated that 
too many manager spend time performing as pilots, through 
activities such as decision-making and taking control from 
subordinates, rather than designing and implementing an 
organizational structure that can be managed well by ordinary 
people (Forrester, 1965). Therefore the role of the executive level 
should be one of corporate design and not corporate operation. 
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Management engineering research, or the research for effective 
engineering of the management activity, is a materialization of 
this vision, through the generation of models, as “CEO’s will 
eventually have to be competent in the creation and use of models 
if they are to lead such [organizational] planning activity 
effectively” (Keough et al., 1992). 
Simulation is an essential part of training for the military 
operatives, pilots, power plant operators and medical doctors, 
examples of activities where human operators interact in real time 
with complex technical systems. However, the use of simulations 
in management is less common despite also having a long history, 
as a minimum going back to the “Beer Distribution Game” 
(Sterman, 1989), a board game developed by Jay Forrester to 
model a simple supply chain (Forrester, 1961). These applied 
simulations have been named “management flight simulators 
(MFS)” (Sterman, 2014) or “policy flight simulators” (Rouse, 
2014), and provide “low cost laboratories […] that allow time to 
be compressed or dilated [and where] actions can be repeated 
under the same or different conditions” (Sterman, 2000, p.35). 
The learning process that happens through the use of these virtual 
worlds is illustrated in Figure 38.  
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Figure 38 Process with virtual and real worlds (Sterman, 2000) 
The process that is followed is understanding the real world 
through the use of a virtual world environment to make up for the 
difficulty of accessing the real dynamic complexity and unknown 
structure of the real world that needs to be managed,  
Models and simulation are an innate part of or human 
experience. As Bossel (1994, p.1) describes: 
“As we get up in the morning, we crank up our mental model 
of the little world around us, run a few simulations in our mind on 
how we are going to deal with the problems and people we meet 
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during the day, try out different approaches, evaluate the likely 
outcomes, and start the day with a plan. It will not protect us from 
failures and surprises, but it will have prepared us to deal more 
effectively with whatever tasks await us” 
Through modelling, existing knowledge about a system and the 
way in which these characteristics interact to condition the 
behaviour of that system, are used for design and management 
purposes. Modelling assists the unreliable ability to understand 
interactions in systems beyond only the individual parts, by 
allowing the visualization of these interactions and their effects. 
As Morecroft (2015) describes it, the goal of a systemic 
simulation is “the redesigning of social and business systems so 
that, despite their complexity, normal people can run them 
competently” (Morecroft, 2015, p.21). 
Some desirable characteristic of models include: its capacity to 
generate insights or new ideas, some degree of descriptive 
realism, their capacity to reproduce modes of behaviour from the 
real world, its degree of transparency and capacity of being 
understood by a non-specialist audience, the relevance of the 
problem being addressed by the model, its capacity to incorporate 
additional findings to modify structure and test outcomes, and its 
capacity to replicate real-world observations and to predict 
behaviour (Randers, 1980). 
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The use of modelling to drive policy facilitates the exploration 
of a problem space with an inductive instead of a deductive 
approach. When understanding a problem deductively, data 
gathered in the field is used to prove or disprove a theory 
represented as hypotheses about the world. Instead, with an 
inductive approach, the problem space is an open field of 
possibilities, the data gathering can be a little fuzzier, yet allowing 
the discovery of patterns or relationships that were previously 
unknown. 
Everyone has their models of the world. More than a choice, 
modelling has been argued as a way in which to have some 
“knowledge of the future” to identify the potential actions. A 
person knows when to cross the street, a student selects a major 
for the next four years, a general decides to position its dissuasive 
forces, or a buyer decides to raise a potential flaw in its computer 
systems, all according to the mental models they have about the 
world in which they operate. 
Mental models, having been built from past experience, 
accumulate observations and resulting generalizations of what 
happened in the past. However, the past is not well known either. 
Research has shown repeated evidence of the unreliability of 
human memory, full of conceptual and perceptual biases, many of 
them unrecognized and subconscious. 
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In the case of increasingly complex social systems, the 
interaction between members of these systems drives them to 
perpetually compare their mental models as a result of individual 
or joint decisions on their common organization. However, mental 
models are not directly transferrable from one mind to another, 
and it is not an intuitive task to translate mental models into the 
symbols and language necessary to convey them to another, as 
these mental models are usually non-sequential, unstructured and 
diffuse. Despite these apparent “shortcomings”, mental models 
seem to allow people to function reasonably well in a changing 
and variable environment. 
3.9.2 Why System Dynamics 
Frederick Taylor is regarded as one of the earliest proponents a 
scientific approach to solving management problems, and the 
early identification and application of scientific principles was 
based on the study of problems in a factory shop floor, in what can 
be regarded as the birth of Operations Management. Through the 
application of analytic techniques to operational processes, an 
efficient utilization of resources was sought by identifying the 
activities that were needed, identifying those activities that were 
not needed, sequencing the activities, and arranging them spatially 
to maximize the use of existing resources (Taylor, 1914). As such 
these earlier versions of scientific management were rather 
engineering activities rather than the development of science, as it 
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lacked an underlying generic knowledge about the processes it 
was managing.  
However, despite this lack of underlying science, scientific 
management has been be extremely successful (Waring, 2016), 
and at its early stages it facilitated the rise of consultant companies 
between the first and second world wars (Kiechel, 2010), and of 
industrial engineering schools seeking to teach these methods 
through simplified problems, also called “idealized problems” 
(Will et al., 2002). 
Idealized problems are stated in simplified and partial terms by 
presenting only those aspects required to the use of the method 
being taught, and with no reference to any particular industrial 
instance of the problem. Examples of this include inventory 
control problem, scheduling problems, routing problems, 
maintenance problems or any type of statistical control. The 
increase in the complexity of the problems to make use of the 
progress in computing power, and mathematical and statistical 
techniques, gradually gave rise to the Operations Research 
discipline, as a branch of computer science and applied 
mathematics, and it has been described as “quantitative research 
within Operations Management” (Will et al. 2002). 
It has been argued that the development of Operations 
Management, both in qualitative and quantitative initially lacked 
in the delivery of scientific models of operational processes with 
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predictive power, rather producing techniques that were partially 
useful, but that did not have explanatory power. First, the 
identification of patterns based on the statistical analysis of 
historical data allowed the development of strong short-term 
forecasting techniques. However, these techniques did not 
develop any causal relationships to explain or predict behaviours, 
acting rather as a black box. Second, the development of Inventory 
control methods allowed for the optimal of good approximate 
solution of that type of problem, again without any underlying 
structure that allowed for explanation of prediction of behaviour. 
As such, these were static analyses. 
Two important exceptions that challenged this static approach. 
First, queuing theory was proposed as a way of modelling the 
stationary behaviour of a system when considering variability in 
the orders arriving to the production system, and available 
resources, providing a framework with a flexibility that allowed 
for the use of probabilistic uncertainty, and stochastic processes, 
for example. Second, the development of system dynamics in the 
1960’s provided a framework for understanding the non-
stationary behaviour of a system as derived from the feedback 
structure of the system. For a detailed discussion about system 
dynamics, see section 3.2.3. 
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Will et al. (2002) classifies therefore Operations Management 
model-based research into two recognizable classes: axiomatic 
and empirical. 
The axiomatic model-based research is driven mainly by the 
idealized model itself. The objective is to derive insights of the 
model as defined for the problem, deriving information about 
certain variables in the model from assumptions in other variables 
in the same model. There is a use of formal methods developed by 
statistics, mathematics or computer science, and researchers in 
this line have training in areas such as queuing theory, Markov 
processes, decision theory, dynamic programming or 
mathematical optimization. It is thus a deductive research 
approach considering a system in a stationary condition7. 
On the other hand, the empirical model-based research is an 
Operations Management research class with strong emphasis on 
the coherence between what can be observed from reality and the 
model made to approximate that reality. This class has therefore a 
close alignment with the virtual-worlds approach discussed in 
section 3.9.1. It is an approach that is mainly inductive, used for 
                                              
 
7 A stationary condition of a system is a behaviour (value over time of the states 
of the system) that has a probability distribution function that does not change over 
time. 
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the analysis of systems in a non-stationary condition. Research 
done in this line includes the industrial dynamics stream 
developed by Forrester (1961) which later evolved to business 
dynamics (Sterman, 2000), and research about the clockspeed in 
industrial systems by Fine (1998), and Mendelson et al. (1998).  
Both classes partly derive their validity from the degree to 
which their model solutions assist managers in making decisions 
in the real world (Will et al., 2002). These two classes are 
compared in Table 21. 
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Table 21 Axiomatic vs. empirical model-based research 
 
Therefore, from the need to model reality for identifying and 
understand structures behind the behaviours of a supply chain, and 
according to the empirical model-based research class within 
Operations Management, is that system dynamics has been chosen 
as the method to develop the model for this part of the thesis. 
Aspect Axiomatic Empirical
Approach Mainly Normative, some descriptive
Mainly descriptive, some 
normative
Inference Mainly deductive Mainly inductive
Focus Model Model correspondence to reality
Academic 
methodology 
discussion
Weak Strong
Task analysis Stationary behavior Non-stationary behavior
Scientific 
relevance
1.- New variant of existing 
problems 
2.- New solution techniques 
to existing problems
3.- Improved solutions to 
existing techniques and 
problems
1.- Model recognized as an 
aspect model of reality
2.- Tests and challenges the 
validity and usability of 
theoretical models
Model 
presentation Formal mathematical terms
Representation of a 
structure that leads to 
process behavior
Researcher 
background
Mathematical analysis, 
Numerical analysis, 
Computer science
Conceptual modeling, 
Operations
Example Methods
Queuing, 
Regression analysis,  
Linear programming 
System Dynamics
Agent Based Modeling
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3.9.3 Data gathering process and analysis 
The objective of this research protocol is to describe and 
prescribe a reproducible data gathering and analysis process. This 
process results in the development of a series of representations of 
the dynamic (time-dependent) structure and response of a supply 
chain when faced with a cyber-attack. These representations are 
causal loop diagrams, a hierarchical control structure and a system 
dynamics model. 
The purpose of the study is threefold: 1) to gain some insight 
into the supply chain structures that partake during a cyber-attack, 
2) to understand the relationship of this structure the 
organizational reaction and performance to the cyber-attack, and 
3) to identify and test the main factors that influence that reaction 
and performance. 
As a source of information, this study uses information from 
four semi-structured interviews (primary data) and the gathering 
of documentation (secondary data). This information is about both 
the structure of the supply chain and the cyber-attack incident that 
required a response. The characteristics of the structure include 
information flows, information storage, regulating loops, delays, 
and the potential perturbations to the system. Information about 
the incident includes a description of the events and performance 
indicators during the event.  
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This study seeks to contribute to the scientific development of 
a framework for understanding resilient behaviour. The approach 
of using system dynamics starts from the premise that 
organizational structure is the source of its visible behaviour. By 
understanding the structure of the system it is possible to 
experiment with different operating conditions and as a result to 
design a system that exhibits the required behaviour. 
Therefore, the results from applying this method evidence its 
capacity to address compartmentalization, static versus dynamic 
behaviour description, and historical dependence during its 
application. The analysis of this capacity, for example its range or 
limitations, provides information to answer the underlying 
research question guiding this research protocol. 
The chosen method is case study with directed analysis. This 
analysis consists in the gathering of mainly narrative information 
that describes a specific situation of an organization experiencing 
cyber-resilience. This information is then “translated” into 1) a 
causal loop diagrams, 2) a hierarchical control structure and 
finally 3) a system dynamics model.  
The gathering if the information is performed through the 
collection of  
• Documents that describe the incident, obtained from 
sources within the company and from a consulting company 
that provided guidance during the incident. 
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• Documents and data from the company of its performance 
during the incident, 
• Interviews with people in the organizations that participated 
during the incident. This interviews were carried out 
following an interview protocol. 
Modelling, as seen in Figure 38, is an iterative process of 
hypothesis formulation, testing and revision, both of formal and 
mental models. The general steps in this process are (Sterman, 
2000): 
• Problem Articulation, the step to define the boundary of the 
problem and systems, the time frame for the study, the 
problem defined in dynamic terms (also called the reference 
modes, and some of the key variables that define this 
dynamic problem. 
• Dynamic hypothesis formulation, the step to formulate a 
dynamic hypothesis of the problem (ideas about why the 
problem is occurring in the first place), and to develop 
representations of the problem by using the initial 
hypothesis, key variables, reference modes and any other 
available data. The available tools include model boundary 
diagrams, subsystem diagrams or sector maps (Morecroft, 
2015), hierarchical control structures, causal loop diagrams, 
stock and flow diagrams and policy structure diagrams. 
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• Formulation of a simulation model, the step to specify the 
model structure and decision rules, to estimate the 
parameters, behavioural relationships, and initial 
conditions, and to test the model for purpose and 
operational ranges. 
• Testing, the step to compare the behaviour of the model 
with the reference mode, to test the robustness of the model 
under extreme conditions of operation, and to determine the 
sensitivity of the parameters under plausible value 
uncertainty. 
• Policy design and evaluation, step to identify and test 
scenarios, to test new policies, decision rules or structures, 
to perform what if analyses, to generate sensitivity analyses 
of the proposed policies, and to identify the effect of 
interacting policies. This process is iterative, as can be seen 
in the following picture. 
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Figure 39 Modelling process (based on Sterman, 2000) 
3.9.4 Software used 
Two main software are used in this process: 1) a software to 
represent the hierarchical control structure, and 2) a software to 
represent the causal loop diagrams and dynamic model, and to 
perform the simulation. 
The hierarchical control structure analysis was done through 
the use of a diagramming software, the “yED graph editor” 
available for download from the developer’s website 
https://www.yworks.com/downloads#yEd. 
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The causal loop and dynamic model were created using 
“VENSIM” in its Personal Learning Edition PLE, available for 
download from the developer’s website: http://vensim.com/free-
download/. 
These software are available for both Linux and Windows, and 
are freely available online.  
3.10 The quality of the research design 
Having outlined the research methods for answering the 
different research questions, is relevant to consider the elements 
that determine the quality of the research, this is the validity and 
reliability of the methods used.  
The validity of the methods is the extent to which the results of 
the methods reflect what is intended (Sanders et al., 2016). 
Although “the questions of validity can never be answered with 
complete certainty, researchers can develop strong support for 
the validity of the process” (Dorst, 2011). Three types of validity 
are relevant for this research, 1) construct validity, 2) internal 
validity, and 3) external validity. 
On the other hand, the reliability of the methods is the extent to 
which the method can be applied by a different researcher, 
delivering the same results. If a method can be applied by different 
researchers or at different point in time with similar results, then 
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the method is said to be reliable (Yin, 1994; Drost, 2011; Sanders 
et al., 2016).  
Yin proposes a series of measures that can be used to improve 
the quality of each of these elements, as shown in the next table. 
Table 22 Tests for research design quality 
 
3.10.1 Construct validity 
Construct validity requires establishing the correct operational 
measures to the concepts that are being studied (Yin 1994). The 
validity has also been called the “operationalization” of the 
construct as it reflects the capacity of the method to “translate a 
concept, idea or behavior into a functioning and operating 
reality” (Drost, 2011).   
Test Case study tactic Phase of research in which the tactic occurs
Use of multiple sources of 
evidence Data collection
Establish chain of evidence Data collection
Have key informats review 
draft case study report Writing
Do pattern-matching Data analysis
Do explanation-building Data analysis
Do time-series analysis Data analysis
External validity Use replication logic in multiple case studies Research design
Use case study protocol Data collection
Develop case study database Data collection
Reliability
Internal validity
Construct validity
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Given that the collection of data is dependent on the framework 
that is used for analysis, the construct validity is justified 
differently for each of the research processes that are followed. 
• For the research about the nature of cyber-risks, the data is 
to be analysed according to criteria of form, function, and 
then compared to other existing risks. Multiple sources of 
data were considered and there is a chain of evidence as the 
information can be accessed publicly. 
• For the research about systemic risk analysis, the process 
considers multiple interviews in each case that is 
considered, and a transcript was created for each interview. 
The participants also read the report that was created after 
the analysis. The use of the STPA method was also justified 
through its successful documented application in other 
domains. 
• For the case of the research about dynamic simulation, the 
process considers multiple interviews in each case that is 
considered. The participants also read the report that was 
created after the analysis. The use of the system dynamics 
method was also justified through its successful 
documented application in other domains. 
3.10.2 Internal validity 
The internal validity test is mainly considered for explanatory 
and causal studies only, where the depicted conditions and causal 
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relationships in fact lead to what is indicated in the research and 
are not the result of relationships that are not genuine (Yin, 1994).  
The Internal validity is again justified differently for each of 
the research processes followed in this thesis. 
• For the research about the nature of cyber-risks, there is 
pattern matching and time series analysis, to categorize the 
characteristics that are found, as the main purpose of the 
research is exploratory and descriptive. 
• For the research about systemic risk analysis, since the 
framework used for the analysis is based on a variation of 
an established method, the relationships that are found are 
contrasted and compared between the different 
interviewees, to identify patterns and match their 
descriptions. Additionally multiple sources of data are used, 
including interviews and organizational documents. The 
explanation building from the data that is gathered, is 
represented in the mental maps about the organization, 
which are one of the results of the interviews. The internal 
consistency of these mental maps is a data in itself, to then 
compare with other performance issues. 
• For the case of the research about dynamic simulation, this 
process is also based on an established process that has been 
successfully used in other domains. Additionally pattern 
matching is required for identifying a dynamic model, and 
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for this multiple sources if data are used, including 
interviews, company reports, and reports by specialized 
agencies. 
3.10.3 External validity 
The external validity test is to establish how generalizable are 
the findings of the research (Saunders et al, 2016). The external 
validity is justified differently for each of the research processes 
followed: 
• For the research about the nature of cyber-risks, multiple 
sources of data were used as part of the research design. 
• For the research about systemic risk analysis, multiple cases 
were used as part of the research design, cases that are 
similar to an extent and thus comparable. 
• For the case of the research about dynamic simulation, one 
case was used, which was analysed in depth, therefore 
aiming to be revelatory rather than generalizable. 
3.10.4 Reliability 
The reliability test deals with demonstrating that the process 
followed in the research can be repeated by different people with 
the same results (Yin, 1994).  
The reliability is justified differently for each of the research 
processes followed in this thesis: 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 285 of 620 
• For the research about the nature of cyber-risks, a study 
protocol was used for obtaining and analysing the data, and 
the data is kept in a database. 
• For the research about systemic risk analysis, a study 
protocol was developed and the data collected in ways of 
the transcripts, is kept in a database, 
• For the case of the research about dynamic simulation, a 
study protocol was used. 
3.11 Methodology summary 
This chapter described the need for a clear methodology as an 
essential part of this PhD thesis and gave a detailed description of 
the methodologies followed in this thesis work. 
The chapter started by discussing the strategic aspects: the 
philosophical position taken throughout this study followed by the 
explanation of the approach to theory development chosen for this 
work, also known as the “logic” of the research. Thereafter the 
design aspects were discussed: the methods used for the research 
are explained and arguments for their choice were given. The 
chapter continued with an explanation of the strategies considered 
in the research, to then finalize by explaining the tactic aspects of 
this research, namely the data collection and data analysis 
methods for each of the research questions, and the considerations 
for the research quality were laid out. 
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After having presented the methodology upon which this thesis 
is based, this work describes the results from the application of 
these methodologies for answering the specific research 
questions. 
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4 Results: nature of cyber-risks 
This chapter starts by providing background information about 
the justification for this part of the thesis research to then describe 
the gathered data. 
4.1 Background 
The systematic review revealed several knowledge gaps in the 
extant literature that make it difficult to answer the main research 
question directly. From a systems perspective, it is necessary to 
understand the underlying structure causing an “unwanted 
behavior” to only then define interventions to the system, either 
through policy or structural design.  
For the case of cyber-risk and resilience in the global supply 
chain, the unwanted behaviour is the operational disruption 
derived from cyber-risks, and the underlying structures are the 
existing agents and connections in the system. A systems 
approach understands that it is through which this structure that 
disruptions occur. The more that is known about how those 
disruptions happen, i.e., the “physics” of the system (Sterman, 
2000; Rahmandad, 2015), the better equipped an organization is 
to design a response and prepare for such an event. 
However, the literature review revealed limited information 
about the way in which cyber-risks result in an operational 
disruption. Furthermore, the information that is available about 
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cyber-disruptions is circumscribed to the domain of IT and data 
transfer without the analysis of any resulting operational 
disruption. As a result, and as it is shown in the answer to RSQ 2 
(see section 2.8.2) the limited information published about 
individual attacks gives rise to RSQ3. 
This part of the thesis seeks to answer RSQ3 by gathering cases 
of cyber-attacks from sources beyond published literature to 1) 
obtain information about the structure of a cyber-attack and 2) 
provide information for evaluating the suitability of cyber-
resilience methods to the nature, i.e., the particular characteristics, 
of cyber risks. The method that is followed is explained in section 
3.7. 
The following section describes the gathered data, which is 
further analysed in Chapter 7, section 7.1. 
4.2 Data gathering results 
The gathered data, in a similar fashion than the literature 
review, is first described and then discussed thematically. 
4.2.1 Description of data 
The initial gathered data consists in 2.425 events of cyber-
attacks. As shown in Figure 40, no trend is detected in terms of 
the number of attacks over time. As this search is not exhaustive, 
this does not have implications on the number of attacks occurring 
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overall, and is only a description of the data that was gathered 
through the established protocol as per section 3.7 of this thesis. 
 
Figure 40 Number of gathered cyber-attacks  
Two main indications have to be made about the reports 
represented in Figure 40: 1) Not of the cyber-attacks mentioned in 
the reports mention an effect on operations, and 2) the reports have 
multiple sources such as newspapers and blogs, independent 
blogs, specialist news boards and university news feeds. Table 23 
shows a summary of the newspapers with the published reports of 
cyber-attacks considered in the data gathered. 
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Table 23 Distribution of reports by newspaper source 
 
The location where the attacks were directed is shown in Table 
24. The country that present the most number of cyber-attack 
reports in the gathered data is the United States of America, with 
almost half of all the reports targeting organizations in that 
country. 
 
  
Newspaper Percentage of articles
International Business Times 26,98%
The Register 19,07%
Reuters International 7,71%
BBC UK 5,07%
Forbes 4,87%
Bloomberg 3,04%
The Guardian 2,84%
BBC International 2,64%
The Independent 1,62%
Cnet 1,62%
New York Times 1,22%
Global News 1,22%
The Washington Post 1,22%
CBC 1,01%
New York Post 1,01%
Reuters UK 1,01%
ABC News 1,01%
Others 16,84%
Total 100,00%
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Table 24 Target countries of cyber-attacks in sample reports  
 
The process that is followed filters both according to the 
sources of data, and to the types of cyber-attack that are reported, 
to include those that have an effect on operations.  
This filtering process is shown in Figure 41, and is based in the 
method described in section 3.7. The initial search process 
resulted in 2.425 reports of cyber-attacks from a wide variety of 
sources. By applying the criteria related to the source validity and 
the contents of the report, these reports were narrowed down by 
60% to 950 reports. A further filter was applied to identify those 
reports that resulted in some form of operational disruption to 
consider information validity. The sources of the gathered 
Target country Percentage of attacks in data
United States 46,81%
United Kingdom 8,05%
India 3,96%
Canada 3,10%
Russian Federation 2,29%
Japan 2,11%
Australia 1,92%
France 1,30%
Israel 1,30%
Italy 1,30%
Thailand 1,24%
China 1,24%
Germany 1,24%
Korea (Republic of) 1,24%
Ukraine 1,11%
Sweden 0,93%
Others 20,87%
Total 100,00%
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information are categorized and filtered according to the exclusion 
criteria in the research protocol. The detailed sample consisted of 
5,7% of the narrowed down reports, which consists in 54 reports 
of cyber-attacks. 
 
Figure 41 Report gathering process 
The distribution of cyber-attack reports according to the 
different validated sources is shown in Figure 42. 
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Figure 42 Distribution of reports about cyber-attacks 
The analysis of the data proceeds by categorizing the cases 
according to their disruption effect.  
Based to the definition by Christopher (2011) in section 1.3 of 
this thesis, a supply chain is a network of companies linked by 
activities that produce value in the form of products and services 
to a customer. As a result agents that participate in a supply chain 
have incentives to join in activities of value creation in the form 
of a products and / or services. This is illustrated in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43 Supply chain agent (based in Christopher, 2011) 
As a result, the areas where the supply chain agent can be 
disrupted generically are either related to the resources it has 
available, the activities it performs with these resources, and the 
products or services that contain the added value from combining 
the activities and resources. 
As a result, the cases in the gathered data are organized and 
grouped according to the form that the disruptions in the cases 
took place. These groups are: 
• Active theft of assets, 
• Passive theft of assets, 
• Active product theft 
• Active interruption of operations, and 
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• Passive interruption of operations. 
4.2.2 Active theft of assets 
Theft of assets was a disruption type present in the data 
gathered. These cases occur in organizations that have the custody 
of some type of transferrable asset, and the data revealed cases in 
formal currency and in cryptocurrency (see glossary of terms) and 
digital intellectual property. It is active since the actions to create 
the disruption are executed by the hackers, not the target company. 
Event description. The case of Tesco Bank8 is descriptive of a 
form of cyber-risk that results in an “active” theft of money. In 
November 2016 Tesco Bank informed that 7% of all their 
customer’s current accounts had been subject to criminal activity 
with the result that money was fraudulently withdrawn. Tesco 
bank’s shares fell by 3% the day of the announcement. Initially, 
the bank did not disclose how much money had been stolen, but 
                                              
 
8 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tesco-bank-cyber-attack-
hack-25-million-pounds-hacked-bank-accounts-a7405591.html 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13882530/1/tesco-shares-drop-on-bank-
hack.html 
http://www.theweek.co.uk/78385/tesco-bank-cyber-attack-everything-we-know-
so-far 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tesco-hackers-used-mobiles-to-launder-haul-
92tjftd57 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37974776 
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later informed that over £2,5 million had been paid out to over 
9.000 customers as a result of the cyber-attack just two days after 
the attack had been acknowledged by the bank.  
These attacks have been named by news reports as “cyber-
heists”. 
The physics of the event. No unique explanation exists on the 
way in which the theft was carried out, as two main explanations 
have been put forward by the specialized news media: 
• The first explanation is that, through previously stolen data 
hackers set up contactless payment accounts on 
smartphones, as revealed by the Sunday Times newspaper 
without identifying sources. In a coordinated action during 
the weekend when the theft was detected, thousands of 
purchases were made in Brazil and the US of low-priced 
goods by using smartphones; many of these transactions 
having been made to the US retailer Best-Buy. This 
assertion contradicts the original claim by the bank at the 
time of acknowledging the theft, that no personal customer 
information had been stolen.  
• A second way was published by the Financial Times, and 
as source was cited an Israeli cyber-security company 
named CyberInt. This company indicates to have found 
evidence of Tesco bank customer information for sale in the 
dark web, reported by the BBC, information that was 
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obtained by “brute force”, as the bank’s website allows 
unlimited login attempts. This vulnerability allows an 
automated system to attempt different login combinations 
until one works out. 
Similar attacks. Similar attacks have been experienced other 
institutions in different parts of the world, for example: 
• The central bank of Bangladesh suffered the loss of more 
than US$ 101 million, in February 2016  
• The Austro bank in Ecuador, suffered the loss of more than 
US$ 9 million,  
• The central bank of Russia suffered the loss of more than 
US$ 45 million in December 2016,  
• The Hong-Kong based cryptocurrency exchange service 
Gatecoin9 suffered a cyber-attack in May 2016 suffering the 
loss of over US$ 2 million in equivalent Bitcoin and 
Ethereum. 
Additionally, the theft of Intellectual property through cyber-
attacks also appeared in the data. 
                                              
 
9 http://news.softpedia.com/news/gatecoin-bitcoin-exchange-loses-2-million-
following-cyber-heist-504128.shtml 
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• In April 2016, US Steel made public the theft through 
cyber-espionage that had occurred in 2014 of strategic 
technical information that represented decades of research 
in creating the next generation high-strength steel10. The 
report indicated Chinese hackers as responsible. 
• In December 2016, ThyssenKrupp a German industrial 
manufacturer revealed that a cyber-attack, probably 
originated in south-east Asia had stolen strategic project 
data, and they could not provide a “reliable estimation of 
the damage” as a result. The breach occurred in February 
2016, and it was discovered in April of the same year11. 
Structure of the event. The structure of this type of operational 
risk can be represented by the interaction of the targeted 
organization and its immediate supply chain. Figure 44 shows the 
interactions mentioned in the descriptions of the normal operation 
of Tesco Bank. 
                                              
 
10 http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-u-s-steel-china-alleged-hacking-
20160427-story.html 
11 https://www.ft.com/content/7b556fb8-bd43-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080 
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Figure 44 Pre-hacker diagram of active theft of resources 
This diagram is a representation of the control structure, as 
described in the methodology of this thesis (see Figure 34 in page 
253). The effect that hackers have on the operation of this system 
is both through the replacement of communications by fraudulent 
ones, or by influencing the system to generate an incorrect 
communication. The different diagrams components are 
represented in different ways in the control structure diagrams. 
These symbols are used in all the risk groups discussed in this 
section, according to the symbols shown in Figure 45. 
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Figure 45 Symbols used in control structure diagrams 
For the case of the active theft of resources, the effect of a 
hacker on the different flows is represented in Figure 46. This 
representation shows that the payment instruction from the 
customer, after a hacker intervention, has been replaced by a 
payment instruction from the hacker. The other effect is that the 
product or service is not delivered to the customer but to the 
hacker, despite the fact that the payment is still made to the 
supplier. 
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Figure 46 Post-hacker diagram of active theft of resources 
The focus of the analysis is Tesco Bank (indicated in Figure 44 
and Figure 46 with the thick-wall blue rectangle) and all hacker 
direct influences are shown in red. When the hacker is present and 
active, the normal payment instruction from the customer is 
replaced by a fraudulent payment instruction from the hacker. 
Tesco Bank, unable to tell the difference, proceeds with the 
normal payment to the supplier, e.g., Best Buy as indicated in the 
Tesco Bank example. The supplier as a result proceeds to deliver 
the product or service to the hacker instead of the customer. 
This structure is equivalent to other case examples of passive 
theft of resources. For example, in the case of the Thyssen-Krupp 
intellectual property theft, a high level representation of the 
normal process is shown in Figure 47. 
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Figure 47 Thyssen-Krupp normal cycle of IP-Revenue 
Figure 47 represents a normal cycle where the intellectual 
property of Thyssen-Krupp is used to generate a supply of 
differentiated products that result in a revenue for the IP owner. 
Thyssen-Krupp, as in the case of other industrial equipment 
manufacturers, do not normally manufacture all of the parts in 
their products, but rely on a market of suppliers who supply the 
products as per Thyssen-Krupp’s specifications. The case with an 
active hacker present is shown in Figure 48.  
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Figure 48 Thyssen-Krupp hacked cycle of IP-Revenue 
The theft of IP is the equivalent of the hacker being able to issue 
the instructions of using these IP to the pool of suppliers to provide 
differentiated products and obtain the revenues. The cases of 
Tesco Bank and Thyssen-Krupp therefore, have a common 
structure that will be explored during the analysis. 
4.2.3 Passive theft of assets 
Some of the cases identified in the research that led to the theft 
of assets had an alternative sequence of events, where rather than 
hackers actively accessing target company systems, the hackers 
intervene the information used by the victims to carry out a 
process of transferring an asset. It is passive since the actions to 
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create the disruption are executed by the target company, not the 
hackers. 
Event description. The case of Leoni AG12 is descriptive of a 
form of cyber-risk that results in the “passive” theft of money. In 
august 2016 Leoni AG, Europe’s biggest manufacturer of wires 
and electrical cables, and the fourth largest vendor of these 
products in the world, was tricked into paying over € 40 million 
(US$ 45 million) by electronic transfer to a fraudulent bank 
account. Leoni AG has over 75.000 employees in 32 countries 
around the world, and it celebrated 100 years of existence only 
one month after the attack. Its main customers are BMW, 
Mercedes-Benz and Rolls Royce. 
When the company made the public announcement 4 days later 
(it is unclear when the mistake was detected), its shares fell 7%. 
This event happened in one of Leoni’s manufacturing sites, 
specifically located in the city of Bistrita in Northern Romania. Of 
the four manufacturing sites owned by Leoni in Romania, only the 
Bistrita site has authorization to make payments, making this a 
directed attack. 
                                              
 
12 http://news.softpedia.com/news/one-of-europe-s-biggest-companies-loses-40-
million-in-online-scam-507818.shtml 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 305 of 620 
This attack has been named by news reports as CEO-Fraud, 
whaling or email spoofing. 
The Physics of the event. The data reveals a unique version 
about the mode in which this fraud was carried out. The 
misdirection of funds was instructed through a fraudulent email 
sent from an unknown source to the Chief financial officer (CFO) 
of the company in Romania. The email was crafted to appear as if 
it had been sent by one of the top German executives of the 
company. Additionally, the fraudulent email contained inside 
information to appear more authentic, such as particulars about 
the company’s transfer protocol, and the request followed 
company policy. 
Similar attacks. Similar attacks have been experienced by other 
companies around the world, for example: 
• In January 2016 the Austrian airplane parts manufacturer 
FACC lost over US$ 56 million through a similar scam13.  
• Also in January 2016, the Belgian bank Crelan (Credit 
Agricole) lost over US$ 75 million in similar circumstances 
to the FACC case.  
                                              
 
13 http://news.softpedia.com/news/company-fires-ceo-after-falling-victim-56-
million-online-scam-504519.shtml 
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• In March 2016, Mattel was scammed in to paying US$ 3 
million to an unidentified destination in China.  
• The Brisbane city council in Australia lost US$ 500k to 
scammers in August 201614 .  
The FBI has recorded at least one victim for this type of attack 
for every US state, along with victims from other 100 countries, 
with money being sent fraudulently to 79 countries. The most 
frequent destination for fraudulent payments is China and Hong 
Kong (FBI, 2016). 
Structure of the event. The structure of the event has differences 
with the structure presented in the previous case group. In the case 
of a passive theft of resources. The Leoni AG case is represented 
by a control structure diagram as shown in Figure 49. The CFO 
orders a payment from the bank to the supplier after an instruction 
from the CEO, and a product is delivered to the warehouse. 
                                              
 
14 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/08/16/brisbane_councillors_lose_500k_to_scam
mers/ 
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Figure 49 Leoni AG case pre-hack 
The altered structure when a hacker is present, is represented in 
Figure 50. The flows are represented according to the symbols 
indicated in Figure 45. The effect of a hacker is the replacement 
of the communication from the CEO to the CFO with a fraudulent 
communication from the hacker to the CFO. The effect is that the 
bank issues the payment inadvertently to the hacker instead of the 
warehouse. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 308 of 620 
 
Figure 50 Leoni AG case post-hack 
An interesting effect of this type of case, and in contrast with 
the active theft shown previously, is that it is partners upstream 
that are affected by this attack, as the supplier, having delivered 
the product, do not receive timely payment. In contrast, in the case 
of the active theft of resources, it is the customers, and therefore 
the downstream supply chain, that experience the effects of the 
cyber attack. 
4.2.4 Active product theft 
The attacks described in the previous sections have different 
effects in the supply chain. An active money theft, being bounded 
to the resources owned by the target organization, does not affect 
suppliers or customers. On the other hand, passive money theft 
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can potentially affect suppliers by misdirecting payments as the 
cases in the previous section illustrate. Another type of cyber-risk 
found in the data affects customers, in the form of misdirecting, 
and thus stealing, products through an active participation of 
foreign agents. It is an active attack as the actions to create the 
disruption are executed by the hackers. 
Event description. The case of the Hyundai and Kia cars is 
representative of an active product theft. In December 2016, 
product and customer data that had been stolen from Hyundai and 
Kia in Israel, was used by a network of criminals to steal dozens 
of cars and smuggle them to the West Bank15.  
The physics of the event. A network of criminals used a list of 
car identification plates to locate the vehicles in the city. When 
one was found, the data was used to identify both the code of the 
keys, of which a copy was made, and the address of the owner, 
from where the car was stolen. 
Similar attacks. Other active product theft examples were 
identified in the gathered data, for example: 
                                              
 
15 https://www.scmagazine.com/alleged-car-thieves-used-breached-data-to-help-
steal-hyundais-and-kias/article/580425/ 
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• A cyber-attack has been recorded in the UK for the theft in 
2016 of BMW luxury cars that have the key-less feature16. 
• An unnamed global shipping company17 experienced an 
attack in 2016, where by using stolen data obtained from a 
previous network intrusion, pirates had specific knowledge 
at the time of boarding a vessel, and located specific 
containers through the bar codes and steal the contents of 
that crate.  
• Another case of active product theft in Manchester, UK in 
201518 did not require network intrusion, but instead 
disrupted the signal, i.e., “jammed the signal”, of the remote 
lock for all the cars in a parking lot. This led to some drivers 
not being able to open or close their cars, and set off alarms 
uncontrollably. Despite the many implications of such a 
simple but effective attack, no product loss was reported. 
Structure of the event. In the case of the KIA and Hyundai car 
thefts, the structure of a normal process is represented in Figure 
                                              
 
16 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4456992/Shocking-moment-car-
hackers-steal-60-000-BMW.html 
17 https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/03/pirates-hack-into-
shipping-companys-servers-to-identify-booty/ 
18 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/20/car_park_vehicle_locks_hacked_en_masse 
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51. This is a simple representation of the normal interaction 
between a product and its owner through some type of control 
system by using proprietary information, which in the case of the 
stolen cars is the key codes and address. Other examples of 
proprietary information include the electronic key code and 
medium for the case of the keyless BMW cars, and the container 
contents and ship location in the case of the global shipping 
company case. 
 
Figure 51 Kia and Hyundai car normal process representation 
When the hacker is present, the proprietary information is used 
by the hacker to obtain results from the control system, as shown 
in Figure 52. The flows are represented according to the symbols 
indicated in Figure 45. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 312 of 620 
 
Figure 52 Kia and Hyundai car hacked process representation 
By accessing the control system of the cars and the physical 
location of these cars, the hackers can obtain results of a normally 
functioning control system and car, instead of the owner. 
4.2.5 Active interruption of operations 
Some cases in the gathered data relate to the interruption of 
productive operations as a result of a cyber-attack. It is an active 
attack as the actions to create the disruption are executed by the 
hackers. It is active since the actions to create the disruption are 
executed by the hackers, not the target company. 
Event description. The case of a German steel manufacturer is 
representative of a cyber-attack affecting operations. In late 2014 
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a steel mill was the subject of a cyber-attack through which 
unidentified foreign agents disrupted the production process19. 
This attack made public by de German federal office for 
information security, known as BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 
der Informationstechnik). BSI describes it as the second disclosed 
case in the world of a cyber-attack causing physical damage after 
Stuxnet in 2010. As a consequence of the intrusion, one of the 
plant’s blast furnaces was shut down in an uncontrolled manner, 
resulting in massive damage to the plant. 
BSI indicates that perpetrators of this attack have not been 
identified, yet the structure of the attack could only have been 
designed by a group people knowledgeable about industrial 
control systems. No motivations have been identified either for 
this attack. 
The physics of the event. The BSI did not disclose the location 
or the name of the company that was affected, but revealed the 
process through which the disruption was executed. 
• The hackers access the office software network of the 
industrial plant, through what is known as “spear phishing”, 
                                              
 
19 https://www.sentryo.net/cyberattack-on-a-german-steel-mill/ 
https://www.wired.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hack-destruction/ 
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similar to the hacking process described in the passive 
money theft, a fraudulent emails that seem to come from a 
legitimate source encourages the recipient to open an 
attachment or visit a website that contains a malware. 
• From the office software the hackers penetrate the steel mill 
production management software, 
• Hacker take over most of the plant’s control systems 
• Hackers methodically destroyed human-machine 
interaction components  
• Hackers prevent blast furnace from initiating its security 
settings at the correct time 
• Incorrect operation caused damage to physical 
infrastructure 
Given the complex attack sequence and the prolonged time 
through which the attack is materialized, these attacks have been 
denominated as Advanced Persistent Threats, or APT. 
Similar attacks. Different examples of cyber-attacks similar to 
the one described for the steel mill were found in the gathered 
data. 
The most famous cyber-attack that resulted in physical 
infrastructure damage is the Stuxnet worm, detected in 2010. This 
attack is found as part of the SLR process to answering RSQ 2 
(see section 2.8.2). Stuxnet is a computer worm targeting nuclear 
enrichment facilities, and is suspected to having had different 
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versions released to the internet, as far back as 2006. Stuxnet 
affects the control of the centrifuges, an equipment central to the 
process of uranium enrichment. By tricking the control system, 
Stuxnet led centrifuges to spin far above their recommended 
speeds, causing them to fail (Zetter, 2014). Stuxnet has several 
distinctive features, such as: 
• It is a directed computer worm with an attack sequence in 
three phases: 1) first it seeks out computers in the network 
running Microsoft Windows, then 2) seeks out a specific 
Siemens programmable logic controller (PLC) connected to 
that computer, to then 3) alter the controlling software for 
this PLC to influence the control of the underlying process 
of uranium enrichment.  
• The disruption process it caused was autonomous and did 
not require a connection to the Internet to function. 
• Stuxnet used proprietary keys and undiscovered software 
vulnerabilities, i.e., zero-day vulnerabilities. 
Research into this malware was carried out through the gradual 
unencrypting of a particularly large file of code discovered in the 
infected computers. This unencrypting resulted in the discovery 
of an extremely sophisticated program with characteristics that led 
experts at the time to characterize it as the first “cyber weapon” 
(Zetter, 2014).  
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Not all cases of active interruption of operations resulted in 
equipment or infrastructure damage as a result of the cyber-attack. 
Examples of infrastructure and equipment foreign intervention 
and control as a result of a cyber-attack include: 
• In 2013, hackers took control of the control systems of a 
New York dam20. The attackers were not able to open the 
gates only because the gate had been manually disconnected 
for maintenance at the time of the attack21. 
• In March 2016, an unnamed water treatment plant was 
hacked22. Hackers took over the control systems and 
changed the levels of chemicals used to treat tap water. 
• In December 2016, several electricity cuts affected Turkey, 
caused by cyber-attacks23, and affecting industrial regions 
from Kocaeli to Istanbul. A similar attack to interrupt 
electricity delivery occurred in Ukraine in 201524. These 
attacks are normally carried out by hackers taking over the 
                                              
 
20 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/12/21/iranian_hackers_target_new_york_dam/ 
21 http://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/ 
22 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/24/water_utility_hacked/ 
23http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/major-cyber-attack-on-turkish-energy-
ministry-reported.aspx?pageID=238&nID=107981 
24 https://www.wired.com/2016/01/everything-we-know-about-ukraines-power-
plant-hack/ 
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control systems to disconnect switches, thus cutting the 
supply of electricity to whole regions. 
• In 2014, a floating oil rig from an unnamed company was 
taken over by hackers who tampered with its control 
systems, tilting it to the point where the production had to 
be shut down. It took 19 days to make the structure and 
control systems sea-worthy again (Wagstaff, 2014). 
Structure of the event. The active interruption of operations 
case of the steel mill before the hacker attack is represented in 
Figure 53. 
 
Figure 53 Steel mill process pre-hack 
In a normal steel mill cooling process, the input is a hot furnace 
that through the furnace cooling process, results in the output of a 
cold furnace. This cooling process is controlled by the continued 
interaction between sensors that measure the state of the process, 
in this case thermometers that read the furnace temperature, and 
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the actuators that influence the process, in this case the electric arc 
generators which create the heat and coolers that take heat away. 
The control loop that is illustrated in Figure 53 represents this 
interaction as mediated by the control system, which directs the 
net heat production from heaters and coolers as a result of the 
temperature signalled by the thermometer, and according to a 
cooling algorithm contained in the control system. 
A hacker that disrupts this process, may do it to take it over or 
to disrupt the normal activity. The intention of the attackers has 
not been informed. Yet, according to the reports, the result of the 
cyber-attack was an uncontrolled cooling of the furnace, and as 
such, can be interpreted as disruption of activity. This is 
represented in Figure 54. The flows are represented according to 
the symbols indicated in Figure 45. 
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Figure 54 Steel mill process post-hack 
The effect of the modifications by the hackers to the control 
system is a distortion of activities and communications in the 
cooling process. By altering the decision algorithm, the action to 
the heat generators or coolers that can lead to equipment damage 
such as inner lining destruction or excessive hydration of steel 
furnaces (Verscheure et al., 2006). 
4.2.6 Passive interruption of operations 
Several of the cases in the gathered data described an 
unexpected interruption of operations executed by the 
organization target of the cyber-attack, i.e., a passive interruption, 
which presents a different structure and sequence of events 
leading to the physical disruption. 
Event description. The Wannacry ransomware attack in June 
2017 and its effect on the national healthcare system (NHS)25 is 
an example of a passive interruption of operations. The infection 
by this ransomware infected more than 150.000 computers in 150 
countries, and in the case of the NHS the ransomware resulted in 
the interruption of service in different hospitals of the system, the 
                                              
 
25 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/why-wannacry-malware-caused-chaos-
national-health-service-u-k-n760126 
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rejection of patients, the treatment of patients without their digital 
health records or prescription dosages, the derivation of patients 
to other parts of the system, and the rerouting of ambulance 
services. No perpetrator or motives for the attack have been 
identified. The NHS indicated that at least 16 of its organizations 
were affected by the Wannacry ransomware26. 
The physics of the event. Incident researchers agree on the 
sequence of events that leads to the operational disruption. 
• From an already infected computer, the Wannacry worm 
actively looks in the network for computers with a 
Windows operating system 
• When a computer is found, Wannacry exploits a software 
vulnerability called “EternalBlue” to infect this computer.  
• Computers infected by Wannacry unexpectedly request 
from the user a restart, proceeding to encrypt most 
information in its hard drive. The only folder not to be 
encrypted was the Windows folder. 
• Upon restarting, Wannacry displays a message requiring the 
transfer of US$ 300 to US$600 to a specific bitcoin account. 
The message proceeded to read that decryption key would 
                                              
 
26 http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/12/528119808/large-cyber-
attack-hits-englands-nhs-hospital-system-ransoms-demanded 
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then be sent to release the data. The message screen is 
illustrated in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55 Wannacry message screen 
• The encrypted information included patient data, and 
hospital schedules, for example. 
• This sudden lack of information leads to palliative measures 
such as the rerouting of ambulances to other organizations 
in the system, the rejection of non-urgent new patients, or 
the treatment of patients without their healthcare record. 
Similar attacks. Other similar attacks have occurred, and this 
Wannacry attack has also affected other industries. 
• A ransomware attack, named “Petya” affected operations at 
the nuclear plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine in 2017. No 
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equipment was destroyed due to the attack, but energy 
production was interrupted as a preventive measure, as vital 
metrics and reports were not accessible on the computers 
during the attack27. 
• In 2013 a ransomware named Cryptolocker infected over 
500.000 computers around the world demanding US$ 300 
in Bitcoin to the victims to release the encrypted files28. 
Structure of the event. The operation of the NHS can be 
represented by a control structure as illustrated in Figure 56. A 
doctor determines actions in a treatment process to a patient, to 
convert an incoming patient to a treated patient. The doctor is 
equivalent to the “controller”, who has an internal set of decision 
rules, i.e., the medical algorithms, and the data of the patient. The 
data is collected through the measuring of the patient’s biometrics, 
in an ongoing process. 
                                              
 
27 http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/821971/Chernobyl-nuclear-power-
plant-hit-ransomware-cyber-attack 
28 https://www.theguardian.com/money/2013/oct/19/cryptolocker-attacks-
computer-ransomeware 
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Figure 56 NHS process representation pre-hack 
The passive interruption of operations as described for the 
Wannacry ransomware attack affected the operations of the NHS 
blocks the access to data, as illustrated in Figure 57. The flows are 
represented according to the symbols indicated in Figure 45. 
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Figure 57 NHS process representation post-hack 
The Wannacry ransomware, by making data inaccessible to the 
controller, i.e., the doctor, causes a distortion in the adjustment 
calls and as a result in the effects of these action calls. As a result 
the treatment process has a distorted outcome. 
4.3 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter started by providing background information 
about the justification for this part of the thesis research to then 
describe the gathered data. 
The analysis of this data is presented in chapter 7. The next 
chapter describes the results from the systemic risk analysis 
process. 
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5 Results: systemic risk analysis 
This chapter describes the results of using the systemic risk 
analysis method STPA to the analysis of cases of organizations 
exposed to cyber-attacks. It starts by giving a description of the 
case where this method was applied. The chapter ends by 
describing the results that were obtained from the STPA 
application. 
5.1 Case description 
The case company is a beverage manufacturer based in the 
United States of America with manufacturing operations in 23 
countries. This company has a complex supply chain and has a 
distributed, global supply team that procures raw materials and 
packaging to all operations through a regional structure. 
Particularly in the Americas this company has 7 manufacturing 
sites and its regional structure since 2007 has been a matrix 
distribution of raw material purchasing responsibility, where a 
procurement team in each of the locations is responsible for the 
purchase of a number of materials for all the other locations in the 
region, in what has been called a “Virtual Organization” (VO) of 
procurement. The procurement team is therefore considered as a 
regional, America-level team. A general representation of the 
manufacturing sites in the Americas is shown in Figure 58. It is 
important to consider that only the procurement team is managed 
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at an America-wide level, and all other aspects of the different 
plants are managed individually. 
This company launches as many as 70 new products per year, 
has a 99.5% operational service level requirement, and 
implemented a version of the Lean methodology both to its 
operations and to its service areas in the company, with varying 
degrees of success. 
The products that are purchased by this matrix organization 
include raw materials in solid and liquid form, and some types of 
packaging, as most of the packaging is purchased locally by each 
plant (mainly plastic containers and cardboard boxes). 
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Figure 58 Beverage manufacturer production sites in America 
From this structure, every world region has a relationship with 
local suppliers in the case of packaging, and global suppliers for 
the case of raw materials. Global supplier conditions are managed 
centrally in the US headquarters on an annual basis, while regional 
the regional supply VO manages the daily operations with these 
suppliers.  
As part of a strategic goal of implementing safe, reliable 
operations, this company is particularly interested in 
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understanding the exposure they have to cyber-risks, as they are 
sensitive to public opinion and reaction in the case they were to 
be attacked: nearly 63% of its market value is related to intangible 
assets, such as trademark, patents, and trade dresses. For more 
information on intellectual property, see section 6.1. 
This company has detailed procedures. In particular, risk is 
identified through a detailed, standardized risk analysis process. 
The main tool that is used is the Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) method, particularly for the operations area, 
within the framework of the Supply Chain Operations Reference 
framework (SCOR) for the SCM area. 
The Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) is a 
framework that was developed by the Supply Chain Council with 
its first version published in 1996, and is currently developed by 
APICS, the American Production and Inventory Control Society 
(Ntabe et al., 2015). It is based on the analysis of five distinct 
management processes for every agent in the supply chain, 
namely Plan, Source, Make, Deliver and Return (APICS, 2010). 
For a supply chain, there is a planning process over the supply 
chain units, as is represented in Figure 59. 
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Figure 59 SCOR model (APICS, 2010) 
The SCOR framework makes no reference to cyber-risks up to 
its version 10 (2010) and Value at Risk (VaR) as the main 
indicator for other risks in the supply chain. The VaR is calculated 
normally through a process of FMEA. 
The FMEA process is executed by identifying the elements that 
are part of the system, and identifying the ways in which these 
elements can fail, as well as the severity of the effects if these 
failures were to happen. This company considers probability of 
occurrence in categories, namely “very unlikely”, “somewhat 
unlikely”, “somewhat probable”, “very probable” and “extremely 
probable”. The Value at Risk is calculated as the sum of the 
consequences of all risks that have a probability of “probable”, 
“very probable” or “extremely probable”.  
These values, i.e., the identification of the modes of failure, the 
probability of occurrence categories and the severity of the events 
occurring, are identified in workshops with the participation of 
members of the organization from warehouse, procurement, 
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expediting, quality, finance, production and maintenance. For the 
Americas plants, these processes have used as few as 8 and as 
many as 15 people per meeting, with a total use as many as 240 
man-hours of meetings (4 meetings of 4 hours each for 15 people) 
plus processing time of another 20 hours by the risk analysis team. 
Since FMEA is a reference framework with no set indications 
on how to measure, probability of failure, severity of failure or 
identification of the failure modes, the process is highly dependent 
on the experience of those taking part in it. The whole process is 
carried out every year, mainly as an update of the previous year’s 
FMEA results, and normally a set of preventive and mitigation 
measures are identified with action owners. These actions are 
followed up in monthly meetings.  
As a part of their yearly risk assessment process, this company 
updates, at an America level, its risk analyses for all plants and 
processes, with a special focus on including cyber-risks within the 
analysis for the year 2016. Their process is carried out through the 
usual FMEA process. Supply managers at three of the plants 
agreed to participate in a pilot test of the STPA process to be run 
in parallel, and to compare the results of these processes with the 
results delivered by FMEA. The management team at the case 
company had detected different problems with the current risk 
assessment method, such as: 
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• The rotation of experienced personnel had been increasing 
over the last 10 years, and it was highly likely that this 
would continue. This was mainly attributed to a 
“generational changeover” being experienced by the 
company, as it was likely to find people with over 15 years 
of experience. Management had its reservations of being 
less dependent on the experience of people by using a risk 
analysis method that was less history-dependent, 
• The company had not experienced cyber-attacks yet, but its 
management continues to be highly sensitive to problems 
derived from public image problems, and cyber-risk was 
thus high in their agenda, 
• The company had implemented the Virtual Organization 
(VO) and before going beyond procurement, wanted to 
understand communication risks and potential interventions 
derived from cyber-risks, 
• The risk numbers, particularly related to severity of the 
failure modes had increased little over the years if at all, in 
a wat that had no relationship to any other indicator in the 
company. As such, management had the impression that 
those numbers were not being reviewed and were just being 
adopted from the previous year’s report. 
In order to develop the process in detail, the procurement 
process was chosen for the analysis and subsequent comparison. 
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5.2 Results of STPA application 
The process that is followed for developing this STPA analysis 
is explained in detail in the methodology section 3.8. 
According to the systems engineering approach (Leveson, 
2011), the required start is by identifying a system goal to be 
achieved. A typical purchase transaction consists of a set of 
interactions between a buyer and a seller for the timely delivery 
of a product at the agreed price to the buyer through the use of a 
transport agent. The process begins when the buyer sends a 
purchase order to the seller, and ends when all involved have been 
paid and the product has been successfully received. Therefore the 
goal of procurement was defined as: 
“A system to safely and timely purchase the correct product by 
means of an cost-effective relationship with our supplier and their 
transport, in order to contribute to the company’s bottom line and 
reputation” 
From this definition, a set of unacceptable accidents were 
agreed with the participants in the workshops, losses which are 
aligned to the objectives of the company and of the procurement 
process itself. These are denominated “accidents” and are shown 
in Table 25. 
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Table 25 Unacceptable accidents / losses 
A1 Erroneous arrival of product 
A2 Erroneous payment to supplier 
A3 Product loss 
A4 Product integrity compromised 
A5 Payment Loss 
A6 Reputational Loss 
Additionally, the hazardous situations were identified, that 
would lead to a loss, as indicated in Table 26. 
Table 26 Hazards in the system 
H1 Inability to initiate supply process 
H2 Inability to perform physical transport 
H3 Inability to confirm product integrity 
H4 Inability to confirm correct payment 
H5 Inability to confirm data integrity 
H6 Inability to confirm data transmission integrity 
 
The process steps have been defined by the company’s 
procedures, and these are represented in Figure 60.  
 
Figure 60 Process diagram 
Additionally, for the process of procurement, the controllers that take 
part in the process have been identified as the Plant, the Supplier, the 
transport agent, the plant’s bank and the supplier’s bank. To carry out the 
process required by the procedures, and as represented in Figure 60, each 
controller is in charge of executing a series of actions, the Control Actions 
required for the process. These are shown in Table 27 
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Table 27. 
These control actions can also be represented in the hierarchical 
control diagram by considering controllers, control actions and 
hierarchy. Controllers that are placed higher up in the diagram 
have more control over the system’s goals and function, as they 
have the capacity of affecting the actions of controllers below 
them. Figure 61 illustrates this for the system under consideration. 
The plant is the controller with the highest hierarchy, as it is in the 
plan that the procurement goals are defined, and where the 
activities of all the other controllers can be influenced. On the 
contrary, the transport, does not control the goals and objectives 
of the system, rather reacts to the control actions of other 
controllers, and its control actions only are confirmations (passive 
responses). Its only active control actions are the pickup from the 
supplier and delivery to the plant. 
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Figure 61 Hierarchical control structure 
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Table 27 Process-controller matrix 
 
According to the process detailed in Figure 35, the system and 
its goal has been identified, as well as the hazards, control actions 
and unacceptable losses. The next step is to identify the ways in 
which the control actions can influence the system into getting 
Control 
Actions Plant Supplier Transport Plant's Bank Supplier's Bank
Order 
*Activate 
Purchase Order
*Cancel 
purchase order
*Confirm 
purchase order
*Confirm 
purchase order 
cancellation
- - -
Prepare -
*Activate 
service order
*Cancel service 
order
*Confirm 
service order 
activation
*Confirm 
service order 
cancellation
- -
Outbound
Check -
*Handover 
products to 
transport
*Handover 
transport 
documents to 
transport
*Perform 
outbound check - -
Pickup - - *Perform pickup - -
Transport - *Send documentation
*Perform 
delivery - -
Inbound
Check
*Perform 
inbound check - - - -
Receive *Receive product - - - -
Validate *Validate product - - - -
Pay
*Order supplier 
payment
*Cancel 
supplier 
payment
*Order 
transport 
payment
*Cancel 
transport 
payment
-
*Confirm 
supplier 
payment order
*Confirm 
supplier 
payment order 
cancellation
*Transfer funds 
to supplier
*Confirm 
transport 
payment order
*Confirm 
transport 
payment order 
cancellation
*Transfer funds 
to transport
Pr
oc
es
s S
te
ps
Controllers
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into a hazardous condition that might lead to an unacceptable loss. 
For this, a matrix is used to identify for each of the control actions, 
its four potential unsafe modes: 1) the application of a control 
action leads to a hazardous condition, 2) the non-application of the 
control action leads to a hazardous condition, 3) applying the 
control action too early or too late leads to a hazardous condition, 
and 4) applying the control action for too long or too short a time 
leads to a hazardous condition. Figure 62 shows an extract of the 
analysis as it was done through the XSTAMPP software. 
 
Figure 62 UCA Analysis through XSTAMPP software 
In total 119 unsafe control actions (UCA) were identified. Of 
these the number of hazards that was associated with each UCA 
ranged from two to five, as shown in the next graph: 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 338 of 620 
 
Figure 63 Number UCA per number of associated hazards 
Of the UCAs that were identified, 37% corresponding to 
actions that had an incorrect timing, 45% of them considered an 
incorrect action being executed, and in 18% of the cases the 
control actions were not given as can be seen in Figure 64. 
 
Figure 64 UCA by type 
Examples of each type of UCA is shown in the next table. The 
complete list of unsafe control actions can be found in appendix 
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11.2, and Table 28 shows a summary of the STPA structure 
resulting from the analysis. 
Table 28 STPA result summary 
 
 
  
Symbol Name Number
ACC Accidents 6
HAZ Hazards 6
CA Control Actions 27
UCA Unsafe Control Actions 119
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 340 of 620 
Table 29 Examples of UCAs by type 
 
Type: Given incorrectly
Performing inbound check without the correct experience is hazardous
Providing purchase order confirmation when the purchase order has been 
cancelled is hazardous
Providing the transport payment order to the wrong Transport Agent is 
hazardous
Providing transport payment order cancellation when there has been 
correct/complete product delivery, is hazardous
Providing transfer if funds for the incorrect amount is hazardous
Providing a service order activation when there has not been a purchase 
order confirmation, is hazardous
Providing service order cancellation when there has been a false Purchase 
Order Cancellation is hazardous
Type: Wrong timing
Providing Supplier Payment Order before there has been product validation is 
hazardous
Providing Product Validation before there has been a product and 
documentation reception is hazardous
Providing product reception before the correct supplier has been confirmed is 
hazardous
Providing purchase order confirmation before the product has been 
confirmed is hazardous
Providing transport payment order cancellation before the correct product 
delivery has been confirmed, is hazardous
Providing transfer of funds to supplier before the correct payment amount 
has been confirmed is hazardous
Type: Not given
Not providing Order Payment Confirmaton when there has been a supplier 
payment order is hazardous
Not providing Purchase Order Activation when there has been a confimed 
requirement is hazardous
Not performing inbound check when the product and documentation has 
been received is hazardous
Not providing transport payment order when there a product delivery 
confirmation is hazardous
Not providing transfer of funds to supplier when there has been confirmation 
of delivery is hazadous
Not providing transport documentation when the product pickup takes place 
is hazardous
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5.3 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter described the results of using the systemic risk 
analysis method STPA to the analysis of a series of cases of 
organizations exposed to cyber-attacks. It started by giving a 
description of the cases where this method was applied. The 
chapter ended by describing the results that were obtained from 
the STPA application. 
Before analysing the answers to the research questions, it is 
first necessary to expand on the application of another method, for 
bridging one of the gaps found in the literature review, namely the 
static versus dynamic methods, i.e., the consideration of time in 
the resilience design for an organization. The next chapter 
describes the dynamic simulation is described, 
Thereafter, in chapter 7, the results of both methods are used to 
answer the research questions. 
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6 Results: cyber-risk dynamic simulation 
This chapter contains the result of applying the system 
dynamics simulation method to the case of a cyber-attack with 
operational consequences. The chapter starts by giving a 
background to the use of the method, to then give a background to 
the case upon which the simulation is based. The case is then 
described in detail. Thereafter the model is developed sequentially 
first its causal structure, then its hierarchical control structure to 
finally describe a resulting system dynamics model.  
The dynamic simulation is developed as a proposal for 
answering the research question RSQ4.2 which was derived from 
the gap identified during the literature reviews concerning the 
importance of understanding the development over time of the 
response in supply chains to cyber-attacks, as a direct indicator of 
the resilience present in that supply chain. 
This method is applied to a case of a company subject to 
Intellectual property theft. As a result, this chapter starts by 
providing background information in relation to the relevance of 
cyber-risks for the Intellectual Property (IP) management, to then 
proceed to describe the case upon which the dynamic simulation 
is based. 
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6.1 Cyber-risk on intellectual property 
The complex digital networks that have resulted from the 
increasing use of IT in supply chain operations have created new 
sources of risk, related to 1) intrinsic programming flaws in these 
IT systems that make unintended user error more likely, 2) logic 
flaws in the connections between system components that result 
in failure risk even if all parts of the supply chain work as 
expected, and 3) external risks of unauthorized agents exploiting 
vulnerabilities and abusing these for their own benefit. 
Intellectual property (IP) is an example of a particular 
organizational asset which has increased its exposure to theft 
through the use of IT for its transfer, storage, and development 
coordination. IP is defined as “an idea, invention or process that 
derives from the work of the mind or intellect” (Merriam-Webster, 
2017). IP is thus differentiating knowledge that adds value to the 
organization that is aware of having it, and is considered as an 
intangible asset, whose unauthorized use might result in losses to 
the target organization. IP can takes the form of patents, 
copyrights, industrial design rights, breeding rights, trademarks, 
trade dress (for example the trademark Coca-Cola has over the 
shape of its bottles) or trade secrets for example. 
The protection given by the state to an invention is a principle 
that was recognized as early as the fifteenth century, as it was in 
the City of Venice that that first patents were granted (Kanwar et 
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al., 2003), however the protection of this IP has been a matter of 
debate for at least the same amount of time. Those in favour of a 
weak protection argue for 1) the effect it would have on the 
markets due to lower prices and more competition as a result of 
widely available IP, 2) lower costs for the acquisition of 
technology, 3) the avoidance of patent abuse by publishing 
distorted patents to the detriment of those using the patent who are 
not the creators, and 4) the availability of technology for human 
advancement by avoiding “sleeping patents”, i.e., patents that are 
purposely kept out of the market, strategy used by some to 
preserve market shares (Gilbert et al., 1982) 
However, in the global context, IP protection has continue to 
spread. Since IP is a central driver for innovation, business growth 
and competitiveness (Bosworth, 2001; Bekkers et al., 2002), and 
a valuing process for IP has gradually increased, with current IP 
asset value levels potentially constituting as much as 80 percent 
of a single company’s total value (Ocean Tomo 2015). As can be 
seen in Figure 65 the proportion of the Standard & Poor 50029 
index company values that corresponds to tangible versus 
                                              
 
29 The Standard and Poor Company in New York created an index in 1957 to track 
the value of 500 large companies, and is along with other indexes such as the 
NASDAQ or the Dow Jones, an indicator about industry composition and 
capitalization. 
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intangible assets, has changed dramatically. Intangible assets are 
partially composed by the IP in the company, and their share of 
the total company value has dramatically increased over the last 
30 years: while in 1985 intangible assets were only 32% of the 
total value of the companies in the S&P 500, this has increased to 
87% in 2015. 
 
Figure 65 Components of S&P market value (Ocean Tomo, 2015) 
This does not necessarily mean that all this value has been 
created in the company and only amounts to the valuation that has 
been given to that know-how in the company, to consider them 
assets in the formal accounts, and to manage them as such. For 
example, a company might have a process developed in-house, 
without having assigned it explicit value. Yet, when a decision is 
taken that this know-how is a differentiator in the market, it 
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becomes a piece of property that needs to be defined and 
protected. 
Additionally the Sarbanes Oxley regulation, enforced after the 
Enron and Worldcom scandals, has imposed accounting rules that 
resulted in greater reporting detail requirements for IP valuation. 
This has transformed IP from being an internal strategic factor, to 
being a public financial dimension (Kossovsky et al., 2004). 
Literature informs that the most advanced economies are those 
with the greatest cyber-related IP losses, theft that accounted for 
as much of the US$ 200 billion cybercrime losses during 2013 
(McAfee, 2014). 
Traditionally, IP risk took the form of people inside the 
organization, with direct knowledge and access to Research and 
Development (R&D) resources, who misappropriated prototypes 
or documentation, physical or digital. This restricted the potential 
suspects in cases an IP theft took place, and it was usually an 
action targeted to specific documents or technology.  
The digitalization of IP coordination and information transfer 
and storage, has opened the field to IP thieves in any location, 
allowing them to operate in relative anonymity. The pool of 
suspects is thus far greater, and can include competitors, hackers 
that do this for money or fun, or even nation-states. IP theft can in 
this case be either a targeted or opportunistic (Mossburg et al., 
2016). 
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The way a company responds over in time to an event such as 
IP theft determines the extent of the consequences derived from 
this disruption. This has been called dynamic response or 
resilience. Sheffi and Rice (2005) showed the relevance of this 
dynamic response in supply chains through what they named a 
“disruption curve”, which proposed representing the extent and 
depth of supply chain performance change as sources of economic 
loss during an unexpected disruption. Following such a 
framework, an improved response to disruption would consist of 
both a shorter and a shallower disruption in performance. This 
curve is seen in Figure 66. 
 
Figure 66 Disruption curve (Sheffi et al., 2005) 
Sheffi& Rice were not the first to postulate a dynamic 
understanding of processes. Asbjornslett et al. (1999) proposed an 
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approach for assessing the vulnerability of production systems 
through the representation of the way in which a stable state is 
achieved by a disrupted system, as shown in Figure 67. 
 
Figure 67 Stability regaining curve (Asbjornslett et al., 1999) 
It can thus be said that Sheffi & Rice built on Asbjornslett et al. 
(1999) by identifying the different stages in the recovery process 
following a disruption, and by extending its application beyond 
productive processes to supply chains, and through the 
identification of resilience-building factors, despite not proposing 
any measures for resilience. 
Tierney et al. (2007) proposed the resilience “triangle” as a way 
of quantifying the resilience of a system as seen in Figure 68. 
According to this approach, this triangle should be minimized 
shorter and shallower effects imply a higher resilience. No 
identification is given to the relative importance of shallowness 
and duration, but this seems to point to at least two dimensions in 
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the resilience response: how deep the effects are during a 
disruption, and how long these effects last. 
 
Figure 68 Resilience triangle (Tierney et al., 2007) 
Furthermore, Zobel et al. (2014) have extended this concept of 
the disruption curve and the embedded resilience triangle to 
multiple disruptions, where subsequent disruptions happen before 
the system has regained a stable performance. This is shown in 
Figure 69. 
 
Figure 69 Multi-event resilience graph (Zobel et al., 2014) 
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6.2 Case description 
ABC Industries is a US$ 40 billion producer of hardware for 
continuous connection to a communication network, also known 
as the Internet of Things (IoT) based in Silicon Valley, California. 
The internet of things has been identified as the inter-connection 
of physical devices, also known as smart-devices, including 
vehicles and buildings, by embedding them with elements such as 
sensors, actuators, electronics, software, and network 
connectivity, thus allowing these elements and devices to collect 
and exchange data. 
ABC Industries, with 60.000 employees and a 12.2 percent 
operating margin had recently finished an investment in 
production facilities, resources for research and development 
(R&D) and marketing, aimed at the development and release of a 
core line of IoT network products. These products were based on 
proprietary technology in hardware production and materials, and 
in the software and information processing capabilities of the 
products offered to the market. 
ABC Industries has a R&D department hierarchically 
dependent from operations management, shown in Figure 70. 
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Figure 70 ABC Industries organigram 
Six months before the product launch a federal agency 
informed ABC a cyber-breach at one of its facilities where the 
development of this line was taking place. Until that moment, 
ABC Industries had no indication of a breach or any consequences 
thereof.30 
                                              
 
30 This is one of the most recurring aspects of cyber-attacks and which differentiate 
these types of risks from other supply chain risks: a company may be under attack for 
much longer than it is aware of the attack. As long as operations are not disrupted, 
supply chains are unable to detect the breach as they have limited sensing capability. 
Additionally, information can be copied without any effect on the quality of the 
original information source, and a leak may be invisible to the organization from an 
operational point of view. 
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The initial assessment of the effect of this breach showed that 
15 out of the 30 product lines under development had been 
affected and their IP data probably stolen. The affected lines were 
expected to contribute 25 percent of the company’s total revenue 
for the next 5 years. No clear motivation was identified for the 
hacker attack. 
An initial analysis showed that the information that was stolen 
would allow a hacker to uncover and exploit previously 
undiscovered design flaws and allow a hacker to implant 
malicious code into these product lines. The implications were 
confirmed 30 days later, when a Silicon Valley blogger released 
the news of the breach, and indicated that these products could be 
reverse-engineered and become an eventual competitor of ABC 
by both beating them to market with a similar product, and 
undercutting them on price. 
ABC’s reaction can be divided into three main sequential and 
slightly overlapping phases: Incident triage, Impact management 
and business recovery. 
During the incident triage phase, ABC took specific steps to 
bring in the necessary resources to assess the initial damage and 
prepare the organization for potential consequences of this attack. 
These actions addressed four areas:  
• First, as a request from the board, a team of managers and 
research scientists formed a task force to oversee the efforts 
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to minimize the effects of this attack. This diversion of 
resources to unforeseen activities had negative effect on the 
productivity of the R&D and sales team. This diversion of 
resources was triggered by the decision that the company 
was under attack (as identified by management after the 
formal notification by the state agency). 
• Second, an external cyber-security company was hired to 
investigate the leak, and patch the system to future similar 
attacks. The choice to have an external company do this 
analysis and forensics was largely based on keeping the 
option of identifying an internal source for the leaks, option 
which is more difficult to investigate objectively with a 
local team.  
• Third, a law firm was hired to lay out the potential legal 
ramifications of the breach.  
• Fourth, a public relations (PR) firm was hired to start 
preparing the commercial ramifications of this breach. 
During the impact management phase, ABC Industries makes 
tactical changes with short-term effects on the use of existing 
resources, and resulting in changes to existing processes. ABC 
Industries decided to accelerate the launch of the product lines by 
two months. This both created a need for additional research 
personnel and overstretched the capacities of existing research 
personnel, decreasing productivity. Additionally, product 
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shipments were suspended while an upgrade was developed for 
the products as a result of the stolen IP. Important contracts were 
lost probably as a result of both a decreased perception of product 
safety in the customers, and by the delayed shipment of existing 
orders. Contract losses were expected to account for 5 -10% of the 
projected revenues for the company. 
During the recovery phase, ABC industries undertakes 
structural changes derived from the cyber-attack. First, it 
performed an inventory of all its IP, classified these, and instituted 
a protection program. ABC also upgraded its security 
infrastructure.  
Figure 71 is a qualitative representation of the impact of the 
different actions taken by ABC Industries after the discovery of 
the incident. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 356 of 620 
 
Figure 71 Timeline for disruption (based on Gelinne et al, 2016) 
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6.3 Reference mode underlying the problem 
Overall, ABC industries reported this cyber-attack had 
additional costs of US$ 3.2 billion, and although their sales level 
returned to normal levels after one year, the total recovery time, 
indicated as the point when no additional costs were incurred 
because of the attack, was of five years. 
ABC Industries reported the relative costs of their operations 
with respect to the expected cost of operations. This is: 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 =  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑  Equation 5 
The relative values were shared as in this way, they would able 
to provide the evolution of the financial effect of the attack 
without disclosing information which would be sensitive to their 
competitive position. 
Figure 72 shows the evolution of the relative sales and profit 
levels with respect to the expected sales and profit levels. The 
complete data series can be found in the appendix 11.4. This is in 
essence the behaviour that is to be reproduced by the model, 
despite this not being the main aim of the model. 
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Figure 72 Sales and Profit Gap relative to expected values 
6.4 Model development - causal description 
From the case description, two ways through which ABC tracks 
the overall performance of the business were identified. The first 
is the Sales Gap, i.e., the difference between the Actual Sales and 
the Expected Sales. Operational measures are predictive 
indicators that determine the financial performance that is 
required. Although these are not the only possible performance 
measures (Hansen et al., 1989; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Prentice, 
2016), this choice is consistent with what has been reported in 
literature as relevant financial performance indicators 
(Venkatraman et al., 1986), and it is what has been chosen as an 
initial performance target for this model. 
From the interviews, the Actual Sales level is mentioned as 
being affected by the Demand, derived from the number of Base 
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Customers, and from the level of differentiation of the product, 
i.e., from the number of distinctive IP features it contains. From 
the description, the Sales Gap is relevant in the short term, as it is 
mentioned to have been recovered after 1 year of the attack having 
been detected.  
The second performance measure is the Profit Gap, i.e., the 
difference between an actual and an Expected Profit level, 
Through the case description it can be derived that the Profit Gap 
is more relevant in the long term, as it is mentioned that although 
the Sales Gap was closed after one year, there were still additional 
costs in the company derived from the IP theft recovery, and 
which finally closed this gap after five years. In a general way, 
therefore, a series of circular causality feedback loop “types” can 
be identified. 
• A first type corresponds to those feedback loops that form 
vicious circles with respect to the current performance 
levels. An example of this performance reduction is the loss 
of contracts derived from the IP theft. The more contracts 
or sales are lost, creates an even lower sales level increasing 
the sales gap and the profit gap.  
• A second type of feedback loops, are those that the company 
uses to manage the short term actions, which have been 
denominated “flexibility options”. These require either 
additional costs or a redistribution of existing resources, as 
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in the short term there has been limited time to increase the 
resources. As resources, the case mentions mainly 
management and R&D personnel. This second type can be 
in itself divided into two subtypes: either a redistribution of 
management resources at no additional cost, but with the 
effect of loss of productivity, and another is the hiring of 
external resources, available quickly, but at additional cost, 
such as the case of the Public relations firm, the cyber-
security company and the Law firm that were hired. Both of 
these options have an effect on the performance, through a 
decrease in the IP generation efficiency, and through the 
increase in operation costs, respectively. 
• A third type of feedback loops are those that the company 
uses to manage the long-term actions, which have been 
denominated the “recovery options”. Examples of this 
include the additional Research and development personnel 
that was hired for the generation of additional IP. These 
have effects on costs and are the last ones to be maintained 
until the company reaches the expected operation level.  
Figure 73 shows these generic feedback loop types. 
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Figure 73 Main generic feedback loops during resilience 
The data contained in the description presented in the previous 
sections can be converted into a series of feedback loops driving 
circular causality effects throughout the process. Consider the 
description example: “…ABC hires a top public relations (PR) 
firm to reach out to stakeholders and create a face-saving public 
image campaign”. This description example contains at least two 
causal loops.  
• On one side the PR firm is hired because of the decrease in 
sales and resulting increase in the deficit of the expected 
profit, due to the decrease in the number of customers 
derived from the IP theft. The hire of this PR firm should 
result in an increase in the customer base that should lead to 
an increase in sales. The individual polarities represent the 
dyadic relationships between the constructs or variables in 
the loop (e.g., an increase in sales results in a decrease in 
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the sales gap, being therefore a negative polarity). This is a 
balancing loop, as it is meant to regulate the variation in any 
of its constituent variables. For example, a decrease in sales, 
by going “around the loop”, i.e., evaluating each of the 
dyadic relationship polarities in sequence, results in an 
increase in sales, thus regulating its value. 
• A second loop included in this description considers the 
circular causality resulting from the increase in costs due to 
hiring this PR firm, which leads to an increase in the 
expected profit deficit, which results in even more required 
activity. This is a reinforcing loop, since if it was the only 
feedback loop present, would lead to a permanent variation 
in any of its constituent variables and constructs. 
The following table contains a list of the feedback loops 
identified in the description, which are explained in detail next. 
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Table 30 List of feedback loops contained in the case description 
 
In order to facilitate the presentation of a complex causal loop 
diagram, this is shown sequentially in the following stages: 
• Stage 1: Base diagram: represents the loops involved in the 
company as a business based on the development of unique 
Intellectual property. 
• Stage 2: Incident Management diagram: represents the base 
diagram plus the loops involved in the short-term reactions 
of ABC Industries, particularly the Triage and Incident 
Management reaction phases. As such, it integrates external 
resources and the resulting costs, as well as the reallocation 
of existing resources with the subsequent effect on 
productivity. 
Loop 
Number Loop Type
Loop 
Name Loop Number
1 Reinforcing R1 IP Rules
2 Reinforcing R2 PR to the rescue
1 Balancing B1 Marketing Stabilizer
2 Balancing B2 IP Expiration
3 Balancing B3 Marketing Costs
4 Balancing B4 Hacker Attacks
5 Balancing B5 Trust issues
6 Balancing B6 Productivoty Loss
7 Balancing B7 Security Costs
8 Balancing B8 Legal Bundle
9 Balancing B9 Legal cousel
10 Balancing B10 Legal costs
11 Balancing B11 PR Costs
12 Balancing B12 Leak containment
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This logic is maintained when developing the stock and flow 
diagram. The base diagram is shown in Figure 74. The main 
Feedback loops considered in the dynamic of the base company 
are: 
• R1, reinforcing loop 1, “IP Rules” feedback loop. This loop 
captures in a general way the main mechanism through 
which a company based in exclusive IP develops its 
business. Exclusive IP generates a Demand which is 
translated into Actual Sales and Actual Profit levels, which 
are partially invested into the development of more 
Exclusive IP, expanding the business 
• B1, balancing loop 1, “Marketing stabilizer” feedback 
loop. This loop captures the main mechanism ABC 
Industries uses to counteract differences in demand. Since 
the development of IP is a long, uncertain process, which is 
then reflected as exclusive products to the market, the way 
in which demand fluctuations are counteracted are through 
changes in the sales strategy using the same existing 
resources, and through the use of marketing instruments 
such as promotions. This creates a loop that eventually does 
not let the Sales Gap to increase endlessly. 
• B2, balancing loop 2, “IP expiration” feedback loop. This 
loop captures the process of IP expiration, resulting from 
the limited time for which an IP is exclusive to the company 
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that created it. For technological developments this 
expiration period varies from 15 to 25 years. This is a 
balancing loop which if existing on its own, would result in 
the company not having any Exclusive IP after some time, 
generating the need for continuous IP development to 
maintain the Exclusive IP difference which is responsible 
for the demand. 
• B3, balancing loop 3, “Marketing Costs” feedback loop. 
This loop captures the important fact that the marketing 
which allows the company to recover demand, also leads to 
additional costs, limiting the amount of marketing that can 
be done, as it affects the profit level with a direct 
consequence in the number of R&D projects that can be 
started. 
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Figure 74 Causal Loop Diagram - Base Diagram 
The model diagram for stage 2 included the actions for incident 
management, reflected in the following Feedback Loops: 
• B4, balancing loop 4, the “Hacker Attacks” feedback loop, 
which captures the effect of the attractiveness of exclusive 
IP to external agents who attempt to steal them. This, all 
else equal, creates a balancing loop limiting the number of 
exclusive IP a company can attempt to have. 
• B5, balancing loop 5, “Trust issue” feedback loop. This 
captures the effect that a hacker attack has on the trust of 
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the product by the customer base, through aspects such as 
resulting product safety. By stealing IP, hackers have access 
to the technology, and this enables them to identify design 
flaws or introduce viruses into the resulting products. The 
lower Product Safety that results from Hacker Attacks 
affects the base customers through effects such as loss of 
contracts or a lower level of general sales, as indicated in 
the case description. 
• B6, balancing loop 6, the “Rearranging Productivity” 
feedback loop. This loop accounts for the short term effects 
of reassigning existing company resources to managing the 
incident, both during the triage and incident management 
phases of the case description. As the case mentions the 
short-term reassignment of resources, R&D and 
management personnel derived from the decision to 
accelerate the product line launch by two months, results in 
lower productivity which stretches beyond the short term 
and well into the long term recovery. As a first 
approximation, is represented as in direct result of the 
organizational pressure to manage incident. 
• B7, balancing loop 7, the “Security costs” feedback loop. 
This loop accounts for the economic effects of engaging a 
cyber-security company to identify and eliminate the IP 
leak (effect contained in Loop B12). These services create 
additional costs which reduce available profit. 
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• B8, balancing loop 8, the “Legal Bundle” feedback loop. 
This loop represents the generic effects of a hacker attack 
in the legal realm, one of the first areas ABC Industries set 
out to manage once the hacker attack was declared. The 
loop captures the higher incidence of lawsuits from the 
hacker attack, and the loss of customer base and sales as a 
result. 
• B9, balancing loop 9, the “Legal Counsel” feedback loop. 
This loop captures one of the measures derived from the 
pressure to react to the attack, which was to hire a legal firm. 
This hire has an effect on the number of hacker-attack-
related lawsuits, limiting their negative effect on the 
organization. 
• B10, balancing loop 10, the “Legal Costs” feedback loop. 
This loop reflects the costs associated with the hiring of the 
legal services, with an effect on overall organizational 
Actual Costs, and reduced Actual Profit. 
• B11, balancing loop 11, the “PR Costs” feedback loop. 
This loop captures the costs of hiring a PR firm, one of the 
first actions undertaken by ABC Industries once the hacker 
attack was declared. 
• B12, balancing loop 12, the “Leak Containment” feedback 
loop. This loop reflects the result of the initial measure 
undertaken by ABC industries once the hacker attack was 
declared of hiring a cyber-security company to detect and 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 369 of 620 
contain the data leak. This action results from the 
organizational Pressure to Manage the Incident, which 
results in the securing of IP. 
• R2, reinforcing loop 2, the “PR to the rescue” feedback 
loop. This reflects the virtuous cycle resulting from hiring a 
Public Relations company. The investment in this service 
should have a positive effect on the Customer Base that has 
an effect on Actual Sales level. 
 
Figure 75 Causal loop diagram model with reaction 
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These feedback loops therefore represent a “translation” from 
the information gathered through documentation and interviews, 
into a causal loop structure to single out variables of interest, the 
relationships between these variables and the type of relationship 
(positive or negative polarity), and the circular causality structures 
and type (reinforcing or balancing loops) that are formed between 
these variables. 
This creates an explicit representation of a common mental 
map that was contained in the documents and people from where 
the information about the system was obtained. However, this is 
still not directly associated with the formal structure of the system, 
and it is relevant to keep this relationship in mind when building 
a model that exists within a formal organization for at least the 
following reasons: 
• A formal organizational structure associated to the causal 
structures that have been identified in this stage are 
sometimes easier to communicate to audiences that do not 
have a lot of experience in systems representation or 
systems design, 
• When the behaviours are explained, it is insightful to relate 
this to the different areas of the organization, particularly if 
the research question that gives rise to this simulation is 
kept in mind: by identifying areas, compartmentalization 
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can be visualized and its usefulness or the difficulties 
created by it can be extracted. 
• By relating the causal structures to the formal 
organizational structure, the relationships that need to be 
contained in the model can be checked and updated, 
particularly of all the input and outputs that exist in the 
normal operation are in fact contained in the model. 
• By relating the causal structures to the formal 
organizational structure of the system, the adequate level of 
aggregation can be better identified, to see if a more 
granular or a more general analysis is necessary. 
It is for these reasons, that the next section of this work 
describes the development of a hierarchical control structure, a 
mid-way step towards developing the dynamic model. 
6.5 Model development - hierarchical control structure 
The hierarchical control structure (HCS) as was shown in 
chapter 5, is a traditional tool used in engineering for the 
representation of complex systems to depict system composition, 
hierarchy of control and information flow. A HCS is proposed for 
the process of modelling of social systems due to a number of 
beneficial characteristics: 
• HCS is a way of representing the different information 
flows present in the case study. Examples of information 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 372 of 620 
flows in the case study include Resources Cost, Actual 
Sales, Stock of IP, Demand Level or Sales Level, for 
example. 
• HCS is a way of representing the different instances where 
information is modified, in places denominated as 
“controllers”. Controllers can be determined by identifying 
where information is transformed. For example, at some 
point the company, the Actual Sales, and Actual Cost is 
“transformed” into the Profit level, calculated as the 
difference between Sales and Costs. This controller has 
been denominated “Finance”. Also, at some point, the 
organization transforms a required resource level into an 
actual resource level available in the organization. This is 
not represented as easily as a subtraction, but is a process 
that takes place in the “R&D Resource Management” area 
of the company. 
• HCS as a way of controlling for required flows in the 
organization. Controllers can be represented and analysed 
individually, such as in Figure X. An analysis for each 
controller can help a developer identify  required inputs  
• HCS is a way of identifying and representing controller 
hierarchies, by positioning controllers in different 
horizontal levels in the diagram. 
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The process of creating a hierarchical control structure as a 
process of building a system dynamics model is not mentioned by 
all authors. Particularly Morecroft (2015) who proposes the 
“sector maps” approach to “show the main interlocking 
subsystems or functional areas in which feedback loops are to be 
found, to convey a clear impression of the model boundary, and 
the assumed level of aggregation” (Morecroft, 2015, p.140). 
Beyond what Morecroft proposes as sector maps, this work has 
added a hierarchical representation of these sectors to develop 
what has been termed here a “hierarchical control structure”, in a 
similar way as it was done for the case of the systemic risk 
analysis, the areas of the organization and the flows between them 
are identified. From the organizational data, the following sectors 
were identified: 
• Corporate,  
• Financial Management,  
• Sales Management,  
• Public Relations 
• IP Management 
• Resource Scheduling 
• R&D Resource Management 
• Performance Tracker 
• Hacker 
• Customer Base 
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When the inputs and outputs to each of these sectors are 
considered, then the following sector diagrams were generated. 
Each diagram shows the sectors that are directly related, as well 
as the information flows. 
 
Figure 76 Corporate sector diagram 
For the case of the corporate sector, it is considered as an 
exogenous variable, since it only generates outputs, this is the 
expected sales and margin levels, which are communicated to the 
performance tracker and financial management divisions of the 
system. This is not to say that Corporate does not have inputs, as 
these are also dependent on both the level of aggregation chosen 
for the model, as well as the boundaries of the system. In the case 
that the system had been considered of a broader scope, the inputs 
to corporate could have been stakeholder expectations, such as 
“stockholder profit level expectations”, or market benchmarks, 
such as “average margin for the industry”. 
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Figure 77 Performance tracker sector diagram 
The performance tracker, as shown in Figure 77 is said to be an 
endogenous sector for the model, as it is dependent on inputs from 
the system. This performance tracker delivers important signals to 
the system, as it “converts” the inputs it receives, in this case 
“Sales” and “Sales Target” to the desired IP levels and the signal 
of attack perception. This las concept was indicated by some 
interviews as “a recognition that an attack was underway”. For 
the case used in this simulation, the attack signal was external, 
triggered by the federal agency that informed the company of a 
cyber-attack taking place. These endogenous nature of the sectors 
is a common characteristic of the other sectors shown in Figure 78 
through Figure 84. 
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Figure 78 Financial management sector diagram 
 
Figure 79 Public relations sector diagram 
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Figure 80 Customer base sector diagram 
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Figure 81 R&D Resource Management sector 
 
Figure 82 Resource scheduling sector diagram 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 379 of 620 
 
Figure 83 Sales management sector diagram 
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Figure 84 IP Management sector diagram 
The last sector being represented, the “Hacker” sector is not a 
sector of the system, but it is an exogenous sector, but rather like 
Corporate, in that it influences the system with its outputs. The 
ways in which this model has considered the Hacker sector can 
influence the system is threefold, according to the description of 
the case: 
• First, the Hacker sector can influence the loss of IP, the most 
evident of the effects, and which in the current case was 
communicated to the company by an external federal 
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agency. The way in which this loss is represented, is 
discussed during the development of the dynamic model. 
• Second, the Hacker sector can affect the customer base, 
through some sort of “bad advertising” resulting from the 
confirmation of IP theft, particularly through public 
channels such as the blog posting. This effect is reflected in 
the case description through events such as the loss of 
important contracts sometime after the attack is made 
known. 
• Third, the Hacker sector can affect the IP generation time, 
or the average time in which ABC industries can 
compensate for the lost IP. This is a way of reflecting the 
case description that indicates that the technical information 
was made public, and thus it was available for any other 
competitor to use without restrictions.  
These influences by the Hacker sector to the model, are 
shown in Figure 85. 
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Figure 85 Hacker sector diagram 
These are not the only ways in which a hacker can affect 
operations, but they are examples of more generic ways in which 
hackers can indeed affect operations. The generic types are the 
operational effects (i.e., effect on IP generation time), 
environmental effects (i.e., effect on the customer base), and 
resource-related effects (i.e., availability of exclusive IP). 
Examples of other options are laid out in the discussion section of 
this thesis. 
The interaction between sectors can also be understood as 
representing three distinct levels of aggregation. The lowest 
aggregation is operational, an overarching aggregation to it is the 
strategic one, and finally the environmental aggregation level, 
which considers conditions external to the system boundaries that 
were chosen. 
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The overall HCS diagram integrates all these components: 
sectors, information flows and aggregation. Additionally, in the 
same way as in the hierarchical control diagram shown in Chapter 
5, the hierarchy is considered in the final representation: sectors 
with more control placed higher up in the diagram. Figure 86 is a 
representation of this integrated HCS, showing aggregation in a 
concentric way, hierarchy in a vertical way, sectors as squares or 
nodes, and information flows as arrows. This representation 
allows for the straightforward identification of exogenous sectors 
(i.e., no arrow are going into them), some of the model 
assumptions (external variables going into a sector), how different 
levels of aggregation actually interact (e.g., information from 
Corporate going into the Operational level), and through the use 
of software such as yED (https://www.yworks.com/products/yed) 
the sectors can be quickly singled out and inconsistencies found 
out. 
 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 384 of 620 
 
Figure 86 Hierarchical control structure 
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The HCS is shown in this work as an intermediate result in the 
process of building a stock and flow diagram, as it provides a good 
way of checking the different components in this system with 
respect to the inputs and outputs of each, and for identifying at a 
high level the variables that might be needed for the next step, 
which is to simulate the sectors in a dynamic model. 
As a result of a HCS, it is now possible to build a system 
dynamics model by developing the sectors sequentially to then 
connect them. As it was indicated during the description of the 
method of system dynamics, it is highly recommended that a 
system dynamics model be developed in some kind of sequential 
way, to continually test and improve in an iterative process that 
culminates when the objectives of the model building process 
have been reached. This sequential building process is shown 
next. 
6.6 Model development – stock-and-flow model 
Starting from the causal loop diagram and the hierarchical 
control structure diagram, a stock-and-flow model was built in 
sequential stages, as was indicated in the section of this paper 
where the causal loop diagram development was mentioned, 
covering first the base model, then a model with the short term 
actions, and then a model including the long term actions. 
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The base model, based on the base causal loop diagram is 
shown in Figure 87. The equations for this model are detailed in 
appendix 11.5. 
 
Figure 87 Base stock-and-flow diagram 
The basic Reinforcing loop and balancing loops are indicated 
here in correspondence to the Base model contained in the causal 
loop diagram. The following aspects have to be noted: 
• Three Stocks have been added to represent relevant delays 
in the base model. These are the stock of Exclusive IP, the 
stock of Demand (equivalent to the number of customers) 
and the marketing promotion, as these are an indication of 
the current state of the system. 
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• Relevant delays were not necessarily indicated in the Causal 
Loop Diagram, but became evident in the process of 
creating the stock and flow diagram. These have been 
indicated as the additional stocks mentioned in the previous 
point. These delays reflect the basic adjustments present in 
the system, and a first order information delay has been 
chosen as a way of representing these. 
This first approximation for the model delivers a behaviour that 
is explored in section 7.3. 
In order to explore more in detail the structure of an IP theft, an 
initial model can be described in terms of the interaction of four 
main areas 1) the inventory of intangible assets in the company, 
in this case the IP 2) the performance tracking, 3) the inventory of 
Resources, and 4) the customer base and the organizational 
resources, as shown in the stock and flow diagram in Figure 88. 
These areas have an equivalent in the hierarchical control 
structure diagram in Figure 86. 
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Figure 88 Basic areas interacting in the model 
In order to build this model sequentially, and in order to focus 
on the aspect of the model that is most relevant to the problem, the 
Intangible asset area is developed in detail.  
To reflect the process of securing IP once a cyber-breach is 
detected, a configuration was chosen that contains two stocks, one 
which represents the IP that secure, and another stock to represent 
the IP that is open to be hacked.. A division of the Exclusive IP 
stock into safe and unsafe stock is shown in the next figure. 
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Figure 89 Advanced model detail safe versus unsafe IP 
This double stock system represents the “physics” involved in 
the securing and un-securing of IP. The following must be noted: 
• The IP theft can thus occur only from the unsafe IP.  
• The “un-securing rate” is not zero, as IP becomes unsafe 
naturally if nothing is done to secure it.  
Figure 90 shows this IP management “module” interacting with 
the performance management section of the model. 
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Figure 90 IP Management plus performance management 
6.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter described the result of applying the system 
dynamics simulation method to the case of a cyber-attack with 
operational consequences. The chapter gave a background to the 
use of the method, to then the chapter described background 
information to the case upon which the simulation is based. The 
case was then described in detail. Thereafter the model 
development was shown sequentially, first its causal structure, 
then its hierarchical control structure to finally describe a first 
approximation to its system dynamics model.  
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7 Discussion 
This chapter presents an analysis of the results described in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. Thereafter the research questions are answered 
from these results and implications to industry and academia are 
described. The chapter ends by outlining the limitations of the 
tools used in this thesis. 
7.1 Analysis of the nature of cyber risks 
This section will review the results for each of the research 
processes followed in this thesis, with a focus in the gathering of 
evidence to answer the research questions. First the analysis is 
presented for each of the processes, and then these analyses are 
combined as necessary to answer the research questions in section 
7.4. 
This section discusses the patterns and categories found in the 
cyber-risks from the cases gathered and presented in chapter 4, 1) 
by comparing cyber-risk groups between each other, and 2) by 
comparing the cyber-risk groups with other supply chain risks, 
according the method outlined in section 3.7.  
7.1.1 Comparison of the different cyber-risks groups 
The cyber-attack groups that are presented in Chapter 4, are 
grouped according to similarities in the structure that causes the 
operational disruption originating from the cyber-attack. Five 
groups were identified, namely 1) active theft of assets, 2) passive 
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theft of assets, 3) active product theft, 4) active interruption of 
operations, and 5) passive interruption of operations. 
When comparing these five groups, differences are identified 
with respect to 1) hacker protagonism, 2) targeted versus non 
targeted approach, and 3) supply chain influence direction. 
The hacker protagonism is related to the active versus passive 
role taken by the hacker to cause the disruption. An “active” cases 
group is defined as those groups of similar cases of cyber-attacks 
where the control action (see section 3.8.2) that leads to the 
operational disruption on the supply chain is executed by the 
hacker. On the other hand, a “passive” cases group is defined as 
the group of similar cyber-attacks where the control action that 
leads to the operational disruption is executed by the target 
organization as a result of a hack.  
If these actions are caused by the hacker, then restricting the 
capacity of a hacker to execute these actions would address the 
problem. For example consider Figure 46 for the case of Tesco 
Bank. The disruption actions of using the credit card data to 
impersonate the customer in the purchase of resources, or in the 
case of Thyssen-Krupp (see Figure 48) the use of the stolen IP to 
create differentiated products or services, is a specific action on 
the supply chain, i.e., the supplier, undertaken by the hackers to 
crate the disruption. 
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However, in the case of the passive theft of resources in Leoni 
AG (see Figure 50), the email supplanting the CEO sent to the 
CFO does not affect the supply chain directly, but it is the CFO’s 
instruction that results in the Bank sending resources to the 
hackers as a result of the disruption. 
Comparison of the cases also reveals targeted versus non-
targeted cyber-attacks, closely related to the active/passive 
categorization. Active sources require case-by-case actions by the 
hackers, posing a limit to the number of actions hackers can 
perform at any one time. For example, the active interruption to 
operations for the Bowman Dam or to the steel mill requires the 
knowledge of specific characteristics to each operation, as the 
controllers and equipment will vary between different 
organizations even within the same industry.  
On the other hand a passive ransomware attack, for example, 
can affect different industries and geographies simultaneously. In 
the case of the Wannacry ransomware, estimates indicate that it 
affected between 150.000 and 200.000 computers in 150 
countries, as can be seen in Figure 91 (Chappell et al., 2017). 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 394 of 620 
 
Figure 91 Wannacry attacks – one dot per affected computer 
The cases in the gathered data also affected the supply chain in 
different ways. In the case of the active, targeted attacks the 
disruption is detected by the upstream supply chain, e.g., the 
customer in case of Tesco Bank losing funds, the Kia and Hyundai 
car being stolen from customers, or the nuclear plant or steel mill 
outputs being affected by disrupted operations. On the other hand, 
the passive, non-targeted attacks have disruptions felt by the 
downstream supply chain, such as Leoni AG suppliers not 
receiving payment, or the NHS service providers (Ambulances) 
having their operations disrupted. 
These differences are summarized in Table 31. 
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Table 31 Comparison of cyber-risk sources 
 
7.1.2 Cyber-risks vs. other supply chain risks 
The cases that are identified in the archival research are 
compared to other supply chain risks. The supply chain risks that 
are used for this comparison are identified in section 3.7.3 of this 
thesis: 
• Non-cyber-related operational risks, such as industrial 
fires, supplier financial stress , or cargo theft from sources 
other than a cyber-attack (not during transport), 
• Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, volcano eruptions, 
floods or wildfires 
• Transportation risks, such as port congestion, cargo theft 
during transport from sources other than cyber-attacks, port 
infrastructure failure, vehicle derailment or accident, and 
vehicle malfunctions during transport, 
• Socio political risks, such as civil unrest, law enforcement, 
or corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
First, cyber-risks present a lower latency when compared to 
other types of supply chain risks. For example, natural disasters 
and its effects such as infrastructure unavailability receive public 
Operational disruption 
group Disruption type
Hacker 
protagonism Approach SC influence
Group 1 Theft of assets/resources Active Targeted Downstream
Group 2 Theft of assets/resources Passive Non-targeted Upstream
Group 3 Theft of Product Active Targeted Downstream
Group 4 Interruption of operations Active Targeted Downstream
Group 5 Interruption of operations Passive Non-targeted Upstream
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news coverage, having thus a very low latency. The operational 
disruption form the natural disaster risk is thus quickly made 
known. Similar arguments can be made for disruptions from other 
supply chain risks such as industrial fires (Operational risks), port 
congestion (transport risks) and to a certain degree, civil unrest 
(socio-political risks). 
Instead, the disruptive effects of cyber risks can go undetected 
for years until other performance problems arise. Such is the case 
of Stuxnet, where the high failure rate of centrifuges, and resulting 
rising average replacement costs gave way to the discovery of an 
attack that had been going on for at least 2 years (Zetter, 2014).  
Second, cyber-risks present operational disruptions that are in 
some cases un-localized when compared to the physical location 
of other types of supply chain risks. For example, after natural 
disasters materialize the affected area is known. Road availability 
can be determined for a specific geographical area. A similar 
argument can be made for an industrial fire (operational risk), port 
congestion (transportation risk) or civil unrest (socio-political 
risk).  
Instead, cyber-risks can lead to multiple geographies being 
affected simultaneously with a much higher complexity, such as 
in the case of the Wannacry ransomware where over 190 countries 
were affected (see Figure 91). Even in cases where the cyber-
attack case is focused such as the Stuxnet attack, the attack also 
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caused damage in other locations in Europe and Asia (Zetter, 
2014) 
Third, cyber-risks present operational disruptions with a higher 
complexity when compared to other types of supply chain risks. 
The geographical effects of a natural disaster are restricted, e.g., 
only a certain number of roads are potentially affected. A similar 
argument can be made of an industrial fire or supplier financial 
stress (operational risk), and port congestion or vehicle failure 
(transport risks). The case is different for some socio-political 
risks, such as civil unrest, where the effects can eventually be very 
complex. 
In the case of cyber-risks, this complexity is much higher. For 
the case of the Steel Mill cyber-attack, the complexity of the attack 
affected multiple plan systems sequentially, as was the case for 
the NHS ransomware attack and its ramifications. The complexity 
of cyber-attacks is represented in the different ways in which it 
affects the system, e.g., by replacing communications, disrupting 
communications, and by the greater number of communication 
streams in a system as there are agents in it. 
Fourth, cyber-risks present a stronger perpetuity when 
compared to the other types of supply chain risks. A natural 
disaster presents a period when it affects operations (during the 
flood, earthquake or snow storm for example). Unless there are 
infrastructure damages as a result, operations can resume after the 
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natural disaster has ended. In the same way, and industrial fire 
(operational risk) is restricted by the existing material that can be 
burnt, a port congestion (transportation risks) will recede after 
some time due to market pressures for example, and a law that is 
being enforced is implemented. The combination of low latency 
and physical location results in focused actions being taken 
promptly to restrict the duration of supply chain risks other than 
cyber-risks. 
On the other hand, a cyber-attack such as Leoni AG or Tesco 
Bank continue to operate as intended without losing its effect until 
specific countermeasures are implemented. No information was 
found in the gathered data of countermeasures for the effects of 
the cyber-attack, neither in Leoni AG nor in Tesco Bank. Actions 
taken after the incidents were made known focused on securing 
the information that allowed the fraudulent communications, and 
nothing was said about limiting the effects of such a fraudulent 
communication being received. 
Fifth, cyber-risks present perfect replicability when compared 
to the other types of supply chain risks. Natural disaster risks are 
not considered as replicable. The same can be said of an industrial 
fire (operational risk), vehicle failure (transportation risk) or law 
enforcement (socio-political risk) as all develop on a case-by-case 
basis. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 399 of 620 
On the other hand, cyber-risk triggers such as ransomware, and 
computer viruses, trojans or worms replicate with a high level of 
fidelity. 
Sixth, cyber-risks present a higher incidence of interaction 
risks with respect to component risk when compared to the other 
types of supply chain risks. Natural disasters disable affect the 
availability of roads and bridges, the components of the supply 
chain. A similar argument can be made of industrial fires or 
supplier financial stress (operational risks), and port infrastructure 
or vehicle failure (transportation risks).  
In the case of socio-political risks, the disruptions are related to 
interactions between components of the system, e.g., supply chain 
and legislators (Law enforcement) or special interest groups and 
the company (CSR). For cyber risks in the case of the Leoni AG 
cyber-attack, it did not affect the information about the payment 
instruction (a necessary component for forgery) but rather affected 
the interaction between agents in the supply chain from this 
information. A similar case can be argued for the Steel Mill case, 
Tesco Bank or Stuxnet. 
Seventh, cyber-risks higher anonymity when compared to the 
other types of supply chain risks. The origin of natural disasters is 
not anonymous, albeit sometimes providing limited reaction lead 
time.  
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On the other hand, the origin of a cyber-attack such as 
Wannacry or Stuxnet is not yet known, and it is unlikely that the 
origin of the attack will be identified. 
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Table 32 Comparison of risks along 7 dimensions 
  Risk types 
Dimensions Cyber-risks to 
operations 
Non-cyber-
related 
operational 
risks Natural Disasters Transportation Risks Socio Political risks 
Latency 
High latency, 
sometimes years (e.g., 
Stuxnet) 
Low (Industrial 
Fire) to medium 
(Supplier 
financial stress) 
Low Low Low to medium 
Physical 
Location 
Can affect multiple 
locations (e.g., 
Wannacry) 
Localized Localized Localized Can have multiple locations (Civil unrest) 
Complexity 
Can affect many 
systems 
simultaneously 
Limited 
complexity Limited complexity Limited complexity 
low (Law enforcement) 
to medium (Civil unrest) 
Replication Perfect replication No replication   No replication   No replication   Imperfect replication 
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  Risk types 
Dimensions Cyber-risks to 
operations 
Non-cyber-
related 
operational 
risks Natural Disasters Transportation Risks Socio Political risks 
Perpetuity 
Perpetual until 
counter-action; unless 
programmed to end  
No replication. 
can be 
perpetual (e.g., 
supplier 
financial stress) 
Limited 
Limited (Port 
congestion) to long 
(infrastructure failure) 
Limited (Law 
enforcement) to long 
(Civil unrest) 
Component 
versus 
Interaction 
risks 
Interaction risks 
Component risk 
(e.g., supplier, 
infrastructure, 
cargo) 
Component risk 
(e.g., supplier, 
infrastructure, 
cargo) 
Component risk 
(Infrastrcture, vehicle) Interaction risks 
Anonymity 
Anonymous unless 
explicit hacker 
declaration 
Known 
perpetrator, 
traceable if not 
originally known 
Known 
perpetrator, 
traceable if not 
originally known 
Known perpetrator, 
traceable if not 
originally known 
Known perpetrator, 
traceable if not originally 
known 
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7.2 Analysis of the systemic risk approach 
The results presented from the application of STPA to an in-
depth case is revelatory in different respects. 
First, the results provide an increased “granularity” of the risk 
analysis. The structured STPA approach presented in the last 
section results in 119 different unsafe control actions (for a 
complete list, see Appendix section 11.2), which is equivalent to 
the same number of contexts that lead to a hazard. This is a list 
agreed by the members of the organization of the different ways 
in which the existing design of this supply chain can result in an 
unwanted event. In the terminology of the method, any of these 
119 “contexts” can make a “control action unsafe”, leading to a 
“hazardous condition” that can create an “unacceptable loss”. 
This approach builds from the original “disruption curve” by 
Sheffi & Rice (Sheffi et al., 2005), expanding the theory by 
uncovering mechanisms through which this behaviour over time 
is achieved in a supply chain after a cyber-attack i.e., cyber-
resilience. The representation of information flows through a 
structured method with an explicit result, i.e., the information flow 
map, has been shown to enhance team productivity and 
effectiveness (Vennix, 1996; Sterman 2000). 
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The large number of contexts not being a rare outcome from an 
STPA analysis, and it is consistent with the findings from the 
applications of this methodology in other domains. However, 
these results originate two problems worth mentioning related to 
1) the number of results and to 2) the nature of the results that are 
generated. 
In regard to the number of results, if large these can be difficult 
to manage. The number of unsafe control actions can be 
understood as a greater granularity of the vulnerabilities present 
in the supply chain, yet this granularity also adds greater 
complexity to the management of these risks. It is therefore 
unlikely that a company will mitigate all the contexts uncovered 
though this analysis, for reasons that range from technical to 
political. Technical reasons are related to resources and timing, 
such as insufficient availability of resources to address and resolve 
all unsafe contexts, while political reasons are related to strategy 
and conflicts of interest, such as the unwillingness of supply 
management to expose so many new risks not considered 
previously for fear of appearing incompetent to upper 
management. 
The nature of the results also differs from the results in the 
probability/severity risk analyses. This methodology does not 
assign a probability to the unsafe control actions or contexts. 
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Rather, these are identified from current supply chain design, and 
thus their probability of “occurrence” is 1: these design flaws exist 
in the system until these are solved, and as such can be exploited 
at any time.  
7.2.1 Endogenous exposure 
A probability calculation is next introduced, related to how 
likely an internal or external agent is to “make use” of any existing 
unsafe contexts resulting in an accident. This calculation of 
external threat likelihood is beyond this method as this reasoning 
is not endogenous. 
The endogenous approach presented here is equivalent to an 
analysis that uncovers a great number of open doors in a system 
where you do not want external entry. These doors remain open 
until the organization decides to address the findings, and it is a 
management decision if either these design flaws are addressed, 
or the choice is to risk anyone foreign attempting to use any one 
of these doors. 
Therefore, from the information revealed by this approach and 
consistent with a systems thinking framework, a way of 
quantifying this exposure is through the calculation of 
probabilities for the different hazards and accidents, thus 
providing management information to focus action on the ones 
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with the highest number of ways in which these accidents or 
hazards can be triggered. 
This concept, of how exposed an organization is because of the 
structure it possesses, is being defined as “endogenous exposure”: 
Definition: “Endogenous exposure is the property of a system 
of not fulfilling its objective because of the triggering, external or 
internal, of an internal design flaw” 
The calculation of the endogenous exposure is based on the 
“database” of contexts derived from the Unsafe Control Action 
analysis. This analysis can also be understood as a traceable 
register of the different sources for failure. If there are N different 
contexts identified through the analysis, the probability would be 
calculated as the number of applicable contexts for the specific 
hazard over the total number of contexts: 
Equation 6 
𝑃𝑃(𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) =  ∑ ((𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)⋃  (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖))𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 ∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1   
A similar argument can be made for the probability of 
accidents. For the case of N different contexts and T different 
hazards, the probability of an accident materializing considers not 
only the pertinent contexts but also the hazards that correspond to 
that accident, thus, the probability is: 
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Equation 7 P(Accidenti)=  ∑ ∑ ((Contextj)⋃  (Hazardk)⋃  (Accidenti))Nj=1Tk=1
∑ (Contextj)Nj=1  
The results for the data from this case are shown next. Table 28 
shows the number of accidents, hazards, control actions and 
unsafe control actions identified for this case study. Table 33 
shows the number of UCA for each accident, and the probability 
as the proportion of the total number of potential UCAs which 
actually lead to the specific accident, proposed in this work as an 
“endogenous exposure” measure for the organization. 
Table 33 Unique UCA per Accident 
Accident CA UCA P(Accident) 
Erroneous payment to supplier 16 93 78% 
Product Integrity compromised 17 103 87% 
Reputational Loss 15 92 77% 
Erroneous arrival of product 18 110 92% 
Product Loss 17 105 88% 
Payment Loss 16 93 78% 
 
In the same way, Table 34 shows the number of UCAs for the 
different hazards as defined for this case study. The probability 
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for each is defined as the proportion of UCAs of the total that lead 
to the specific hazard. 
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Table 34 Unique UCA per Hazard 
Hazard CA UCA P(Hazard) 
Inability to perform physical transport 8 41 34% 
Inability to initiate supply process 6 20 17% 
Inability to confirm data transmission 
integrity 13 79 66% 
Inability to confirm product integrity 10 44 37% 
Inability to confirm data integrity 12 54 45% 
Inability to confirm correct payment 8 33 28% 
 
Additionally, four as the largest number of hazards assigned for 
a single UCA, as shown in Figure 5. This is an indication of the 
connection present in the system, and of the level of independence 
of the hazards from each other. 
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Figure 92 Number of hazards per UCA 
7.2.2 System requirements from analysis 
The analysis of requirements follows the system dynamics 
theory by considering dynamic behaviour is caused by a structure 
composed of stocks and flows. The analysis as shown in Table 35 
results in the categorization of unwanted behaviours (UCA) as 
either related to problems of stock of information, of information 
flow, or of both. 
Table 35 Information system requirements 
SD UCA 
Categories 
Data 
(Stock) 
Process 
(Flow) 
Generic 
Type 
Behaviour 
Description 
Requirement 
Normal 
Operation 
Correct Correct   
Process within the 
designed 
behaviour 
No requirement 
Data 
Corruption  
(Stock 
Problem) 
Incorrec
t 
Correct 
GT1 
Members of the 
system cannot 
identify each 
other 
unequivocally 
Information 
system will 
include a process 
through which 
each system 
member can 
identify each 
other 
unequivocally 
GT2 
Data for the 
process is 
changed without 
Information 
system will 
include a data 
management 
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SD UCA 
Categories 
Data 
(Stock) 
Process 
(Flow) 
Generic 
Type 
Behaviour 
Description 
Requirement 
members of the 
system noticing 
process that will 
detect changes in 
data 
Flawed 
Process  
(Flow 
Problem) 
Correct Incorrect 
GT3 
Process sequence 
advanced before 
confirmations are 
made 
Information 
system will 
support the 
process sequence 
and confirmation 
milestones 
GT4 
Process sequence 
understanding is 
different between 
the members of 
the system 
Information 
system will 
continually 
communicate to 
all system 
members about 
the process 
sequence 
Compound 
Problem 
Incorrec
t 
Incorrect 
GT5 
Wrong data is 
used for the 
process without 
members noticing 
Information 
System will 
include 
communication 
data confirmation 
as milestone 
before data 
exchange between 
members 
GT6 
Reaction times 
between members 
are not known 
Information 
system will 
continually 
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SD UCA 
Categories 
Data 
(Stock) 
Process 
(Flow) 
Generic 
Type 
Behaviour 
Description 
Requirement 
leading to 
untimely 
decisions 
communicate all 
system members 
about required 
action dates. 
 
7.2.3 Comparison of FMEA versus STPA performance 
The process of developing the STPA analysis for the 
Procurement process was compared with an alternate method of 
risk analysis, the FMEA. This was possible, since the case 
company was in the process of updating its risk records to include 
cyber-risks. The comparison was done with respect to resources 
needed, risks uncovered and resulting requirements. The detailed 
results of the FMEA analysis were not disclosed by the company.  
As is summarized in Table 36, the FMEA was a process 
required a reported four one-hour long meetings with 15 people 
per meeting, plus a 20 hour processing time. This process 
uncovered 48 risks for the procurement area in general with 15 
risks that were specifically about cyber-risks. This compares with 
the 42 man-hours required for the STPA process, which 
uncovered 119 contexts for failure and 38 contexts that were about 
cyber-risks to the procurement area. 
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Where the comparison is particularly interesting is in the 
resulting requirements from the analysis. The FMEA resulted in 8 
preventive measures for cyber-risks, and no design requirements 
were extracted from this process. In the meanwhile, the STPA 
process results in 28 preventive measures, directly related to some 
of the contexts that were described during the process, contexts 
that led to unsafe control actions. The STPA process also revealed 
6 design recommendations (indicated as GT1 to GT6 in Table 35). 
Table 36 FMEA – STPA performance comparison 
Concept FMEA STPA 
Resources 
Needed 260 man-hours 42 man-hours 
Risks 
uncovered 
48 overall risks 
15 cyber-related risks 
119 contexts for failure 
38 contexts for cyber-risks 
Resulting 
requirements 
8 preventive measures 
0 design 
recommendations 
28 preventive measures 
6 design recommendations 
This result is not unexpected, as other experiences of STPA 
application for process analysis have also revealed many more 
unsafe contexts than other methods, including HAZOP and 
FMEA. For the particular case of this research this might be a 
result of several factors: 
• The structured process. In contrast to FMEA, the STPA 
process has a structured way of both understanding the 
system, as well as of looking for the unsafe contexts. In the 
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case of FMEA, first the components of the system are 
identified and then, to identify the modes of failure, 
brainstorming sessions are held. Normally the identification 
of those components as well as the related information of 
probability of failure and severity of occurrence is quite 
time-consuming, particularly for cases where this 
information is highly dependent on a specific member of the 
organization that has the required information. This is the 
case for sensitive information such as monetary cost of 
failures. On the other hand, the STPA process starts by 
defining the system and its controllers with the existing 
information flows and control actions (CA). The contexts 
are then searched through a process that can be understood 
as “bounded brainstorming”, by concentrating the efforts of 
the people at the meeting in a specific domain of possible 
failures, for example “How could NOT executing this CA 
result in a hazardous condition?” This focused search is 
possibly part of the success of the method. Additionally, as 
the process is then repeated for different CAs and modes of 
CA influence (effecting the CA, not effecting the CA, 
effecting the CA too long or too early, and effecting the CA 
too much or too little). 
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• The systemic thinking. The unsafe contexts that are revealed 
through the process are not necessarily directly linked to the 
failure mode. But also context conditions are identified, as 
these are identified for their ability of creating a hazard, and 
not only the failure. For example, sending a purchase order 
to a supplier without checking the data of the supplier was 
identified as an unsafe way of effecting the control action 
“confirm PO with supplier”. This is dangerous not directly 
because it creates an accident (in fact it was not detected in 
the FMEA), but because if a cyber-attack was to happen, 
the system would be open to a loss. This systemic approach 
to searching for hazardous conditions certainly contributes 
to a greater number of unsafe contexts. 
• The dynamic thinking. The structured search for unsafe 
control action contexts considers a dynamic component, 
both through the “effecting the CA too soon or too late” and 
“effecting the CA too much or too little”, as both are related 
to timing. Given the nature of the processes and control 
actions involved in the procurement process, the “too much-
too little” component is not relevant. However, the “too 
early, too late” as a condition to search for unsafe control 
action contexts, does deliver some results that are invisible 
to the FMEA process, unless it comes out in the 
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brainstorming session. Yet, it has been documented that 
humans are particularly bad at understanding dynamic and 
special effects (Sterman, 2000), i.e., those effects that 
happen over time, or those effects that happen over 
distances, respectively. 
• Going beyond human failure. A feature of systems thinking 
when evaluating risks, is that of considering design as the 
cause of errors made by humans, so rather than asking “why 
did a specific operator behave in this way”, a question 
towards systems thinking would rather be “why would an 
operator in that circumstance have made that decision?”. 
The answer to such a question would result in more contexts 
and design considerations. 
7.3 Analysis of the dynamic modelling approach 
The model in Figure 87, after being set in equilibrium, was 
tested for an initial disruption in the level of Exclusive IP stock, 
and different levels of marketing feedback. As an example, the 
sensitivity analysis for three parameters are shown next:  
• The Customer adjustment time, or the time in months that 
customers return after a bad experience 
• The Marketing Factor, which is the effect on demand in 
US$/Month resulting from every US$ spent in marketing 
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• The Promotion adjustment rate, which is the reaction time 
for adjustments in marketing budget after a disruption.  
 
Figure 93 Marketing factor sensitivity 
 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 418 of 620 
  
Figure 94 customer adjustment time sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 95 Marketing adjustment time sensitivity analysis 
The values shown here are of the Sales Gap with respect to the 
Expected Sales. The general model behaviour can be explained by 
the balancing feedback loops present in the IP Stock adjustment 
and Customer Adjustment through marketing.  
The model was not compared with the available data, as the 
model that includes all the medium and long term feedbacks 
resulting from the case description have not been included in a 
quantifiable model. The values if the Sales Gap, although 
following a similar curve than the one obtained from company 
data (see Figure 72), the values are much smaller than the ones 
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reported. This is the result of both the pending inclusion of factors 
that decreased the sales post-disruption, such as the loss of 
contracts and loss of sales due to product safety problems derived 
from the IP Theft, and the inclusion of costs derived from the use 
of PR, cyber-security and legal services. 
However, despite delivering limited results from the 
simulation, the process of simulation, the process reveals a series 
of problems and advantages. 
The problems have relation with the quantification of the 
variables, and the sequential construction process of the model, 
and the calibration of the model by comparing its behaviour with 
an observed, measures variable. 
The advantages of the process relate to the sequential 
identification of variables and their relationships through the 
casual loop diagram and the hierarchical control structure. 
Therefore insights and behaviour development such as the 
description of the feedback loops detailed in section 6.4, can 
explicitly represent information about the cyber-attack, serve as 
an explicit representation of an agreed system structure, and guide 
the focused building of a simulation model to answer specific 
questions related to an attack. 
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7.4 Answer to research questions 
The analyses detailed in the previous section are used in this 
section to provide answers to the research questions as detailed in 
Table 18.  
7.4.1 Answer to research sub-question 3 
The research sub-question 3 refers to the nature, i.e., the 
particular characteristics, of cyber-risks with respect to other 
supply chain risks. 
Research sub-question 3: how do cyber-risks cause operational 
disruption in supply chains and how does this differ from other 
supply chain risks? 
The process of answering this question, as indicated in Table 
18, is separated into three sub-questions: 
• First, an exploratory that analyses the events of operational 
disruptions caused by cyber-attacks that have been recorded 
beyond published literature, which originates research sub-
question 3.1. RSQ3.1: What events of operational 
disruptions caused by cyber-risks have been recorded? 
• Second, a more descriptive aspect where the events that are 
found are used to describe how the operational disruption is 
caused, which originates research sub-question 3.2. 
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RSQ3.2: How have these events resulted in operational 
disruption? 
• Third, an aspect that is more evaluative that compares 
disruptions from cyber-risks to disruptions by other supply 
chain risks, RSQ3.3: How do events from cyber-risks differ 
from events from other supply chain risks? 
The results of this part of the research are found in chapter 4, 
and based on those results, the following answers to these research 
questions are suggested. 
RSQ3.1: What events of operational 
disruptions caused by cyber-risks have 
been recorded? 
The events of operational disruption are being recorded 
continuously in different media beyond published literature, as 
evidenced by the number of reports of cyber-attacks that could be 
retrieved through the methodology applied in this thesis, 2425 
reports, despite this methodology not being exhaustive. All the 
cyber-attack reports that were gathered are related in some way to 
the loss of data, either  
The reports appear first in newspapers or blog websites 
specialized on the topic of hacker attacks, and the information 
they contain is of variable depth and quality. All of the reports that 
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were found mention at least three things, the company industry 
where this attack happened, the type of attack (e.g., data loss, 
operational disruption), and a quantification of the disruption, be 
this in monetary value, or quantity of loss data, for example. 
These events are then reported with some lag by newsletters, 
and specialized consultants such as software security companies. 
Finally these events are summarized by specialized government 
agencies and specialized consultants, business consultants and 
insurance companies.  
The times of record for the cyber-attacks, ranging from the 
same day to one week after. The sooner the report the less 
information that was made available about the mechanics of the 
attack. 
The data gathered included a range of reports with a reporting 
lag from the incident occurring to the date of the report that ranges 
from hours to months. In the detailed sample that was gathered, 
3% of the reports were connected with some type of operational 
disruption, and as was seen in the case groups presented in section 
4.2, all cases originate in the loss of data. Only 1% of cases of 
intellectual property loss was seen in the sample. Given that the 
research process of archival research did not intend to be 
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exhaustive, these number provide an instance of the relative 
quantities. 
There is a dispersion in terms of the countries to which the 
attacks in the sample are directed, most of the ones in the sample 
directed towards the US and UK, with India in a distant third 
place. 
This dispersion is not generalizable, and might be related to the 
method of data gathering, including sources and language of 
reports for example. 
RSQ3.2: How have these events 
resulted in operational disruption? 
The cases that are presented in chapter 4 are categorized 
according to the disruptions these cause to the supply chain. The 
five identified categories are 1) active theft of resources, 2) 
passive theft of resources, 3) active theft of products, 4) active 
disruption of operations, and 5) passive disruption of operations. 
Each of these categories present a distinguishing set of 
characteristics related to how the supply chain disruption is 
caused, as well as other categories that are similar and which 
distinguishes cyber-risks as a group from other supply chain risks. 
Some common features are found in the gathered data: 
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• All the cases are dependent on stolen proprietary data of 
some sort: 1) directly, as in case of cyber-attacks as a result 
the loss of data, or 2) indirectly, as in case of cyber-attacks 
that have an operational disruption as outcome from the use 
of proprietary data that had been stole previously. 
• All the cases have a mechanism of deception, for the 
replacement of expected communication streams by 
fraudulent ones, either 1) to another member of the supply 
chain, or 2) to a member within the organization, 
• All the cases have a mechanism of undue influence, for the 
creation of legitimate but wrong communication streams 
either 1) to other members of the supply chain, or 2) to 
members of the same organization, 
• Most cases have a mechanism of reward, for the hackers in 
the form of either in the form of 1) organizational resources 
such as money or IP, or 2) products from suppliers to the 
organization. 
• The progression of these mechanisms is very consistent, 
identified as 1) the unauthorized use of proprietary data to 
follow a sequence in the mechanisms of 2) deception, 3) 
undue influence, and 4) reward. This is likely not a linear 
process, but rather a cyclic process, as the reward is the 
incentive driving data theft. 
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Figure 96 shows an example of this sequence for some example 
cases. 
 
Figure 96 Cycle of disruption 
Finally the aspect relating to the difference between cyber-risks 
and other supply chain risks, is contained in research sub-question 
3.3. 
RSQ3.3: How do events from cyber 
risks differ from other supply chain 
risks? 
Differences between cyber-risks and other supply chain risks 
are identified along dimensions of latency, physical location, 
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complexity, replication, perpetuity, anonymity, and component 
versus interaction as main driver of the risks. 
Cyber risks are compared with other supply chain risks grouped 
according to categories of 1) Non-cyber-related operational risks 
such as industrial fires of supplier financial stress, 2) natural 
disaster risk such as earthquakes or floods, 3) transportation risks 
such as port congestion or vehicle failure, and 4) socio political 
risks, such as civil unrest or corporate social responsibility risks. 
Table 32 shows a detailed account of the differences between 
the dimensions and categories of the analysis, and the practical 
implications are summarized in the following table: 
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Table 37 Cyber-risks vs. Physical risks in supply chains 
Dimension Events from 
Supply chain cyber 
risks 
Events from 
other supply chain risks 
Physical 
location 
Physical location is 
irrelevant 
Physical location is relevant 
Anonymity Anonymity is common Anonymity is uncommon 
Complexity Unlimited complexity Limited complexity 
Latency Can go undetected for a 
long time 
Cannot go undetected for a 
long time 
Component 
versus 
Interaction 
Mainly interaction risks Mainly component risk 
Replication Perfect replication Difficult or imperfect 
replication 
Perpetuity Events will continue 
until counteracted 
Events mostly have a 
duration 
7.4.2 Answer to research sub-question 4 
The research sub question 4 refers to the use of systems 
thinking to mitigate some of the gaps that were detected during 
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the systematic literature review for managing cyber-risks in the 
supply chain.  
Research sub-question 4: how can a systems approach be used 
to mitigate compartmentalization, static frameworks and 
historical dependence for managing cyber-risks in the supply 
chain? 
This question was separated in two parts, as shown in Table 38, 
to extract insights from the application of two systems thinking 
approaches for the management of cyber-risks, one for the 
evaluation of risks, and another for the simulation of the resilient 
response to cyber-risks.  
Table 38 RSQ4 and derived research sub-questions 
Research question Explanatory Evaluative 
RSQ4 
How can a systems 
approach be used to 
mitigate 
compartmentalization, 
static frameworks and 
historical-dependence 
for managing cyber 
risks in the supply 
chain?  
RSQ4.1a.- How can a 
systemic risk analysis 
approach mitigate 
compartmentalization, 
static frameworks and 
historical dependence 
for managing cyber 
risks in the supply 
chain? 
RSQ4.1b.- How 
does a systemic 
risk analysis 
approach 
compare to 
established risk 
analysis 
methods? 
RSQ4.2.- How can 
System Dynamics 
simulation mitigate 
compartmentalization, 
static frameworks and 
historical dependence 
for managing cyber 
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risks in the supply 
chain? 
Next, answer to these derived sub-questions and then to sub-
question 4 are detailed: 
RSQ4.1a: How can a systemic risk 
analysis approach mitigate 
compartmentalization, static 
frameworks and historical dependence 
for managing cyber risks in the supply 
chain? 
The process of systemic risk analysis as structured through the 
STPA process, addresses compartmentalization, static evaluation 
of risk and historical dependence of the risk evaluation in specific 
ways. 
The compartmentalization is addressed through the process by 
which the unsafe control actions are identified. The process is 
similar to the traditional event tree analysis and branches out from 
the undesirable outcomes in this case the list of unacceptable 
losses shown in Table 25. However, in contrast to the event tree 
method, the STPA process continues with a process of structured 
enquiry by first defining the relevant system of controllers and 
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control actions, to then identify these dangerous conditions by 
assuming four instances when this dangerous condition might 
arise, this is, either through: 
• A controller executing a control action in its domain 
• A controller not executing a control action in its domain 
• A controller executing a control action in its domain too 
early or too late, or 
• A controller executing a control action in its domain for too 
long or too short a period. 
These options do not compartmentalize the areas of the system 
that are involved. For example, the UCA (unsafe control action) 
of “Buyer executes instruction of supplier payment before product 
validation” involves the areas of finance, warehousing and 
purchasing. Additionally, the level of aggregation selected for the 
analysis will condition the hierarchical level at which the 
controllers and their actions are being considered and the process 
of finding UCAs required by the method, does not 
compartmentalize at any level of hierarchy or aggregation. 
The static framework gap is addressed by the STPA method by 
including time in the analysis of UCAs from the perspective of 1) 
executing UCAs too soon or too late, and 2) executing UCAs for 
too long or too short a period. These conditions reveal contexts 
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which are time-related. For example, the UCA “Bank executes the 
transfer of funds to the supplier before the correct payment 
amount has been confirmed” contains a sequence of activities, this 
is it is necessary to confirm payment amount before executing the 
control action. This results in a requirement of confirming 
monetary amounts throughout the payment process, requirement 
that can be fulfilled through a number of alternatives. 
The historical independence, from its application to the case 
study, is understood as only partial. The aspects that are history-
independent include: 
• The operating requirements, i.e., the accidents and hazards 
of the system, as these are obtained from management 
expectations,  
• The structure of the system that is required for unsafe 
context analysis, i.e., controllers and control actions, which 
are a result of the mental maps about the organization, and 
• The identification of unsafe control actions through a 
process of imagination. 
On the other hand, the historical-dependence of the STPA 
process, is related to: 
• The cycle of the process as illustrated in Figure 35, 
inasmuch as the next cycle of system definition will be 
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dependent on the outcome requirements from a previous 
cycle of analysis. This is not a limitation, but rather a feature 
of the method. When history-dependency was identified as 
a gap during the literature review, this dependency was seen 
as a gap in cases where there was no previous experience 
from which to extract data for analysis. In the case of STPA, 
the data is the system structure and the dependency is the 
updating of this structure with the requirements from 
previous analysis cycles. See section 2.9.2 when the gap 
type 2 from the SLR is described, related to the methods 
used cyber resilience analysis. 
• The identification of unsafe contexts of operation, when 
these identification is derived from experience. For rare or 
very specialized systems, experience about the potential 
ways in which the structure of the system can lead to an 
unsafe context of operation that is undetectable with this 
experience. 
As a corollary to answering question 4.1a, the evidence 
gathered in the thesis reveals that the STPA systemic risk analysis 
method addresses compartmentalization and the dynamic nature 
of the systems being managed, and provides partial time-
independence to analysis. 
RSQ4.1b compares this method to other established method: 
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RSQ4.1b: How does a systemic risk 
analysis approach compare to 
established risk analysis methods? 
The results from the application of the STPA method were 
compared to the results from the FMEA analysis, as described in 
section 7.2.3. The evidence shows several advantages of using a 
systemic risk analysis for the evaluation of cyber risks, related to 
• Resources needed for the risk assessment in terms of man-
hours needed, as the STPA process needed 16% of the 
resources needed by an FMEA process for the same end, 
i.e., identifying cyber-risks, 
• Number of failure contexts uncovered, as the STPA process 
uncovered 153% more cyber-risks (148% more overall 
risks) 
• Number of design recommendations, as the FMEA did not 
reveal design recommendations related to cyber-risks, 
• Number of preventive measures, as the STPA process 
revealed 2,5 as many preventive measures as the FMEA 
process of the same purpose, 
• Structuring of the process and incorporation of systemic and 
dynamic thinking. 
• Going beyond human failure for recommendations. 
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As a corollary to answering RSQ4.1b, a systemic risk analysis 
method evidences several promising features in its application to 
cyber-risk analysis in a supply chain. Consideration should be had 
that these features were uncovered through the revelatory study 
presented in this thesis, and will require further evidence to 
consolidate these revelations as definitive characteristics of the 
method. 
The final research sub-question is concerned with the use of 
dynamic simulation: 
 
RSQ4.2: How can system dynamics 
simulation mitigate 
compartmentalization, static 
frameworks and historical dependence 
for managing cyber-risks in the supply 
chain? 
The process of dynamic simulation as structured through the 
system dynamics method, addresses compartmentalization, static 
versus dynamic concerns as well as historical-dependence of the 
risk evaluation in specific ways. 
The compartmentalization is addressed through the process by 
which the modelling is progressed, as the causal loop 
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diagramming, the hierarchical control structure and the stock and 
flow diagram all consider a trans-organizational approach. 
• The casual loop diagram, as shown for example in Figure 
75 originates from the identification of the relevant 
variables involved in the system, and related to the 
behaviour that is at justifies the model, this is the reference 
mode. These variables are not related to any part of the 
system specifically, as it is the causal relationships that 
originate the connections. The only compartment that is 
considered in the process is the system itself, this is, the 
limits within which the close causality is explored. 
• The hierarchical control structure, such as the one 
represented in Figure 86 goes a step further, as it identifies 
the “sectors” within the system between which the 
connections occur. It builds on the causal loop diagram for 
the case developed in this thesis, but I can be the starting 
point of the analysis, as all causal loops are contained in the 
hierarchical control structure as well. 
• The stock-and-flow diagram, such as the one shown in 
Figure 87 do not consider compartments either, and are 
restricted to explaining the system structure and behaviour 
by generating a causally closed model 
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The static versus dynamic concerns are addressed by the 
dynamic models explicitly, despite not all of them in the same 
way. 
• The model least concerned with dynamics is the 
hierarchical control structure, as it represents the sectors in 
the system, and the relationships between these sectors, for 
examples, as it has been illustrated in Figure 77 or Figure 
80, for example. This structure does not identify time in any 
of its definitions, and its application is to 1) order the 
concepts involved in the system definition for subsequent 
stock-and-flow modelling, concepts mentioned in section 
6.5, and 2) to serve as a more familiar introduction to the 
modelling process to laymen in an organization, due to the 
use by the hierarchical control structure diagram of existing 
areas and communication process that can be identified by 
members of the system. 
• The causal loop diagram, despite not quantifying the 
variables it represent, it lays out the circular causality 
structures, i.e., feedback loops, that explain the evolution 
over time of the variables of interest, in this case the profit 
and the sales. 
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• The stock-and-flow diagram is based on the modelling of 
its structure over time, and it is thus intrinsically a dynamic 
process. 
The historical dependence of the dynamic modelling process is 
variable depending on the dynamic model that is used: 
• Both the Hierarchical control stricture and the causal loop 
diagram entirely rely on the present structure of the system 
that is being modelled, and as such depends in history only 
inasmuch as it requires the extraction of mental models 
from members of the organization, mental models which 
are formed by experience. 
• The stock-and-flow diagram, despite being constituted by 
the structure of the system being modelled, when it is used 
for predictive or prescriptive purposes, its calibration is 
achieved by the quantification of exogenous variables to the 
system. For example, in the case of the model represented 
in Figure 87, for example, the “marketing factor” or the 
“Cobb Constant” have to be quantified. Some of the 
techniques that can be used to quantify these variables 
consider past history. However, other processes exist that 
can achieve this quantification relying on the historical 
information concerning the reference mode of interest. 
These quantification processes not discussed in this thesis, 
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but include maximum likelihood methods, bootstrapping 
methods, or methods of simulated moments (Rahmandad et 
al., 2015), for example. 
As a corollary to answering RSQ4.2, the dynamic modelling 
method provides an explicit, structured process to collect 
information contained in mental models from members, and 
formal information in a supply chain. This process addresses 
compartmentalization, are dynamic, and do not rely on historical 
information. 
7.4.3 Answer to Main Research Question 
The answers to the different research sub-questions presented 
in sections 2.8.1, 2.8.2, 7.4.1, and 7.4.2 provide information to 
answer the main research question (see Figure 2 for an overview 
of this structure of enquiry): 
RQ: How can cybersecurity and cyber-
resilience be managed in the global 
supply chain? 
Cyber-risks differ from other supply chain risks in several 
fundamental dimensions. For example, cyber risks can have 
higher levels of complexity, geographical dispersion or be more 
difficult to detect than other risks to the supply chain Additionally, 
the risk assessment methods that are available for supply chains 
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to prepare and react to cyber-attacks have shortcomings, for 
example, through their dependence on historical data or relative 
neglect of the dynamics of an supply chain when understanding 
cyber resilience. Therefore, after the analysis in this thesis it is no 
surprise that negative effects from cyber-attacks continue to 
manifest as operational disruptions, and both the gaps uncovered 
through the SLR and the particular characteristics of cyber risks 
provide a foundation to assert that cyber-attacks will continue to 
occur: 
Cyber risks rely on the existing structure of a supply chain, 
particularly the proprietary information, communication channels, 
and established procedures between supply chain partners. 
As a result, management processes that are suggested for cyber 
risks, consider both this particular nature of cyber risks, as well as 
the process that cyber risks enable for attacks to convert to 
operational disruption. 
The management of cyber risks in a global supply, as a result 
of the evidence gathered, will therefore benefit from considering: 
• An approach that understands cyber-risks as different from 
other supply chain risks (see section 7.1.2) in their 
complexity, geographical dispersion of disruptions, 
difficulty of identification, persistence, and intrinsic 
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anonymity, for example. In contrast with other supply chain 
risks that could be managed through protection, cyber-risks 
evidence the need to understand and design the supply chain 
structure, as it is this structure that is being used by hackers 
to disrupt (see section 4.2). 
• An un-compartmentalized approach to the identification of 
risks. This exposes conditions that are not immediately 
leading to a cyber-risk materializing as a disruption, but 
rather set the stage for this disruption to be likely. These 
“distal” causes are invisible to traditional methods that 
operate through the causal chain approach, but can easily be 
identified through system-thinking based methods (see 
sections 5.2 and 6.4). 
• An approach from management team to designing the 
reaction of the supply chains that are needed. This approach 
benefits from the simulation of ranges of operation and 
structures that better result in the required behaviours (see 
sections 6.6 and 7.2.2), and as a result requires looking 
inward to the structure present in the supply chain as source 
of threats, instead of looking outside the supply chain for 
the identification of threats (see section 7.2.1). 
• An approach that will take into consideration the use of 
modular design to manage increasingly complex systems, 
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through the system definition as a causally closed set of 
components and relationships that result in the observed 
behaviour (see section 3.2.3), 
• An approach that will not depend on history of attacks for 
the evaluation of cyber-risks, as technologies such as IoT 
(Internet of Things) will introduce vulnerabilities that are as 
yet unknown (see section 7.4.2). The methods based on 
systems thinking, by considering the structure of the supply 
chain as the source of risks, has a focus on supply chain 
design irrespective of the external threats. 
• An approach that will acknowledge the strength in mental 
models, both as source of information about a cyber-
physical and socio-technical system, but also as source of 
difficulty to change. The system-thinking based processes 
developed in this thesis serve as a platform to channel this 
change. The required changes include for example, the 
migration from risk assessment to resilience assessment 
(see section 3.2.1, 3.8.3 and 3.9.3). 
7.5 Implications for supply chains 
The answers that have been given to the research questions in 
this thesis have different consequences for industry and in 
particular to supply chains. 
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7.5.1 Updating the threat paradigm 
There is a necessary, yet troubled migration from risk to 
resilience management for the case of cyber-risks. Linkov et al. 
(2013a) particularly highlights the “dominant paradigm of 
quantitative risk assessment for system design and management” 
and how these pervasive concepts from risk “have encroached 
themselves in the understanding of resilience”.  
Since resilience has a wider scope, and considering that every 
risk analysis is in reality a resilience analysis, albeit limited, there 
is a need to incorporate new tools that are clearly identifiable from 
those directed to merely quantitative risk analysis. This work is 
proposing two approaches towards that end: systemic risk 
analysis, and dynamic simulation. 
The increasing reporting of malware with the potential of 
disrupting operations has different implications for the 
functioning and development of supply chains. 
7.5.2 Cyber-threats are the new normal 
Malware reports expose what is probably the tip of the iceberg 
of a whole ecosystem of programmers developing software to 
exploit supply chain vulnerabilities. Different communities 
related to the development and commercialization of 
vulnerabilities have been documented; groups that show 
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increasing specialization (Leveson, 1995; Zetter, 2014; Bartlett, 
2015; Goodman, 2015). 
Additionally, the extent of these vulnerability-exploiting 
communities and the incentives behind the perpetrators is still 
diffuse or undetermined. Therefore, expecting to understand 
attacker incentives before a decision is not an efficient option due 
to 1) the difficulty of determining those incentives, and 2) 
irrelevance of attacker incentives when designing how a company 
should react and recover from an attack.  
Instead, available resources, their deployment and control 
strategy largely determines the undesired operational effects of a 
cyber-attack irrespective of the attack source. For example, 
vulnerabilities can be “exploited” unwillingly by unsuspecting 
members of an organization, case where there is no intention to 
harm. 
Given the connectedness of the information network 
underlying physical processes, a protection criteria based on the 
direct effects of a vulnerability is incomplete at best and 
ineffective at worst, since in a connected network, vulnerabilities 
have an undesirable effect through the weakest link in the 
organization: connections rather than components become 
paramount (Leveson, 1994). 
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7.5.3 Risk analysis is risky 
Risk analysis not only uncovers vulnerabilities, but makes them 
known. It is as such a double edge sword. The unsafe control 
action analysis detailed in section 5.2 both results in requirements 
for the elimination of hazardous contexts (see Table 35), but at the 
same time exposes in detail different ways in which the current 
system can be driven to an unacceptable loss. 
7.5.4 Modular control versus centralized control 
The concept of hierarchical control structure that has been used 
both in the systemic risk analysis and in the process of arriving to 
a dynamic simulation model has implications for the management 
of complex systems. 
• First, a systems approach with the consideration of 
hierarchical control structures, points towards the design of 
self-regulated modules, providing a base for de-centralized 
control in complex supply chains. In contrast to centralized 
control, the modularity achieved by defining causally-
closed systems, allows the replication of these modules with 
similar sub-systems, for example, by making modular 
requirements for auto-regulation that is applicable to a 
group of similar suppliers. 
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• Second, the control of the organization can be designed and 
thought in terms of hierarchies. Although this has been 
present to some degree in organizations through the use of 
area managers, a hierarchical control structure can allow for 
the conscious design of such a structure, 
• Third the modular design can be pursued at different levels 
of aggregation, as the defined causally-closed system might 
be a production unit or a plant. 
• Fourth, the paradigm change that is required for managing 
a complex system from the point of control structures, 
requires that the some of the education that is currently 
delivered to prospective be adjusted to consider systems 
thinking, analysis and design as a core competency. 
7.5.5 Managers as designers 
Anderson (1993) argued early on that it was management 
problems and not necessarily hardware problem that are many 
times the source of the vulnerabilities in systems that have 
implemented IT Systems. He highlighted the particular problems 
faced by cryptographic systems regarding feedback about their 
failures. In an analogy, Anderson compares the information other 
developers have access to when the systems they are designing 
fail, such as in the case of an airplane. In that case, when there is 
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a crush, it is normally front-page news, with investigators 
studying the scene, and a wide variety of actors processing the 
information at a technical and social level, such as the carrier, the 
manufacturer, and the local aviation authority. This constitutes an 
“institutionalized learning mechanism” which is absent in the case 
of cryptosystems, and probably other security systems. 
The lack of this learning mechanism in the case of security 
systems results in the same mistakes being made over and over 
again, with the advancement of attribution for problem solving 
advancing at a slow pace (Anderson, 1993; Rid et al, 2015). This 
risk is only increased by initiatives such as the outsourcing of IT 
capabilities (Earl, 1996). 
Shutao et al. (2009) lays out derived suggestions that 
managerial skills and partner coordination and support are 
significant drivers in the deriving value of the use of IT in supply 
chains, and that much of that value comes from “fitting the pieces 
together” beyond only having the available technological 
resources. Shutao and his team analysed three key resources 
driving performance improvement in supply chain by the use of 
IT, namely backend integration, managerial skills and partner 
support. Of these,  and based on case studies, managerial skills 
presented the strongest correlation performance improvement, 
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understood as process performance and competitive position, as is 
shown in Figure 97. 
 
Figure 97 Resources in IT enabled SC (Shutao et al., 2009) 
Managers therefore have a function that largely exceeds 
operative functions, such as organizational design (Keough et al., 
1992). The systems thinking tools used in this thesis provide a 
foundation for design. 
7.5.6 Non-historical risk analysis methods 
The speed with which cyber-attacks are occurring, and the slow 
reporting cycle in accepted information sources (see analysis in 
section 2.9.1) point at least towards to possible scenarios. Either: 
• Academia drifts away from practitioners in the study and 
effective management of cyber-risks as academia is not able 
to keep up with the speed required by practitioners, or 
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• Academia explores methods and processes to respond in the 
time and depth required by practitioners. 
The evidence gathered in this thesis points both to a need in 
academia and industry to 1) increase the speed of reporting and to 
2) develop methods which are less history-dependent (see the 
analysis in section 2.9.2). 
The use of the either systems thinking based methods shown in 
this thesis result in a process that is less history-dependent (see 
section 7.4.2). 
7.6 Implications for academia 
7.6.1 Alternative ways to obtain information 
Findings from the SLR indicate that the access to information 
about cyber-attacks is very difficult, driven by incentives that 
continue to exist (see section 2.9.1). A result of this, is that in order 
to access this information, alternate ways of accessing this 
information must be explored. 
Although the relevance of cyber-risks to the supply chain is 
understood (Hult et al., 2014), and it is clear that gathering data of 
cyber-attacks has the potential of decreasing organizational costs 
and of lowering the risks of cyber-attacks, this data gathering has 
been marginal and incomplete (Glaessner et al., 2002), as there are 
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important hurdles which are keeping back organizations from 
contributing to this data collection. These hurdles have been 
categorized as fragmented information (Anderson et al., 2013), 
incentives towards non-disclosure, and inability of risk 
quantification (Cashell et al., 2004). 
The incentives towards non-disclosure are real economic 
incentives experienced by companies that lead them to withhold 
information of cyber-attacks. The costs from a disclosure that has 
been made public may take different forms, such as impact in 
financial markets, effects to the reputation and confidence of an 
organization, litigation concerns related to the cyber-attacks, 
liability concerns derived from the attacks, agent effects such as 
job security, and signals to potential attackers (Cashell et al., 
2004). These costs of disclosure have been summarized the 
following table. 
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Table 39 Costs of disclosure for cyber-risks 
Disclosure cost 
name 
Description Example 
Impact in financial 
markets (Signal to 
market) 
Financial market such as 
stocks and bonds react 
negatively to news of 
cyber- attacks. 
Additionally, banks and 
potential lenders can rank 
organization as being more 
risky die to a previous 
cyber attack 
The World Economic 
Forum has highlighted 
that organizations 
experiencing a cyber-
attack have lost as 
much as 7% of their 
market value even 
before making a cyber-
attack public. 
Effects to 
reputation and 
confidence (Signal 
to supply chain) 
News from a cyber-attack 
affect the reputation or 
brand value of the affected 
organization, or causes 
customers to loose trust in 
the product, opening up an 
advantage for competitors. 
 
Litigations When the consequences of 
a cyber-attack are 
disclosed, any number of 
supply chain agents, 
customers, investors or 
shareholders may use the 
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Disclosure cost 
name 
Description Example 
legal system to attempt the 
recovery of damages. This 
may open up a pattern of 
negligence with effects on 
the reputation. 
Liabilities The investigation of a 
documented cyber-attack 
may result in economic 
sanctions for the company 
due to its accountability, or 
standards for safeguarding 
patent and customer 
records. The latter may 
also result in litigations 
with customers defending 
the privacy of their 
information. 
 
Agent effects Any effect involving a 
person having a role in the 
affected organization, 
where the personal benefit 
and the organizational 
benefit are at conflict, and 
Organization members 
responsible for the 
cyber-attack have 
incentives to conceal 
the attack for fear of 
losing their jobs. 
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Disclosure cost 
name 
Description Example 
where the personal benefit 
option is taken. 
Signals to potential 
attackers 
The public disclosure of a 
cyber-attack may signal 
other potential attackers of 
high organizational 
vulnerabilities towards 
cyber-risks 
 
It is therefore imperative for academia to develop ways of 
circumventing or counteracting these perverse incentives in order 
to increase data gathering. 
7.6.2 Evaluation of sources of research data 
As indicated in the introduction of this thesis, cyber-attacks that 
are occurring to organizations with a frequency and speed such, 
that some of the information from these events has not yet been 
integrated into journals, and it seems unlikely that this will occur 
in future with enough promptness to be used in current research 
(see analysis in section 2.9.1). 
Authors have proposed ways of evaluating website content for 
their validity (Stoker et al., 1994; Banos et al., 2013). The 
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objective of this evaluation is to establish if the information 
required by the research comes from an adequate source. For 
example, a widely used framework for the evaluation of sources 
of information is the CRAAP framework, also known as the 
CRAAP test (Blakeslee, 2004; Wichowski et al. (2012) which 
proposes: 
• C: Currency, i.e., how recent is the source of information, 
in terms of when it was written, and when it was last 
revised. 
• R: Relevance, i.e., whether the information provided by the 
source is within the scope of the project for which the 
information is gathered. 
• A: Authority, i.e., whether the source of information has a 
visible author, the author credentials and website 
credentials, as domains such as “.edu”, “.gov”, “.com” or 
“.org” may have different authority levels. 
• A: Accuracy, i.e., whether the information source strives for 
reliability, truth and accuracy. 
• P: Purpose, i.e., the reasons why the information from the 
source was published, such as to persuade, to entertain, to 
provide facts, or to teach. 
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Therefore, an implication to academia from the results of this 
thesis research, particularly the method described in section 3.7, 
and its results as described in section 4.2, is that the research 
process needs to include new sources of data in a way that is 
accepted by the scientific community. 
7.6.3 Dynamics in the case study process 
Case study method, or the in-depth inquiry into a topic or 
phenomenon within its real-life setting (Case studies in general, 
and particularly about resilient response in supply chains from 
sources such as a cyber-attack, lack a focus on the dynamic 
response for the case being described despite proposals about the 
complementarity of the case study method and a system dynamics 
approach (Papachristos, 2012). 
The use of case study in this research reveals the shortcoming 
in current case study process descriptions and its incomplete 
understanding of “dynamics” during the established data 
gathering and analysis processes. The implication to academia as 
a result of the results in this thesis is an opportunity for collecting 
the dynamics as well as the systemic implications of a case (see 
sections 3.8.3, 3.9.3 and 6.4) to enable distal causality analysis, 
circular causality analysis and dynamic simulation (see section 
6.6) of a cases where reaction over time is relevant. 
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7.6.4 Consolidate cyber-resilience research community 
The multiple unconnected sources found the SLR about cyber-
resilience (see Table 12), as well as the very few frameworks that 
had any connection to resilience frameworks (see analysis in 
section 2.7.4) point to the lack of a established community for the 
research of cyber-resilience in the supply chain.  
Given that the cyber-threat is not likely to decrease, the 
implication to academia is that a consolidated research group on 
cyber-resilience can better drive a structured research process. 
7.6.5 Research methods applicable to other attack types 
The dynamic research methods applied to cyber-risks and 
cyber-resilience, are in every way applicable to other types of 
risks that are experienced by organizations. Given the particular 
characteristics of cyber-risks, it is that a structural approach is 
required, while other risks such as financial or environmental, 
having physical restrictions in the complexity these can reach, can 
be treated through localized strategies, an organization would 
nevertheless benefit from understanding the structural design that 
is exposing it to these risks.  
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7.7 Study limitations 
The dynamics simulation was based on a system dynamics 
model of the IP generation process, starting from a case study 
analysis of the event. The aspects that are discussed in this section 
include the way in which the case study data was gathered 
(including the hurdles for data gathering and the special nature of 
the data that was gathered), as well as from the results that were 
obtained through the simulation and the implications these results 
have on practitioner  
7.7.1 External validity of systems-thinking methods 
Despite measures are taken in this thesis to address the validity 
of the results (see section 3.10), particularly the external validity 
of the results is not robust. The approach of this research is a 
revelatory approach. By using systems-thinking methods to 
specific case studies, the characteristics of the tool were analysed 
to identify the degree to which these addressed the method gaps 
revealed after the SLR. 
It is therefore a limitation of the process shown in this part of 
the thesis. This limitation does not restrict answering the research 
questions that give rise to the research, as the questions deal with 
the method.  
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7.7.2 Case study limitations 
The case study presents a practical instance where to develop 
the system dynamics method starting from an example of a cyber-
attack actually having affected a company. The case study method 
relies on the information provided by the case company, and 
calibrated against values found in literature. Different aspects can 
be identified as limitations: 
• Bias limitations. The information source contains bias. The 
effect of the cyber-attack that resulted in the loss of IP is a 
self-reported value, which could be subject to manipulation, 
for example, as a way to argue other negative results as 
derived from the cyber-attack, while these might have other 
origins. Despite this effect is not something this thesis sets 
out to measure, the general behaviour of the performance 
measure after a disruption (in this case the sales and profit 
gaps) agrees with the behaviour seen from the simulation 
method, and can be directly traced to and explained from 
the structure that was developed for this model. 
• Dynamic-focus limitations. The information as presented 
does not collect information about dynamics, i.e., how 
variables in the system change over time, what accumulates 
versus what flows in the system, and what are the feedback 
loops. The dynamics for the case is rather inferred from the 
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incident descriptions. This is not an uncommon approach, 
particularly with groups that do not have systems thinking 
training (Vennix, 1996) 
7.7.3 Systemic risk analysis  
It has been argued that despite its ability to identify and 
structure contributing factors to “accidents” when dealing with 
complex systems, the use of systemic risk analysis unfortunately 
has some drawbacks that have to be considered for any current 
application of the method (Bennett, 2016): 
• Systems thinking-informed analyses are intellectually 
demanding, partly because of the paradigm change it 
requires to understand and model a problem by looking at 
aggregate effects, hierarchies, constraints and process 
models, (Leveson, 2011) 
• Systems thinking-informed analyses can be potentially time 
consuming, particularly if these are attempted without the 
proper training or guidance. However, as it has been 
indicated in this thesis, the time required for this process 
once a basic knowledge for implementation has been 
attained, is substantially lower than other established 
methods. 
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• Systems thinking-informed analysis can be unpopular with 
interested parties such as politicians, constituents, 
managements, shareholders, regulators or journalists, as an 
endogenous causality method reveals that it is the decisions 
of the members of the system that are likely to drive an 
unwanted behaviour. This is an reason for the 
recommended use of group building techniques during the 
process (Vennix, 1996; Leveson, 2011) 
• Bennet (2016) has mentioned systems thinking-informed 
analysis as more costly, although no evidence has been 
provided of where this extra cost actually comes from. No 
costs were calculated for this thesis, despite the finding that 
the resources needed for the analysed case, were lower. 
7.7.4 System Dynamics modelling 
Despite the advantages that a system dynamics approach offers 
to organizations, it has several important hurdles to overcome 
before its application is more widespread. These difficulties have 
to do with the application of the method and with the method 
itself. 
The application of the method and the motivation to implement 
it are at odds, as: 
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“In a normal corporate setting, the window of opportunity for 
introducing and understanding their dynamics is very narrow. An 
organization that has no problems and thinks it is doing just fine 
doesn’t have really any motivation to go out and look for trouble 
it has not experienced. Then it reaches a point where it sees the 
handwriting on the wall, and it might be amenable to try to 
understand the nature of their problems, but it may be a very short 
time after that when the crisis is so deep that there is no time to 
study it, and in fact no time to remedy it, and so you sometimes 
find these organizations simply going out of business because they 
haven’t thought early enough about what they were doing” 
(Forrester, 1999) 
The challenge as indicated by Jay Forrester is thus one of 
application, of finding the correct moment when the users of the 
models and their results are most receptive to them. This 
receptivity to the model and the utility of the model are according 
to Forrester, not in synchrony. 
Regarding the method itself, it has been described as 
intellectually demanding, and requires the involvement of the end 
users, particularly when it reveals counterintuitive insights 
(Keough et al., 1992). A result of this, is that its application is 
intimately linked to group model building (Vennix, 1996). 
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7.8 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter presented an analysis of the results that had been 
described in chapters 4, 5 and 6, the research questions were 
answered and implications to industry and academia are described 
from these results. The chapter ended by describing limitations of 
the research methods used in this thesis. 
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8 Summary of contributions 
This chapter describes the contributions that have been 
presented throughout this thesis. To facilitate the presentation, the 
contributions have been categorized in two qualitative 
dimensions, 1) according to a strategic–operative spectrum and 2) 
according to an academia–industry spectrum. Beyond the content 
of the contributions themselves, the placements of these along the 
two dimensions is the subjective appreciation of the author, and 
reveal the relative placement of these contributions to each other 
rather than any absolute placement within these scales. 
An academic contribution is related to advancement or 
implications to a research method or theory, while industrial 
contribution is related to advancement or implications to an 
operative method. A measure of this spectrum is the answer to a 
question such as “how relevant or applicable is this contribution 
to an active company?” The stronger the positive answer, the 
further towards the “industrial” end in the spectrum that the 
contribution is placed. 
A strategic contribution is related to “plans towards a goal” in 
the long-term by a higher hierarchical level in the organization 
(Merriam-Webster, 2017) while the operational contribution is 
directed towards actions in the short term by a lower hierarchical 
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level in the organization. A measure of this spectrum is the answer 
to a question such as “How high a hierarchical level is responsible 
for deciding on this contribution?” The higher the required 
hierarchy, the further towards “strategy” end in the spectrum that 
the contribution is placed. 
Figure 98 represents these two dimensions as a two by two 
matrix, laying out the different contributions within this matrix, 
contributions that are discussed next. 
 
Figure 98 Thesis contributions and categories 
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8.1 The nature of cyber-risks to the supply chain 
The archival and documental research uncovered different 
ways in which operations are disrupted when a cyber-risk 
materializes. Even though the analysis was not exhaustive, as the 
research strategy did not aim for one, the analysis to identify 
categories is nevertheless a contribution since: 
• The analysis provides a framework of disruption 
mechanism classes that serves as a way of understanding 
new attacks, and which can be updated by new cyber-risk-
related operational disruption types (see section 4.2). 
• The analysis provides relevant differences with other 
supply chain risk types, and thus lays a justification towards 
the use of systemic risks and simulation analyses for 
managing these particular types of risks (see section 7.1.1) 
• The analysis describes different structures through which 
cyber-attacks take place, providing base information for 
modelling and simulation of these cyber-attacks to explore 
reaction types (see section 4.2). 
• The analysis describes the differences between cyber-risks 
and other risks in the supply chain, information needed as 
justification for the need of complementary methods for 
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cyber-risk management both in academic and industrial 
communities of interest (see section 7.1.2). 
Cyber-attacks, by making unauthorized use of existing 
organizational infrastructure highlight that companies are exposed 
by omission, i.e., what companies have failed to do, at least to a 
similar degree as from commission, i.e., what has been done. 
The examples seem to show that no matter how many walls 
continue to be built around organizations for protection against 
cyber-risks, this effort is defeated by the growth in complexity of 
connections between members of the system and with the 
environment. 
8.2 Definition of cyber-resilience 
The literature research gathered multiple definitions of cyber-
resilience, through an analysis, a synthesis definition was 
proposed (See section 2.7.1): 
“The capability of a system to minimize the effects on expected 
performance of a disruption caused by the manifestation of a 
cyber-risk” 
This definition is a concise description of the characteristics of 
cyber-resilience 
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• It is a capability, which denotes the potential of reaching a 
condition, and it is thus an emergent property (see section 
6.5), 
• It has a focus on the expected performance, and as such, 
disruption is defined from the expectations, 
• It is a counteraction to the manifestation of a cyber-risk 
8.3 Gaps in extant literature about cyber-resilience 
As a result of the systematic literature review, this thesis 
described gaps in the literature regarding cyber risks (see section 
2.9). The structure proposed consisted in gaps along three 
categories, 1) The thing being managed, 2) the methods used to 
manage 3) and the people using the methods of management. This 
list of gaps and resulting research questions is shown in  
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Table 14. This categorization provides a research agenda for 
this domain, part of which is advanced through this thesis work. 
8.4 Systems thinking for managing cyber-risks 
In the search for effective tools to manage the response to 
unexpected events, academia in collaboration with industrial 
partners have developed a rich body of risk management 
frameworks during the past four decades and resilience 
frameworks for the last two decades. However, given the 
particular nature of cyber-risks, and the developing characteristics 
of the attacks against information networks with operational 
consequences, traditional risk analysis techniques appear to be ill-
suited for the challenges presented by cyber-risks in complex 
supply networks. By focusing on the expected resulting 
behaviours and pre-existing capacities required for a resilient 
response, traditional frameworks comparatively overlook the 
capabilities required to activate, drive and control the response.  
This work proposes a representation of circular causality for 
understanding both the exposure of supply chains to disruption of 
operations, and the development over time of the response to 
disruptions in the supply chain. 
This contrasts directly with the mainstream approaches of 
representing disruption exposure and reaction as a linear process. 
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Paulsson et al. (2011) still considered linear approaches to 
understanding reaction, as seen in Figure 99. 
 
Figure 99 Disruption risk exposure (Paulsson et al., 2011) 
Cross-disciplinary approach to resilience and the need for 
System Dynamics specialists. The information flow structures 
represented as a result of the SD model require a cross-
disciplinary focus in an organization. This is an evidence of an 
organization-wide approach when understanding and designing 
an organization for resilient response. 
A dynamic focus for designing a resilient response is an 
iterative, arduous process. If anyone expected to find a “formula” 
for understanding the dynamics in an organization, they might 
have been disappointed. The representation of the dynamics in the 
behaviours of an organization requires the understanding and 
application practice in concepts such as circular causality, stocks 
and flows, polarity and feedback loop types. Despite these 
concepts being easily related to experience once introduced, their 
application to a model is a process which has a steep learning 
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curve. The work here presented is aimed at laying a basic structure 
for understanding resilience, and future work will progress in the 
inclusion of long term structures that lead to a resilient response, 
and that are generalizable. 
8.4.1 Systems thinking for supply chains 
The STPA process, developed from the work by prof. Nancy 
Leveson (2011), despite having had applications in complex 
systems regarding production processes or had not been applied 
to the case of supply chains.  
The process developed in this thesis, particularly the results 
shown in chapters 5 and 0, are a contribution to supply chain 
management by: 
• Identifying a system structure of controllers, control 
actions, (See section 3.8.2) 
• Identifying sources of risk in the structure (see section 5.2) 
• Identifying levels of hierarchy (see section 5.2 and 6.5) 
• Identifying levels of aggregation, resulting in the 
understanding of resilience as an emergent property only at 
certain levels of aggregation (see section 6.5) 
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8.4.2 Endogenous exposure 
By considering “exposure” as a system state of “having no 
protection from a financial loss” (Merriam-Webster, 2017), 
endogenous exposure is the understanding of the sources of 
exposure as resulting from the structure that exists in the system, 
instead of looking for these disruptions from outside sources.  
For the preparation phase, the endogenous exposure was 
described through the application of the systemic risk analysis 
method. The endogenous exposure was proposed as a measure of 
risk as derived from the current design of the supply chain, 
through the mapping of system structure and the identification of 
conditions that led the system to behave in an unwanted manner 
through the established control actions designed into this system. 
These “Unsafe Control Actions” reflected how the existing system 
structure could lead to an unwanted event irrespective of the 
trigger, as the analysis would be unchanged whether the trigger is 
from an internal or an external source, and whether the trigger is 
premeditated or accidental. 
This approach changes the exogenous focus of analysis in some 
fundamental ways, as with an endogenous approach: 
• The threat is not considered from outside the system but 
from within its own structure,  
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• Intentionality is not a relevant factor of analysis, 
• The objective of the process is no longer system protection, 
rather system design, and 
• Historical information is not fundamental for the analysis of 
endogenous exposure, a crucial advantage when dealing 
with situations for which historical information is restricted 
or non-existent.  
The differences between an exogenous and endogenous 
approach to risk, is summarized in Table 40. 
 
Table 40 Exogenous vs. endogenous risk assessment 
 
Aspect Exogenous approach Endogenous approach
Source of risk Outside the boundaries of the system.
Inside the boundaries of the 
system
Method of 
analysis
Rank the risk from external 
sources and protect system 
from external sources
Rank unsafe control actions 
and design the system for 
better response.
Risk Ranking Probability and Severity Number of Unsafe Control Actions
Relevance of 
Intentionality
Relevant for calculations of 
probability Not relevant.
Relevance of past 
events / Need for 
historical 
evidence
Past events essential to 
determine probabilities of 
future events / Historical 
evidence is fundamental
Past events may point out 
undetected unsafe control 
actions to calculate relative 
probabilities (Historical 
evidence is not necessary)
Objective System protection System design
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8.5 Dynamic simulation of cyber-risks 
As foreseen by Jay Forrester as early as 1965 (Forrester, 1965), 
the activity of managers in an organization is related to design 
rather than to operation. However, “lacking a systemic vision of 
causality [managers] have no way of knowing why policies often 
produce results directly opposite to those intended. But we do 
know this happens – all the time” (Keough et al., 1992). The work 
presented in this thesis contributes directly to improving this lack 
of understanding. By testing systemic tools to uncover and 
structure systemic causalities behind the response to cyber-risks, 
it is expected that management will both increase activities 
towards the identification and understanding of these structures, 
and as a result will intensify the creation for ways in which these 
structures can be better designed for the objectives of the 
organization. 
Additionally, the dynamics are part of the information 
contained in the members of the system. The models that members 
of an organization have about how this organization works, 
conditions how this organization is run: “if men define situations 
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as real, they are real in their consequences31” (Thomas et al., 
1928). Additionally, “people tend to look or information which 
confirms their viewpoint rather than to look for evidence that 
might refute it” (Hogharth, 1987). Therefore the relevance of an 
explicit representation of those mental models for consensus, 
analysis and improvement cannot be overstated. The methods 
used in this thesis present the implementation of a way for 
representing these mental models. 
 
8.6 Cyber-resilience as an emergent property 
Resilience in general, and cyber-resilience in particular, 
through the dynamic model and its hierarchical structure 
representation, are understood as emergent properties (see section 
3.2.1), as understood from a specific hierarchical level where this 
emergent property makes sense. Yet, the dynamic model 
presented in this thesis shows the need to understand the 
underlying structures that result in this resilience. However, the 
measurement of the resilience according to published methods 
                                              
 
31 This is known as the “Thomas Theorem”. 
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does not point to ways in which to identify particular resilience 
values that are more convenient for an organization. Shorter and 
shallower consequences are better, but between shorter or 
shallower, no clear distinction can be made. 
If cyber-resilience is understood as an emergent property, i.e., 
it is the result of multiple behaviours that are collectively 
understood from a specific hierarchical level, then "too much" or 
"too little" resilience loses meaning. Shape is an emergent 
property for example. In this case “too much shape” is not a 
sensible description. Rather, the discussion requires a different 
paradigm, of identifying the shape (in this case the cyber-
resilience) needed for a particular objective. 
8.7 Dynamic analysis in the case study process 
As was discussed in section 7.6.2, the “dynamics” that is to be 
considered for the analysis of the evolution of a system’s response 
over time is far more than what is currently understood as 
“dynamics” within the case study research method. This partial 
understanding of the “dynamics” concept in the case study method 
results in important data being overlooked during the research 
information gathering process. This information, suitable for 
modelling structure and simulating behaviour, has the potential of 
expanding the descriptive and exploratory nature of the traditional 
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case study (Yin, 1994) to applications into the structured-
explanatory and evaluative-predictive applications. 
The use of systems thinking during data gathering and analysis 
for a case study research, as presented in this thesis is an example 
of this approach, and illustrates the application of a system 
dynamics strategy for structuring and conducting the interview, 
for analysing the data, and for comparison between cases. 
8.8 Contribution to theory and theory development 
According to Boer et al. (2015), the development of a new 
theory is difficult and therefore “research in management 
disciplines tends towards contributing to existing theory, or using 
existing theory to explain phenomena, rather than developing new 
theory”. The approach that has been taken in this thesis, based on 
Systems Thinking and through the use of the System Dynamics 
method, takes the traditional approach started by Jay Forrester, of 
building the theory about a phenomenon, from the observable 
world. Therefore, despite not presenting a contribution to the 
theory behind the methods used in this thesis, there are several 
contributions respect to the theory of the phenomena that this 
thesis is describing. This process is more in tune to the process 
suggested by Schemenner (Boer et al., 2015) of “discovery” rather 
than prematurely advancing one theory or another. Five relevant 
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contributions to theory and theory development derived from this 
work are mentioned next. 
First, the systemic risk analysis in section 5 defines 
mechanisms that contribute to an accident, in this case, a cyber-
event that requires a resilient response from the organization. This 
proposal is based on the implicit knowledge of the members in the 
organization, and can be potentially improved in future research 
efforts to cumulatively obtain a sound theory for the occurrence 
of cyber-attacks in organizations. This is a new contribution, as 
the literature review presented in this thesis did not reveal the 
proposal of such mechanisms involved in cyber-attacks in 
organizations. Theory development will follow as more such 
examples are analysed. A concept that is derived from this process 
is the endogenous exposure concept, and a method that results 
from this process when considering the concept of endogenous 
exposure, is the calculation of endogenous exposure. 
Second, and in the same way as in the systemic risk analysis, 
system dynamics modelling provides, based on field data, a 
structure that leads to an observed behaviour, and as such is a 
contribution to theory development about structures that result in 
a resilient behaviour to cyber-events, similar to those presented by 
Fink et al. (2014) in its capacity for quantification, but more 
similar to the model by Tran et al. (2016), as the resilient response 
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is the complete result of the structure present in the system. As 
such, the results of this part of the research support the view that 
an endogenous explanation for the cyber-resilient behaviour is a 
plausible theory for describing the phenomenon of cyber-
resilience, and that it can eventually lead to the prescriptive 
application of modelling towards these events. 
Third, this thesis gathered descriptive data, again in the process 
of “discovery” related to the nature of cyber risks, was analysed 
in this thesis. This analysis performed in this thesis from that 
information, related to how cyber risks differ from other supply 
chain risks, is a contribution to theory development regarding 
cyber risks in supply chains, particularly with respect to their 
effect in the organization response to cyber-events. 
Fourth, the thesis identifies shortcomings in the case study 
method with respect to the gathering of information over time, of 
the case’s dynamics. This shortcoming is inherent in the 
definitions that are used for the case study. For example, Saunders 
et al. (2016) indicates that the case study “the case study research 
sets out to study the dynamics of the topic being studied”, with 
these dynamics understood as “the interactions between the 
subject of the case and its context”. This is a very restricted and 
vague definition, as there are dynamics inside the subject of study 
(if this subject was, say, a supply chain). This vague definition 
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does not consider other authors who have defined the dynamics in 
systems very precisely, as consisting of accumulations, circular 
causality in the form of feedback loops and resulting meta-
structures such as delays. It is therefore plausible that the current 
definition of a case study will leave useful information in the field. 
An expanded definition of a case study should consider specific, 
generic structures that can be identified by the actors of the system 
or subject of the study. 
Finally, the thesis proposes a new theory of resilience from the 
scope of cyber-resilience. This theory has the starting point in the 
“endogenous nature of cyber risks” and defines the cyber risks as 
a consequence of structures existing in the organization that allow 
a cyber-event. These structures, akin to an open door in a building 
we want to keep inaccessible, can lead to cyber events that need a 
resilient response, both from external or internal agents. In fact, 
from the point of view of this endogenous theory, the source of 
the attacks is irrelevant. 
8.9 Summary of chapter 
This chapter described the contributions that had been 
presented throughout this thesis. A categorization was proposed 
for these contributions, and these were described in detail. 
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9 Conclusions and potential research 
This chapter presents the conclusion of this work by making an 
overview of the thesis process, and the context from which the 
problem statement was proposed, the methods used and the 
conclusions that were reached. The chapter ends by proposing 
areas of further research derived from this work. 
9.1 Conclusion 
The overall objective of this thesis was the derivation of tools 
for the improved management of cyber-risks in supply chains (see 
Table 1 for a list of the objectives). The tools used in this thesis 
were derived starting from a scientific analysis of the current state 
of knowledge about the topic domain, and of empirical data about 
cyber-risks. A structure of enquiry was followed by initially 
understanding the distinctive nature of cyber-risks with respect to 
other supply chain risks, and finally by developing tools that 
address some of these gaps. 
The findings of the research are in three main domains. First, 
the research reveals relevant gaps in the traditional methods 
available for the management of cyber risks, as these do not 
consider behaviour over time (dynamic behaviour), rely on 
inadequate or difficult reporting of events, depend on historical 
data to manage unknown or new attacks, and adopt a silo-
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approach for managing a problem that is cross-disciplinary. 
Second, the analysis finds differences between cyber-risks and 
other supply chain risks, such as the capacity of disruptions from 
cyber risks to go undetected, the high reproduction fidelity of 
cyber-risks, the capacity of cyber risks to affect different 
geographical locations simultaneously, or the complexity of 
cyber-attacks. Finally, the research reveals that the novel use of 
methods based in systems thinking for managing cyber-risks 
simultaneously address gaps found in traditional methods, and 
provide a foundation for thinking about cyber-risks not as an 
outside threat, but rather created by the supply chain itself, as the 
result of incomplete requirements to the supply chain design. 
The implications for practitioners suggest that supply chains 
can design the behaviours they require through cross-disciplinary, 
simulation-based techniques, and that modularity helps to manage 
complexity. The implications for academics suggest that reporting 
methods regarding cyber-attacks have to be adjusted to match the 
quick development of these threats, a cross-disciplinary cyber-risk 
and resilience research community needs to be identified and 
fostered, and current research methods need to be expanded to 
integrate dynamic systems thinking into the data gathering and 
analysis. 
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From the understanding that supply chains are a network of 
processes for the production and distribution of goods and 
services, based on underlying information flows and storage, this 
thesis claimed as a contribution that an “endogenous” approach of 
causality for understanding cyber-risks results in actionable 
insights independent of the source of threat to operations. 
This work argues that despite the relevant advances that have 
been made in regard to Information Technology (IT) in 
organizations (both towards enabling systems to communicate 
and store data, and to allow collaboration more accurately) and of 
risk management towards IT and supply chain management 
(SCM), these are misdirected due to the particular nature of the 
threat presented by cyber-attacks, problem that is to a large extent 
one of social decisions and organizational design towards timely 
and effective reaction (cyber-resilience) that actively involves 
other areas of the organization beyond only IT management.  
Traditional approaches for solutions to cyber-risks rely 
predominantly on IT, expecting to build walls around the 
organization to make access more difficult for attackers. These are 
incomplete at best and misguided at worst, as they do not explore 
the actual causes that are leading to the breaches, by pursuing and 
temporarily solving only the symptoms. In this way, organizations 
not only enable and provide incentives for an ever-increasing 
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stream of defence artefacts that decrease organizational flexibility 
and increase dependence on IT-consultants, but also perpetuate 
the real underlying problem that lies behind the unwanted 
behaviour i.e., cyber-attacks, and which relates to the existing 
structures that make these attacks possible. 
By sequentially answering the main research question, this 
work derives the proposal of systems-thinking-based approaches 
to understanding and managing cyber-risks. These approaches are 
characterized by considering the supply chain’s own structure and 
not outside forces, as the main focus when understanding an 
unwanted behaviour such as the disruption from a cyber-attack. A 
systems thinking approach is the philosophical pivot point that 
justifies a change in focus from protecting systems against outside 
threats to understanding the reactions of systems according to 
their structure, changed focus that will increase the likelihood of 
a supply chains reacting as intended and recovering swiftly to 
whatever disruption materializes. 
9.2 Potential research 
Several avenues of further research are opened through the 
results presented in this work. Some of these are discussed next. 
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9.2.1 Exploration of other data gathering processes 
The process chosen for researching the nature of cyber-risks in 
their effects towards operational disruption was through an 
archival and documentary research process. Other possibilities 
can be explored, for example: 
• Forming strategic alliances with companies or industrial 
unions, to obtain direct information when a cyber-attack has 
been detected to gather primary data as contingency plans 
are implemented by the company under attack. However, 
before this is possible, 1) companies have to be willing to 
share data, often sensitive data while an attack is happening, 
and 2) companies have to understand the role of resilience 
design and management engineering, beyond an IT 
response, as the strategic option to take. 
• Producing a survey to be answered by companies about the 
cyber-attacks they have experienced. However, 1) as was 
seen in the methodology section, a survey can deliver 
historical information that is limited or inexistent in the case 
of cyber-risks. As a result this is not an indication of any 
sort about the attacks that could be experienced in future, 
and 2) surveys have to be complemented by directed 
interviews considering a dynamic framework, to gather data 
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that is useful in the management of organizational response 
to cyber-risks. 
9.2.2 Improvement of the models 
The models that were considered for the research have 
assumptions and simplifications which limit their applicability 
and thus offer an opportunity for further research. 
For the case of the systemic risk analysis, despite the risk 
analysis model having followed a clear process, the level of 
aggregation is a choice in the analysis that can be improved. For 
example: 
• The chosen controllers respond to a first level of analysis 
that can be improved to consider, for example, the inner 
structure of the plant, finance procurement and warehousing 
as explicit controllers, and the understanding of how 
communication design can be improved. It is always 
possible to go to increasing levels of detail when dealing 
with human action, yet it has been found that modelling 
human behaviour in detail is difficult to achieve (Leveson, 
2011). As a result some level of aggregation has been the 
norm when modelling. 
• Use of CAST for analysis of past attack events can 
potentially reveal information about the sensibility of 
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existing supply chain structures, for the prioritization of 
improvement actions. 
For the case of the system dynamics model, the model that was 
developed for this thesis, is an approximation that can benefit 
from a series of improvements, such as  
• The calculation of customer base 
• The performance decision algorithm. Despite the case 
having an attack indication signal declared through the 
exogenous information delivered by the federal agency that 
told ABC industries of an attack taking place, this needs not 
be so. Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) are 
gaining ground as tools for continuous condition 
monitoring and discrimination of states that are unusual or 
likely to lead to a disruption. Therefore a place for 
improvement is through the consideration of alternate 
algorithms within the performance tracker, to identify 
ranges of operation where these might make sense, and 
situations where these are most effective. 
9.2.3 Systems analysis education in management  
The models presented and developed in this work, despite 
diverse simplifications and assumptions during their creation and 
analysis, evidence the ever increasing complex nature of the 
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organizations that need to be designed and managed. Additionally 
the dynamic way in which the systems are studied in this work 
(i.e., these evolve over time) has shown that this behaviour can 
quickly exceed any understanding that can be provided by 
intuition alone. 
Models have shown their contribution in different aspects, from 
providing a method to structure the mental models present in the 
members of the organization, to proposing an explicit way of 
representing these mental models for collaboration and alignment. 
However, the gap between the usefulness of these tools and the 
perception by management is considerable.  
Different authors have put forward reasons why this is as come 
to be the case. Alleged reasons include for example the difficulty 
for management to focus on medium to long term simulation 
while at the same time having short term objectives and 
operational pressure; the non-linear nature of the system 
modelling process with a steep learning curve. 
The communication to companies about the usefulness of 
understanding the dynamic nature of the organizations that need 
to be managed, is unsurprisingly a slow one, to which this work 
expects to contribute, but which needs an available knowledge 
base both among managers and among researchers. For this, it is 
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proposed that the education of dynamics, and particularly system 
dynamic modelling and simulation be included in the basic 
management engineering education curriculum. This has been 
advanced by universities around the world such as the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Delft University of 
Technology, the University of Bergen, the University of 
Manchester, the National University of Singapore, and 
Stellenbosch University in South Africa. 
9.2.4 Cyber-risk from a management perspective.  
The research that was carried out in this thesis explored the 
concept of cyber-risks beyond its technical implications, and as 
the literature review clearly showed, the problem of cyber-risks is 
one that is more about collaboration and organizational design that 
about protection and merely information safeguarding. 
This work is expected to serve as a stepping stone towards 
further research into the relevance of management engineering, of 
the design of the organization that are being created, into the 
effective prevention and response of risks such as cyber-risks. 
9.2.5 Incentives in cyber-risk information sharing 
The research in both the systematic literature review and the 
archival research evidenced a lack of information about cyber-
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risks as derived from cyber-attacks to supply chains. This 
restricted information access, an organizational behaviour, 
according the systems thinking framework is the result of an 
underlying structure. Evidence about the damaging market effects 
of a cyber-attack disclosure on the company that is making the 
disclosure, points towards strong incentives to limit or delay 
disclosure. The exploration of these incentive structure, and how 
it can be influenced or changed for more effective data sharing is 
an area open for research. 
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11 Appendix 
11.1 Glossary of terms 
This glossary gathers the terminology that has been used in this 
thesis in regard to cyber-risk and resilience in the global supply 
chain. It was found convenient to include this glossary, as the 
audiences that will be reading this work come from a variety of 
backgrounds, including SCM, ITM, and R&RM for example. The 
sources have been indicated as far as possible from scientific 
sources, otherwise the relevant practitioner magazines or news 
outlet websites have been mentioned.  
Accident (w.r.t. Safety) An undesired and unplanned (but not necessarily 
unexpected) event that results in at least a specified level 
of loss (Leveson, 1995), such as loss of human life or 
human injury, property damage, environmental 
pollution, mission loss, and economic loss. (Leveson, 
2011) 
Adaptability Capacity of a Supply Chain to adjust its structure to 
changes in its environment, by developing new plans, 
taking new actions or by modifying behaviours. Closely 
related to Flexibility. Considered by some authors as one 
of the five characteristics of resilience (Rodin, 2014).  
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CISO – Chief 
Information Security 
Officer 
A title associated with the highest ranking individual 
whose sole function within an organization is to manage 
an organization-wide security program (Bayuk et al., 
2012). 
Computer emergency 
response team (CERT) 
An organization whose mission is to receive reports of 
cyber incidents and gather a team qualified and 
motivated to resolve them (Bayuk et al., 2012). 
Crimeware Software created for executing cybercrimes as a service, 
e.g., denial of service attacks. 
Cryptocurrency It is a medium of exchange using cryptographic systems 
to both secure transactions, and to control the creation 
of additional units of the currency. It is considered a 
digital asset. Some of the more successful 
cryptocurrencies include Bitcoin, and more recently, 
Ethereum. 
Cryptology It is the science of code and cypher systems, widely used 
to protect communications. Techniques such as end-to-
end encryption have become a standard in the protection 
of digital information transfer. 
Cryptographic systems Communication systems which apply cryptological 
techniques to their communication protocols. 
Current Supply Chain Network structure and configuration of the supply chain 
that considers the Agents, Infrastructure, Procedures and 
Protocols necessary for its steady state operation. 
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Cyber-physical system [Definition Pending] 
Cyber-risk Business Risks derived from the interaction of 
information technology and supply chain operations. 
Cyber-security It is the ability to control access to networked systems, 
and the information they contain, referring to methods 
of using people, process and technology to prevent, 
detect and recover from damage to confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information in cyber space 
(Bayuk et al., 2012). Cyber-security includes the overall 
coordinated measures and actions taken by potential 
targets to prevent, prepare, analyse and respond to the 
threats their information systems are facing due to 
cyber-attacks (Katz, 2013). 
Cyber-space The global collection of electronic circuits which allow 
people and systems to connect without physical 
proximity or connectivity. 
Cyber-warfare Actions by a nation-state or international organization to 
attack and attempt to damage another nation’s computer 
or information networks through, for example, computer 
viruses or denial-of-service attacks [RAND 2017] 
Cyber-weapon Malicious software that can be used to access host 
computer networks by a foreign agent, for the purpose 
of gathering strategic information or to cause disruption 
in the activities of the host  
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Disruption Conditions that will cause a supply chain event, process 
or activity to vary beyond its thresholds of normality. 
Disruption, deliberate A Disruption that is intentionally generated to provoke 
change through the Adaptability of the supply chain 
without destabilizing the whole system, or to lose its 
ability to self-regulate. 
Disruption Period Time over which the influence of a disruption is 
experienced in a supply chain. This period begins at the 
start of the Disruption Trigger and continues until the 
moment when the supply chain has a performance value 
and trend within its normal functioning variability. 
Disruption Trigger Event when an External Disruptor acts upon an exposed 
Supply chain interphase. 
Disruptive Event Event when a Disruption is occurring in a supply chain. 
Error (w.r.t. Safety) A design flaw or a deviation from a desired or intended 
state (Leveson, 1995) 
External Disruptor Agent external to the Current supply chain which as the 
ability of acting upon a Supply chain interphase to cause 
a Disruption. 
Flexibility Capacity of a supply chain to apply existing resources to 
new or additional purposes or roles. Closely related to 
Adaptability. 
Operative Module Set of self-contained operations within a supply chain 
that can be combined, through their Supply chain 
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interphases, to form more complex supply chain 
structures. 
Phishing Use of electronic communication such as emails or 
webpages to fraudulently attempt to obtain confidential 
information from an unsuspecting party. Information 
sought may include user names, passwords and credit 
card details, for example. 
Reliability (Safety) The probability that a component of a system will 
perform its intended purpose for a specific time and 
under specific environmental conditions (Leveson, 
1995) 
Resilience It is the ability of a supply chain to continue its activities 
during and after a disrupting event, with as little 
disruption to its downstream performance as possible. It 
is a dynamic concept that is measured and evaluated 
over the Disruption Period. Other definitions include: 
“The ability of a system to return to its original state or 
move to a new, more desirable state after being 
disturbed” (Christopher et al., 2003), “Shock absorption 
between stages in the supply chain” (Sheffi & Rice, 
2005). Concept originally borrowed from Materials 
engineering as a measure of the quantity of energy that 
can be absorbed by a material without creating a 
permanent distortion (Marks, 2016). 
Risk Exposure or lack of protection to danger harm or loss 
from a Disruptive Event. This exposure is created by the 
structure of the supply chain. Risk is a static concept, 
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and its description and quantification say nothing about 
how it will dynamically react to a Disruption. 
Socio Technical 
Systems (STS) 
It is an approach to complex organizational work design 
that recognizes the interaction between people and 
technology in workspaces. The notion of STS was 
created in the context of labour studies by the Tavistock 
institute in London at the end of the 1950’s (Emery et 
al., 1960). 
Spoofing An event whereby a hacker successfully passes as a 
different member of the supply process by falsifying 
some data, and thereby gaining an illegitimate 
advantage 
Supply chain interphase Transition point in a supply chain where there is 
exchange of goods or information between two 
established Operative Modules, and with option of 
human influence. 
System Dynamics For a supply chain, it is the characteristic that supply 
chain structure leads to its endogenous behaviour over 
time, and that this system structure in constituted by 
processes with non-linear causal relationships, feedback 
loops, delays and inertia generators. 
Zero-Day Vulnerability An undisclosed or unknown vulnerability in computer 
software that becomes known only when hackers have 
made use of it to cause adverse effects. It is called zero-
day because, due to lack of information, the software 
author has no time (zero-day) to develop a patch or 
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workarounds to mitigate its effects before the attack is 
carried out. An example of a famous case that features 
the use of zero-day vulnerabilities is the Stuxnet attack 
(Kushner, 2013) which used 6 different zero-day 
vulnerabilities to disable control systems in the 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) different 
nuclear plants. 
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11.2 Research protocol – Dynamic model 
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11.3 List of Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) 
CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Confirm 
payment order 
Plant's 
Bank Plant 
Not providing Order Payment 
Confirmation when there has 
been a supplier payment order 
is hazardous 
Confirm 
payment order 
Plant's 
Bank Plant 
Providing Order Payment 
Confirmation when there has 
not been a supplier payment 
order is hazardous 
Confirm 
payment order 
Plant's 
Bank Plant 
Providing Order Payment 
Confirmation before there has 
been a supplier payment order 
is hazardous 
Order Supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Not providing Supplier Payment 
Order when there has been 
confirmation of product 
reception and validation is 
hazardous 
Order Supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Providing Supplier Payment 
Order when there has not been 
a product reception is 
hazardous 
Order Supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Providing Supplier Payment 
Order when there has not been 
product validation is hazardous 
Order Supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Providing Supplier Payment 
Order before there has been 
product reception is hazardous 
Order Supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Providing Supplier Payment 
Order before there has been 
product validation is hazardous 
Order Supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Providing Supplier Payment 
Order when there has not been 
a supplier payment data 
confirmation is hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Cancel supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Not providing Supplier Payment 
Cancellation when there has 
not been product reception is 
hazardous 
Cancel supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Providing Supplier Payment 
Cancellation when there has 
been product validation, 
reception and supplier data 
confirmation is hazardous 
Cancel supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Not providing Supplier Payment 
Cancellation when there has 
not been product validation is 
hazardous 
Cancel supplier 
payment Plant 
Plant's 
Bank 
Not providing Supplier Payment 
Cancellation when there has 
not been a supplier payment 
data confirmation is hazardous 
Activate 
Purchase Order Plant Supplier 
Not providing Purchase Order 
Activation when there has been 
a confirmed requirement is 
hazardous 
Activate 
Purchase Order Plant Supplier 
Providing Purchase Order 
Activation when there has not 
been a confirmed requirement 
is hazardous 
Activate 
Purchase Order Plant Supplier 
Providing Purchase Order 
Activation before there has 
been a confirmed requirement 
is hazardous 
Activate 
Purchase Order Plant Supplier 
Providing Purchase Order 
Activation when the supplier 
has not been confirmed is 
hazardous 
Activate 
Purchase Order Plant Supplier 
Providing Purchase Order 
Activation before the supplier 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
has been confirmed is 
hazardous 
Cancel 
Purchase Order Plant Supplier 
Providing Purchase Order 
Cancellation when the purchase 
order is correct is hazardous 
Cancel 
Purchase Order Plant Supplier 
Not providing Purchase Order 
Cancellation when the supply 
process is incorrect is hazardous 
Cancel 
Purchase Order Plant Supplier 
Providing Purchase Order 
Cancellation after pickup has 
been executed is hazardous 
Validate 
Product Plant Supplier 
Not providing Product 
Validation when there has been 
a product and documentation 
reception is hazardous 
Validate 
Product Plant Supplier 
Providing Product Validation 
when there has not been a 
product and documentation 
reception is hazardous 
Validate 
Product Plant Supplier 
Providing Product Validation 
with the wrong documentation 
is hazardous 
Validate 
Product Plant Supplier 
Providing Product Validation 
before there has been a 
product and documentation 
reception is hazardous 
Validate 
Product Plant Supplier 
Providing Product Validation 
without quality approval is 
hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Not providing product delivery 
when a schedule has been 
agreed is hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery 
when a schedule has not been 
agreed is hazardous 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 533 of 620 
CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery with 
the wrong documentation is 
hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery 
when the address has not been 
confirmed is hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery 
when the address data has 
been changed is hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery to 
the incorrect address is 
hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery 
before a schedule has been 
agreed is hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery 
before correct documentation 
has been issued is hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery 
before the correct address has 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Perform 
Delivery Transport Plant 
Providing product delivery 
when the product is incorrect is 
hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Not providing product reception 
when correct documentation 
and quality has been confirmed 
is hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception 
when the incorrect 
documentation has been 
received is hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception 
when quality testing has not 
been granted is hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception for 
the incorrect product is 
hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception 
when the supplier has not been 
confirmed is hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception 
after the order has been 
cancelled is hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception 
before the correct 
documentation has been 
received is hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception 
before the quality testing has 
been granted is hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception 
before the correct product has 
been identified is hazardous 
Receive 
product Plant Transport 
Providing product reception 
before the correct supplier has 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Not performing inbound check 
when the product and 
documentation has been 
received is hazardous 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Performing inbound check 
when the incorrect product has 
been identified is hazardous 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Performing inbound check 
when the incorrect 
documentation has been 
received is hazardous 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Performing inbound check with 
an incomplete process is 
hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Performing inbound check 
without the correct experience 
is hazardous 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Preforming inbound check 
before the correct product has 
been identified is hazardous 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Performing inbound check 
before the correct 
documentation has been 
received is hazardous 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Performing inbound check 
before the correct process has 
been completed is hazardous 
Perform 
inbound check Plant Transport 
Performing inbound check 
before the correct experience 
has been obtained is hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order Supplier Plant 
Not providing purchase order 
confirmation when the buyer, 
product and timeframes have 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order Supplier Plant 
Providing purchase order 
confirmation when the buyer 
has not been confirmed is 
hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order Supplier Plant 
Providing purchase order 
confirmation when the product 
has not been confirm is 
hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order Supplier Plant 
Providing purchase order 
confirmation when the 
timeframe has not been 
confirmed is hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order Supplier Plant 
Providing purchase order 
confirmation before the buyer 
has been confirmed is 
hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Confirm 
Purchase Order Supplier Plant 
Providing purchase order 
confirmation before the 
product has been confirmed is 
hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order Supplier Plant 
Providing purchase order 
confirmation before the 
timeframe has been confirmed 
is hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order Supplier Plant 
Providing purchase order 
confirmation when the 
purchase order has been 
cancelled is hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order 
Cancellation 
Supplier Plant 
Not providing purchase order 
cancellation when the 
instruction ahs been sent by 
buyer is hazardous 
Confirm 
Purchase Order 
Cancellation 
Supplier Plant 
Providing purchase order 
cancellation when the 
instruction has not been issued 
by the buyer is hazardous 
Send 
Documentation Supplier Plant 
Not providing product 
documentation when the 
product pickup takes place is 
hazardous 
Send 
Documentation Supplier Plant 
Providing product 
documentation to the wrong 
buyer can be hazardous 
Send 
Documentation Supplier Plant 
Providing product 
documentation before the 
correct buyer data has been 
confirmed is hazardous 
Send 
Documentation Supplier Plant 
Providing transport 
documentation before the 
correct transport agent data 
has been confirmed is 
hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Send 
Documentation Supplier Plant 
Providing incomplete product 
documentation is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Not providing transport 
payment order when there a 
product delivery confirmation is 
hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing the transport 
payment order to the wrong 
Transport Agent is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing transport payment 
order for the incorrect amount 
is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing transport payment 
order without the 
documentation is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing the transport 
payment order before the 
transport Agent Data has been 
confirmed is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing the transport order 
payment without having 
confirmed Transport agent Data 
is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing the transport 
payment order before the 
correct documentation has 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Cancellation 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Not providing transport 
payment order cancellation 
when there has been an 
incorrect/incomplete product 
delivery, is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Cancellation 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing transport payment 
order cancellation when there 
has been correct/complete 
product delivery, is hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Cancellation 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing transport payment 
order cancellation when there 
has been a false report of 
incomplete product delivery is 
hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Cancellation 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing transport payment 
order cancellation before the 
correct product delivery has 
been confirmed, is hazardous 
Confirm 
Transport 
Payment Order 
Cancellation 
Supplier's 
Bank Supplier 
Providing transport payment 
order cancellation before the 
incomplete product delivery has 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Order 
Transport 
Payment 
Supplier Supplier's Bank 
Not providing transport 
payment order 
Transfer funds 
to Transport 
Supplier's 
Bank Transport 
Not providing transfer of funds 
to transport when delivery has 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to Transport 
Supplier's 
Bank Transport 
Providing transfer of funds to 
transport when delivery has not 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to Transport 
Supplier's 
Bank Transport 
Providing transfer of funds to 
transport before delivery has 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to Transport 
Supplier's 
Bank Transport 
Providing transfer of funds to 
transport after a faulty 
reception has been confirmed is 
hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to Transport 
Supplier's 
Bank Transport 
Providing transfer of funds to 
transport before the correct 
transport agent data has been 
confirmed, is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to Transport 
Supplier's 
Bank Transport 
Providing transfer of funds to 
transport to the incorrect 
transport agent is hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Transfer funds 
to Transport 
Supplier's 
Bank Transport 
Providing transfer if funds for 
the incorrect amount is 
hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to Transport 
Supplier's 
Bank Transport 
Providing transfer of funds 
before the correct payment 
amount has been confirmed is 
hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to supplier 
Plant's 
Bank 
Supplier's 
Bank 
Not providing transfer of funds 
to supplier when there has 
been confirmation of delivery is 
hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to supplier 
Plant's 
Bank 
Supplier's 
Bank 
Providing transfer of funds to 
supplier when delivery has not 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to supplier 
Plant's 
Bank 
Supplier's 
Bank 
Providing transfer of funds to 
supplier to the incorrect 
supplier is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to supplier 
Plant's 
Bank 
Supplier's 
Bank 
Providing transfer of funds to 
supplier for the incorrect 
amount is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to supplier 
Plant's 
Bank 
Supplier's 
Bank 
Providing transfer of funds to 
supplier before delivery has 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to supplier 
Plant's 
Bank 
Supplier's 
Bank 
Providing transfer of funds to 
supplier after a faulty reception 
is hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to supplier 
Plant's 
Bank 
Supplier's 
Bank 
Providing transfer of funds to 
supplier before the correct 
supplier has been confirmed is 
hazardous 
Transfer funds 
to supplier 
Plant's 
Bank 
Supplier's 
Bank 
Providing transfer of funds to 
supplier before the correct 
payment amount has been 
confirmed is hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Not providing a service order 
activation when there has been 
a purchase order confirmation 
is hazardous 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Providing a service order 
activation when there has not 
been a purchase order 
confirmation, is hazardous 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Providing a service order 
activation before there has 
been a purchase order 
confirmation is hazardous 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Providing a service order 
activation when there has not 
been a purchase order 
cancellation is hazardous 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Providing a service order 
activation when there has not 
been a transport agent 
confirmation is hazardous 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Providing a service order 
activation after there has been 
a purchase order cancellation is 
hazardous 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Providing a service order 
activation to the wrong 
transport agent is hazardous 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Providing a service order 
activation before there has 
been a transport agent 
confirmation is hazardous 
Activate 
Service Order Supplier Transport 
Providing a service order 
confirmation before  the correct 
transport agent has been 
identified is hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Cancel Service 
Order Supplier Transport 
Not providing service order 
cancellation when there has 
been a purchase order 
cancellation is hazardous 
Cancel Service 
Order Supplier Transport 
Providing service order 
cancellation when there has 
been a false Purchase Order 
Cancellation is hazardous 
Cancel Service 
Order Supplier Transport 
Providing service order 
cancellation before there has 
been a confirmation of 
purchase order cancellation is 
hazardous 
Cancel Service 
Order Supplier Transport 
Providing service order 
cancellation after there has 
been product pickup is 
hazardous 
Cancel Service 
Order Supplier Transport 
Providing service order 
cancellation to the wrong 
service order is hazardous 
Cancel Service 
Order Supplier Transport 
Providing service order 
cancellation by multiple persons 
is hazardous 
Handover 
transport 
documentation 
to transport 
Supplier Transport 
Not providing transport 
documentation when the 
product pickup takes place is 
hazardous 
Handover 
transport 
documentation 
to transport 
Supplier Transport Providing incomplete transport documentation is hazardous 
Handover 
transport 
documentation 
to transport 
Supplier Transport 
Providing transport 
documentation to the wrong 
transport agency is hazardous 
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CA Description Source Destination UCA 
Handover 
transport 
documentation 
to transport 
Supplier Transport 
Providing transport 
documentation before the 
correct transport agent has 
been confirmed is hazardous 
Handover 
transport 
documentation 
to transport 
Supplier Transport 
Providing transport 
documentation before it has 
been checked for completeness 
is hazardous 
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11.4 Time series for sales and Profit Gap 
Mes Sales Gap Profit Gap 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
2 -0,05 -0,1 
3 -0,3 -0,25 
4 -0,7 -0,36 
5 -0,75 -0,5 
6 -0,8 -0,55 
7 -0,65 -0,6 
8 -0,4 -0,8 
9 -0,15 -0,95 
10 -0,17 -1,22 
11 0,05 -1,5 
12 0 -1,35 
13 0,02 -1,4 
14 0 -1,3 
15 -0,02 -1,2 
16 0 -1,15 
17 -0,04 -1,03 
18 0 -1 
19 0 -0,8 
20 0 -0,85 
21 0,02 -0,8 
22 0,04 -0,7 
23 0 -0,6 
24 0,02 -0,55 
25 0 -0,48 
26 0 -0,49 
27 -0,03 -0,46 
28 0 -0,44 
29 -0,03 -0,42 
30 0 -0,48 
31 0 -0,3 
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Mes Sales Gap Profit Gap 
32 0,01 -0,4 
33 0 -0,4 
34 -0,03 -0,41 
35 -0,04 -0,38 
36 0 -0,3 
37 0 -0,31 
38 0 -0,25 
39 0,02 -0,26 
40 0,04 -0,27 
41 0,04 -0,27 
42 -0,01 -0,26 
43 0 -0,26 
44 -0,04 -0,3 
45 0 -0,25 
46 0 -0,24 
47 -0,01 -0,24 
48 0 -0,23 
49 0,03 -0,2 
50 0 -0,08 
51 0 -0,1 
52 0 -0,06 
53 -0,05 -0,05 
54 -0,04 -0,02 
55 0 0 
56 0 -0,06 
57 0,01 0,03 
58 0 -0,02 
59 0,03 0 
60 0 0 
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11.5 Dynamic model equations 
Actual Costs= 
 Marketing Promotion*Marketing Rate+10*Resources 
Units: USD/Month 
Costs in the company, simplified as consisting of resource costs plus IP management 
costs 
 
Actual Profit= 
 Actual Sales-Actual Costs 
Units: USD/Month 
Actual profit level, calculated as the difference between Actual Sales and Actual 
Costs. 
 
Actual Sales= 
 Demand*Effect of Demand 
Units: USD/Month 
Actual sales resulting from a demand. 
 
Alpha= 
 0.4 
Units: Dmnl [0,3,0.01] 
Cobb-Douglas Exponent 
 
Cobb Constant= 
 8.5 
Units: USD/(Month*IPUnits) 
Cobb-Douglas Constant 
 
Customer Adjustment Time= 
 6 
Units: Month 
Time over which the demand is adjusted as a result of Marketing efforts 
 
Customer Change Rate= 
 (Target Demand-Demand)/Customer Adjustment Time 
Units: USD/(Month*Month) 
Rate of change in the demand 
 
Demand=  
INTEG (Customer Change Rate, 22106.1) 
Units: USD/Month 
Demand level as a rate of purchase per month 
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Effect of Demand= 
 0.2 
Units: Dmnl [0,5,0.1] 
The effect of demand on sales is consdiered as proportional. 
 
Exclusive IP=  
INTEG ("R&D Projects"-IP Rights Expiration, 0.4*Planned IP*IP 
Lifetime/(IP Lifetime+IP Creation Time)) 
Units: IPUnits 
Exclusive IP in the company 
 
Expected Sales= 
 4421.21 
Units: USD/Month 
Expected Sales according to company planning 
 
IP Creation Time= 
 6 
Units: Month 
Average time that it takes the researcher to develop an IPUnit 
 
IP Gap= 
 MAX(0,Planned IP-Exclusive IP) 
Units: IPUnits 
Difference between the planned Exclusive IP level and the Actual exclusive IP level 
 
IP Lifetime= 
 240 
Units: Month 
Average number of months that ABC industries has property over its IP. Considered 
as 20 years. 
 
IP Rights Expiration= 
 Exclusive IP/IP Lifetime 
Units: IPUnits/Month 
Rate of expiration of IP Units. 
 
Marketing Factor= 
 2000 
Units: USD/(Month*Hours) [0,10000,100] 
Effect on the resulting demand.as USD/Month of each hour of Marketing effort 
 
Marketing Promotion=  
INTEG (Marketing Promotion change rate, 0) 
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Units: Hours 
Number of marketing hours 
 
Marketing Promotion adjustment time= 
 12 
Units: Month 
Time required by the marketing departmetn to adjust the marketing efforts. 
Normally based in an annual plan 
 
Marketing Promotion change rate= 
 (10*Required Marketing-Marketing Promotion)/Marketing 
Promotion adjustment time 
Units: Hours/Month 
Change rate at which the marketing hours are adjusted 
 
Marketing Rate= 
 0.5 
Units: USD/(Hours*Month) 
Rate at which Marketing service are hired. 
 
Planned IP= 
 1000 
Units: IPUnits 
Number of IP units that are expected to account for a big enough differentiation that 
results in the expected sales level 
 
"R&D Effectiveness"= 
 0.02 
Units: IPUnits/(USD*Researcher) 
The number of IP units that can be produced by each researcher and by each dollar 
invested. 
 
"R&D Projects"= 
 MIN(Resources*"R&D Effectiveness"*Actual Profit,IP Gap/IP 
Creation Time) 
Units: IPUnits/Month 
Rate of Production of IP. This is determined as the minimum between the available 
producion due to the available profit and the required IP production. 
 
Required Marketing=  
WITH LOOKUP (Sales Gap,([(-1.4,0)-(1,21)],(-1.4,20),(-1.30581,20), (-
1.09602,19.25), (-0.916208,16.6711),(-0.809174,13.0789),(-0.749235,8.8421),(-
0.646483,4.69737),(0.535168,2.30263),(-0.346789,0.552632),(-
0.119878,0.0921053),(0,0),(1,0) )) 
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Units: Hours 
Required marketing as resulting from the underlying Sales Gap 
 
Resources= 
 50 
Units: Researcher 
Number of R&D researchers available in the company 
 
Sales Gap= 
 (Actual Sales-Expected Sales)/Expected Sales 
Units: USD/Month 
Sales gap as the difference between expected and actual sales levels 
 
Target Demand= 
 Cobb Constant*(Exclusive IP^Alpha)*(5000^(1-Alpha))+ 
Marketing Promotion*Marketing Factor 
Units: USD/Month 
Expected demand as a result of the marketing and the exclusive IP 
 
  
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 549 of 620 
11.6 Scientific Papers 
Five of the papers that were developed during the thesis project 
are shared in this section to convey the extent of the work carried 
out during the PhD project. The aim of these papers was to engage 
with the relevant communities during the research process by 
sharing the current state of the project’s research. 
Paper 1 (P1) is a journal paper titled “Supply chain cyber-
resilience: creating an agenda for future research”, and it 
contains the first results of a structured literature review in 2015 
to evaluate the applicability of resilience frameworks to cyber-
risks. This review is later updated and expanded in Chapter 0 of 
the thesis to contain articles up to 2017 and to evaluate specifically 
cyber-resilience frameworks. 
Paper 2 (P2) is a journal paper titled “An endogenous exposure 
calculation method for cyber-risk assessment in supply chains”, 
and it contains the results of the application of a modified STPA 
method as presented in section 5.2 of this thesis, explaining the 
process of endogenous exposure calculation. 
Paper 3 (P3) is a conference paper titled “Extending supply 
chain risk and resilience frameworks to manage cyber risk”, and 
it contains the results of initial research into the use of systems 
thinking for understanding cyber-risk, both from the point of view 
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of causal analysis as later developed in section 6.4 of this thesis, 
and the dynamic simulation of behaviour, theme identified in the 
SLR (section 2.9.2). 
Paper 4 (P4) is a conference paper titled “Control structures in 
supply chains as a way to manage unpredictable cyber-risks” and 
contains the partial results of research about the use of control 
structures, applied in this thesis both for the case of systemic risk 
analysis (see section 5.2) and dynamic modelling (see section 6.5). 
Paper 5 (P5) is a conference paper titled “A system dynamics 
case study of resilient response to IP theft from a cyber-attack” 
and contains the partial results of a case study, shown in detail in 
Chapter 0 of this thesis. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 551 of 620 
11.6.1 Paper 1 
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11.6.2 Paper 2 
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11.6.3 Paper 3 
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11.6.4 Paper 4 
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11.6.5 Paper 5 
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11.7 Complete list of articles in the synthesis sample 
Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
2000 
International 
Journal of Physical 
Distribution & 
Logistics 
Management 
Journal Article 
Warren, M. and Hutchinson, W., 
2000. Cyber-attacks against supply 
chain management systems: a short 
note. International Journal of 
Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 30(7/8), pp.710-716. 
2002 
International 
Journal of Physical 
Distribution & 
Logistics 
Management 
Journal Article 
Williams, L.R., Esper, T.L. and 
Ozment, J., 2002. The electronic 
supply chain: Its impact on the 
current and future structure of 
strategic alliances, partnerships and 
logistics leadership. International 
Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, 32(8), 
pp.703-719. 
2006 Risk analysis Journal Article 
Andrijcic, E. and Horowitz, B., 
2006. A Macro‐Economic 
Framework for Evaluation of 
Cyber-security Risks Related to 
Protection of Intellectual Property. 
Risk analysis, 26(4), pp.907-923. 
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Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
2006 
Quality of 
Protection 
Journal Article 
McQueen, M.A., Boyer, W.F., 
Flynn, M.A. and Beitel, G.A., 
2006. Time-to-compromise model 
for cyber-risk reduction estimation. 
In Quality of Protection (pp. 49-
64). Springer, Boston, MA. 
2010 Report Journal Article 
Goldman, H.G., 2010. Building 
secure, resilient architectures for 
cyber mission assurance. The 
MITRE Corporation. 
2011 
In Internet of 
things 
(iThings/CPSCom) 
Conference 
Article 
Zhu, B., Joseph, A. and Sastry, S., 
2011, October. A taxonomy of 
cyber attacks on SCADA systems. 
In Internet of things 
(iThings/CPSCom), 2011 
international conference on and 4th 
international conference on cyber, 
physical and social computing (pp. 
380-388). IEEE. 
2011 
In Technologies 
for Homeland 
Security (HST) 
Conference 
Article 
Goldman, H., McQuaid, R. and 
Picciotto, J., 2011, November. 
Cyber-resilience for mission 
assurance. In Technologies for 
Homeland Security (HST), 2011 
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Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
IEEE International Conference on 
(pp. 236-241). IEEE 
2011 
In Decision and 
Control and 
European Control 
Conference (CDC-
ECC) 
Conference 
Article 
Zhu, Q. and Başar, T., 2011, 
December. Robust and resilient 
control design for cyber-physical 
systems with an application to 
power systems. In Decision and 
Control and European Control 
Conference (CDC-ECC), 2011 
50th IEEE Conference on (pp. 
4066-4071). IEEE. 
2012 Network Security Journal Article 
de Crespigny, M., 2012. Building 
cyber-resilience to tackle threats. 
Network Security, 2012(4), pp.5-8. 
2012 
In Intelligence and 
Security 
Informatics 
Conference 
(EISIC) 
Conference 
Article 
Rajamäki, J., Rathod, P., Ahlgren, 
A., Aho, J., Takari, M. and 
Ahlgren, S., 2012, August. 
Resilience of cyber-physical 
system: A case study of safe school 
environment. In Intelligence and 
Security Informatics Conference 
(EISIC), 2012 European (pp. 285-
285). IEEE. 
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Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
2013 
Environment 
Systems and 
Decisions 
Journal Article 
Kelic, A., Collier, Z.A., Brown, C., 
Beyeler, W.E., Outkin, A.V., 
Vargas, V.N., Ehlen, M.A., Judson, 
C., Zaidi, A., Leung, B. and 
Linkov, I., 2013. Decision 
framework for evaluating the 
macroeconomic risks and policy 
impacts of cyber attacks. 
Environment Systems and 
Decisions, 33(4), pp.544-560. 
2013 
Environment 
Systems and 
Decisions 
Journal Article 
Collier, Z.A., Linkov, I. and 
Lambert, J.H., 2013. Four domains 
of cybersecurity: a risk-based 
systems approach to cyber 
decisions. Environment Systems 
and Decisions, 4(33), pp.469-470. 
2013 
Environment 
Systems and 
Decisions 
Journal Article 
Linkov, I., Eisenberg, D.A., 
Plourde, K., Seager, T.P., Allen, J. 
and Kott, A., 2013. Resilience 
metrics for cyber systems. 
Environment Systems and 
Decisions, 33(4), pp.471-476. 
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Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
2013 
In Nordic 
Conference on 
Secure IT Systems 
Conference 
Article 
Krotofil, M. and Cárdenas, A.A., 
2013, October. Resilience of 
process control systems to cyber-
physical attacks. In Nordic 
Conference on Secure IT Systems 
(pp. 166-182). Springer, Berlin, 
Heidelberg. 
2013 
Information & 
Security 
Journal Article 
Urciuoli, L., Männistö, T., Hintsa, 
J. and Khan, T., 2013. Supply 
Chain Cyber-security-Potential 
Threats. Information & Security, 
29(1), p.51. 
2013 Politics Journal Article 
Herrington, L. and Aldrich, R., 
2013. The future of cyber-
resilience in an age of global 
complexity. Politics, 33(4), pp.299-
310. 
2013 
In Technologies 
for Homeland 
Security (HST) 
Conference 
Article 
Ramuhalli, P., Halappanavar, M., 
Coble, J. and Dixit, M., 2013, 
November. Towards a theory of 
autonomous reconstitution of 
compromised cyber-systems. In 
Technologies for Homeland 
Security (HST), 2013 IEEE 
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Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
International Conference on (pp. 
577-583). IEEE. 
2013 
Environment 
Systems and 
Decisions 
Journal Article 
Pawlak, P. and Wendling, C., 2013. 
Trends in cyberspace: can 
governments keep up?. 
Environment Systems and 
Decisions, 33(4), pp.536-543. 
2014 
The Electricity 
Journal 
Journal Article 
Onyeji, I., Bazilian, M. and Bronk, 
C., 2014. Cyber-security and 
critical energy infrastructure. The 
Electricity Journal, 27(2), pp.52-
60. 
2014 
Journal of business 
continuity & 
emergency 
planning 
Journal Article 
Mallinder, J. and Drabwell, P., 
2014. Cyber security: A critical 
examination of information sharing 
versus data sensitivity issues for 
organisations at risk of cyber 
attack. Journal of business 
continuity & emergency planning, 
7(2), pp.103-111. 
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Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
2014 Technovation Journal Article 
Boyson, S., 2014. Cyber supply 
chain risk management: 
Revolutionizing the strategic 
control of critical IT systems. 
Technovation, 34(7), pp.342-353. 
2014 Computer Journal Article 
Collier, Z.A., DiMase, D., Walters, 
S., Tehranipoor, M.M., Lambert, 
J.H. and Linkov, I., 2014. 
Cybersecurity standards: managing 
risk and creating resilience. 
Computer, 47(9), pp.70-76. 
2014 
Journal of business 
continuity & 
emergency 
planning 
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pp.382-384. 
2014 Technovation Journal Article 
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7(34), pp.392-393. 
2014 
Journal of business 
continuity & 
emergency 
planning 
Journal Article 
Hult, F. and Sivanesan, G., 2014. 
What good cyber-resilience looks 
like. Journal of business continuity 
& emergency planning, 7(2), 
pp.112-125. 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 606 of 620 
Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
2015 
International 
Journal of 
Computer 
Networks & 
Communications 
Journal Article 
Abraham, S. and Nair, S., 2015. A 
PREDICTIVE FRAMEWORK 
FOR CYBER SECURITY 
ANALYTICS USING ATTACK 
GRAPHS. International Journal of 
Computer Networks & 
Communications, 7(1), p.1. 
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Kohnke, A., 2017. Cyber-
resilience: Rethinking 
Cybersecurity Strategy to Build a 
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the cyber-resilience of industrial 
control systems. International 
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Neuman, C., 2016. Resilience 
Evaluation of Demand Response as 
  
PhD Thesis: Managing cyber-risk and security in the global supply chain 
Page 614 of 620 
Year Journal Type (J/C/B) Citation (Harvard) 
Spinning Reserve under Cyber-
Physical Threats. Electronics, 6(1), 
p.2. 
2017 
International 
Journal of 
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Pan, Y., White, J., Schmidt, D.C., 
Elhabashy, A., Sturm, L., Camelio, 
J. and Williams, C., 2017. 
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International Journal of Interactive 
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IEEE Transactions 
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Jin, D., Li, Z., Hannon, C., Chen, 
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Lee, C.W., 2017. Towards a Cyber 
Resilient and Secure Microgrid 
Using Software-Defined 
Networking. IEEE Transactions on 
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11.8 Python routine XML-Data 
# Python routine written to read the xml Tree structure 
# that comes out of a XSTAMPP file 
 
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET 
import csv 
 
tree = ET.parse("XSTAMPP-Data.hazx") 
root = tree.getroot() 
 
# open a file for writing 
data = open('Data-Out.csv', 'w') 
 
chosen_set=["number","title","description","id"] 
chosen_tree = 'controlaction' 
chosen_subset=["description","id","number","type"] 
chosen_subtree= 'unsafecontrolaction' 
 
# create the csv writer object 
csvwriter = csv.writer(data) 
 
#data_head = [] 
 
#count = 0 
 
for attribute in root: 
 dataline =[]  
 for item in attribute.iter('controlaction'): 
  for subitem in item.iter('unsafecontrolactions'): 
   for param_value in 
subitem.iter('unsafecontrolaction'): 
    value 
=param_value.text 
    datapoint = value
  dataline.append(datapoint) 
 csvwriter.writerow(dataline) 
data.close() 
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11.9 Research Protocol: Systemic Risk Analysis 
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